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Plato’s Orpheus: The Philosophical Appropriation of Orphic Formulae
By
Dannu J. Hütwohl

B.A., Classical Studies, University of New Mexico, 2012
M.A., Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, University of New Mexico, 2016
Abstract
In this project I explore Plato’s deployment and transposition of Orphic
eschatological ideas through his incorporation of Orphic formulae, based on the Olbian
Tablets and Orphic Gold Tablets, into his philosophical settings throughout his dialogues.
I show how Plato deploys Orphic formulae throughout his dialogues in order to promote
his philosophy, which points to Plato’s knowledge of Orphic doctrine.
First I analyze Plato’s use of specific terminology and formulae in eschatological
contexts. Then I look specifically at the Orphic term poinē in terms of the Orphic myth of
Dionysus. I contend with the arguments of Edmonds who redefines the Greek word poinē
as time in order to discredit the existence of an Orphic doctrine. I survey the use of the
Greek word poinē in Homer, Pindar, Plato, the Derveni Papyrus and the Gurôb Papyrus
in order to demonstrate that poinē points to the cohesiveness and integrity of the Orphic
doctrine.
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Plato’s Orpheus: The Philosophical Appropriation of Orphic
Formulae

Introduction: Orphic Mythology and Sources
The mythological biography of the legendary figure Orpheus unfolds in several
Greek myths. Orpheus was the son of Apollo, and was famed for his music (Pindar,
Pythian 4.176-177; Euripides, Alcestis 357-362). Orpheus provided his harmonious
sounds to protect the Argonauts from the Sirens (Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica
4.890-920), and was a magician with mystical powers over nature (Simonides fr. 567
PMG). With these gifts Orpheus descended into the realm of Hades to retrieve his dead
wife (Plato, Symposium 179d), but he was subsequently dismembered at the hands of
Bacchic women (Pseudo-Eratosthenes, Katasterismi 24). This elusive biography of the
culture hero Orpheus provided the background for an initiatory cult dedicated to death,
rebirth and the salvation of the soul, but the identity of Orpheus as man or myth continues
to elude scholars.
Orphic literature consists of a substantial collection of extant and fragmentary
texts—the Hymns, Krater, Lithica, and Argonautica—as well as testimonia concerning a
broad range of themes associated with the mythical Orpheus or Mystery rites in general.
Gottfried Hermann first published both the extant Orphic texts and fragments in his
Orphica, “Orphic references” (1805), but when the debate over Orphism became the
subject of philology, Otto Kern then exclusively assembled the Orphic fragments under
the name Orphicorum fragmenta (1922), which included both Classical and Hellenistic
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authors, such as Plato’s Orphica as well as references to Orpheus in the Neo-Platonic
scholia. These fragments include references to the mythological biography of Orpheus,
his Katabasis and return from the dead, Neo-Platonic scholia on the myth of DionysusZagreus, and references to the origin and fate of the soul.
The most contentious issue surrounding Orphic scholarship is the question of
whether this collection of fragments and complete Orphic texts can be considered reliable
evidence for an Orphic cult of community defined by a certain set of beliefs and
practices. The designation of the Orphic texts as representing a “system” of thought has
been argued through the appearance of various eschatological doctrines evident in the
texts, including discussions of the topography of an afterlife world (Hades, Elysium) and
the consequent punishment for uninitiated or reward for initiates, depending on a
person’s conduct during life. In addition, the Orphic system contained soteriological
doctrines, such as ideas about the immortality of the soul, reincarnation, and the divine
origin of humankind through the savior god Dionysus. Moreover, Orphic texts promote
cultivation of the soul over the body through ritual purifications and vegetarianism and
other dietary restrictions. Although scholarship on the Orphic texts is vast, the spectrum
of Orphic scholarship can be separated into two methodically opposed camps: the
minimalists (including Wilamowitz, Linforth, West, and Edmonds III) who deny the
existence of an Orphic cult because they believe the evidence for such a historical cult is
unreliable; and the maximalists (including Kern, Rohde, Guthrie, and Bernabé) who
believe the evidence for a historical cult of Orpheus is reliable and substantiates the
existence of an initiatory cult whose practices and tenets can be traced and identified.
With such a broad range of texts attributed to the Orphic movement, one general problem
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in Orphic scholarship is how to define Orphism: either as a collection of texts associated
with the name Orpheus or as a collection of texts testifying to an established cult.
The Orphic debate has been transformed in recent years by archeological
discoveries such as the Gold Tablets,1 the Derveni Papyrus,2 the Gûrob Papyrus,3 and an
Olbian bone tablet,4 which appear to be some of the oldest “Orphic” remains. The Orphic
Hymns, the Orphic Argonautica, and cosmological treatises such as the Rhapsodies are
typically considered to be later Hellenistic and Imperial creations. Bernabé’s Teubner
edition (2004, 2005) of the Orphicorum fragmenta includes the most recent archeological
discoveries dating back to the beginnings of Orphic scholarship in the late nineteenth
century. This new evidence offers insight into the scheme and geography of the Orphic
underworld, the interview with Persephone, and even Orphic allegorizing and ritual. In
my thesis (see overview of Chapter 1 below), I will argue that these recent archaeological
discoveries, unavailable to the earlier skeptics like Wilamowitz and Linforth, support the
claim that the Orphic texts testify to an established cult with a definite body of beliefs and
doctrines. My thesis will be concerned with the influence of this body of “Orphic” beliefs
and doctrines had upon the thought and writings of Plato.

1

See Graf and Johnston 2007: 52-56 for a history of discovery and publication of the Gold Tablets. Our
earliest information about the tablets dates to 1834, but some tablets did not receive publication until 1999:
e.g., Graf and Johnston 2007: 42 (Tablet 33, Pella/Dion 3).
2
The Derveni Papyrus was discovered in 1962, but not officially published until 2006: see Kouremenos,
Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou 2006, and the review by R. Janko BMCR 2006.10.29
(http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2006/2006-10-29.html).
3
Originally published in 1921: Graf and Johnston 2007: 150-155, 211n90 with bibliography.
4
A number of bone tablets were discovered in Olbia in 1951, but not published until 1978: See West 1982,
Zhmud’ 1992.
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Plato’s Orphica: An Introduction
Plato’s Orphica comprise a critical portion of the Orphicorum fragmenta, which
has long led scholars to debate Plato’s role in disseminating Orphic beliefs. Plato’s
Orphica consists of explicit and implicit references to Orpheus as a mythological
character and his Mystery rites. The perplexing question concerning scholars who study
Plato’s Orphica is: why does Plato often represent Orpheus in a negative light, but then
elsewhere champion Orphic beliefs? For instance, Plato praises “the Orphic life” and its
abstention from eating meat (Laws 782c), yet he rebukes the traveling priests who
promise knowledge by providing a “bushel of Orphic books” (Republic 364e). Plato
speaks of souls passing through cycles of incarnation and judgment (Republic 615b,
Phaedrus 249)—an idea attributed to Orphic beliefs in the salvation of the soul. But in
his Myth of Er the soul of Orpheus chooses to incarnate as a swan because of his
animosity for the women who killed him (Republic 620a), which suggests Orpheus
himself was not free from the cycle of incarnations his cult promised. Elsewhere, Plato
alludes to the Orphic Katabasis (Symposium 179d) and remarks on Orpheus’ cowardice.
Nevertheless he includes Orpheus among poets famed for song (Ion 533b-c), and honors
him along with Homer and Hesiod (Protagoras 316d). The dichotomy between esteem
and criticism is a prevalent theme with Plato’s representation of Orpheus and Orphism.
The question of Plato’s view of Orpheus and Orphism is significant, for Plato
does indeed make reference to specific Orphic doctrines. In one dialogue, he reveals an
Orphic belief that the soul is prisoner to the body, engages in etymological speculation
about the meaning of the word sōma “body/tomb” (Cratylus 400b-c), and goes on to
quote two lines from an Orphic poem (Cratylus 402b). As I will argue, Plato’s critical
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engagement with original Orphic texts suggests he is employing his philosophical method
to reading Orphic doctrine. A fragment of Pindar preserved in Plato’s Meno (81b-c),
which describes Persephone immortalizing the souls of men, has been considered by
some scholars to be a reference to the Orphic aitiological myth of the dismemberment of
Dionysus-Zagreus. After recounting the myth of Persephone, Plato affirms τὸ μανθάνειν
ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἐστίν, “learning is absolutely recollection” (Phaedo 82d).5 In other
words, once again Plato seems to be referring to a piece of Orphic eschatological thought,
and connects it to a theory of anamnesis that is fundamental for his own philosophical
thought about memory and knowledge (detailed, for instance, in the Meno, Gorgias,
Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic). John Palmer, a scholar who has worked extensively on
Plato and the Pre-Socratic philosophical tradition, associates the idea of Plato’s
anamnesis with the function of memory on the Gold Tablets when he argues that both
Phaedrus and Republic have a common source in the Orphic afterlife depicted on the
Tablets.6 Both the Orphic and Platonic afterlifes offer similar views in which memory
plays the key role in achieving communion with the divine or access to the afterlife.
Plato’s ἀνάμνησις “recollection” (Phaedrus 249b-d) for the philosopher is a
development of the mnemonic devices used by the Orphic initiates to ensure their
blessings in the afterlife.7 Plato’s interest can be investigated through a comparison of the
views of the afterlife and eschatology in both Plato’s writings and the surviving Orphic
texts.
Eschatology is the study of beliefs in an afterlife: death, judgment, and the destiny
of the soul. The Gold Tablets are the most insightful evidence for Orphic eschatology,
5

All translations are my own unless stated otherwise.
Palmer 1999: 22-23.
7
Graf and Johnson 2007: 94.
6
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and Plato’s views are represented in Republic, Gorgias, and Phaedo. Both the Orphic and
Platonic viewpoints draw upon and adopt from a stock of cultural and ritual beliefs.8 The
debate over the origins of Plato’s eschatology has fascinated scholars since the nineteenth
century. In his fundamental study of Greek and Christian apocalyptic religions, Albrecht
Dieterich (1893) argued that Plato reproduced an authentic Orphic eschatology, a position
taken up more recently by Peter Kingsley (1996).9 But E. R. Dodds (1951, rpt. 2002) and
Alberto Bernabé and Anna Isabel Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) favored the idea that
Plato created his own eschatology, borrowing elements from a variety of sources.10 W. K.
C. Guthrie, a historian of Greek philosophy and religion, moderately argued that Plato
merely “supplemented” Orphic religion.11 The American scholar Ivan Linforth doubted
that Plato borrowed from a single pre-existing “Orphic” belief system, and instead
proposed that Plato attributed to the single personage of Orpheus works belonging to a
larger group of poets and prophets associated with rites.12 In any case, as Erwin Rohde,
one of the great German Classical scholars of the nineteenth century, explained, we must
conclude that “Plato is following in the track of the theologians of earlier times.”13
Auguste Diès, a celebrated scholar of Plato’s life and works, first acknowledged
the influence of Orphic thought on Plato’s philosophy in contrast with the originality of
Plato’s philosophy.14 He argued that Plato transposed the religious and initiatory
doctrines of Orphism into the pursuit of philosophical perfection. Bernabé (2011) has
since inherited this position and further developed the theory of “transposition” (Diès’
8

Graf and Johnston 2007: 94.
Dieterich 1893: 113ff; Kingsley 1996: 115.
10
Dodds 2002: 373; Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 54.
11
Guthrie 1993: 243.
12
Linforth 1941: 281.
13
Rohde 1925: 468.
14
Diès 1927: 444. On Diès’ stature in Platonic studies, see P. Shorey’s review of his Platon (Paris: E.
Flammarion, 1930) in Classical Philology 25 (1930) 203.
9
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term) of religious language. Bernabé (2011, 2013) argues that Plato replaces the Orphic
life with the philosophic life. Instead of initiatory rights and purifications, Plato proclaims
moral obligations and philosophic perfection. The historian of philosophy Giovanni
Reale (1987) pointed out, “Without Orphism, we cannot explain Pythagoras, nor
Heraclitus, nor Empedocles, and naturally not Plato and whatever was derived from
him.”15 Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) recently elucidated how Plato “takes
concepts from Orphic doctrines and re-elaborates them in agreement with his own
theories, equating philosophical with mystery initiation.”16 While some scholars have
argued that Plato reproduced Orphic ideas of the afterlife or supplemented his dialogues
with Orphica, other scholars have focused on Plato’s Orphic criticism and argued that
Plato borrowed his eschatological themes from a variety of sources. For my part, I argue
in this thesis that Plato is not simply emulating and re-elaborating Orphic myths through
“transposition,” but rather that Plato’s dialogues are a direct continuation of the Orphic
mysteries and rites through the revised methodology of philosophy. Furthermore, I
explain Plato’s Orphic criticism to be a natural and expected outcome of the transposition
process. Therefore, I conclude that we can better read Plato with an understanding of
Orphism.
I answer the problem of Plato’s duplicitous Orphica by pointing out the harmony
between Plato’s eschatology and the afterlife depicted on the Gold Tablets. I demonstrate
how the Platonic doctrine of the soul was a philosophical development rooted in the
Orphic Mysteria. By comparing Orphic and Platonic eschatology, I indicate a direct line
of descent from the origins of Orphic Mysteria to the revolution of Platonic philosophy. I
15
16

Reale 1987: 15.
Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 76.
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build upon Diès’ theory of “transposition,” as well as Dieterich’s argument that Plato
reproduced Orphic myths. I argue that Plato critically engaged the mythological discourse
of Orpheus with his rational methods of dialectic because he adopted some Orphic beliefs
and disregarded others; consequently Plato reshaped the Orphic mythos as a way to
explain phenomenal and noumenal questions, such as the nature and fate of the soul.
Plato’s speculation of an immortal soul reuniting with the divine Forms was contrasted
with the shadowy Homeric soul dwelling in the eternal darkness of Hades. Orphism
provided Plato with a theoretical and mythological prerogative for disseminating his new
philosophy. Because Plato’s “immortal soul” exhibits similar traits to beliefs of the
Orphic movement, his Orphica is critical for defining and investigating Orphism.
Ultimately, I argue the eschatological system developed by Plato represents a theoretical
explication of the “metaphysical” doctrines of the Orphic Mysteries, which instructed its
initiates (μύστοι) in the arrheton “the unspeakable,” such as the myth of Chthonian
Dionysus-Zagreus and the immortality of the soul.17 Plato analyzed the teachings of the
Mysteries, systematically demonstrated Orphic eschatology through his dialogues, and
thereby continued the rites of Orphic initiation through philosophical dialectic.

Orphic Eschatology and Platonic Philosophy: An Introduction
In this project I explore Plato’s borrowing of Orphic themes and terminology
within eschatological contexts. In order to investigate Orphic eschatology it is necessary
to establish when Orphic belief in the afterlife emerged by first distinguishing between
the mythical Orpheus and the Orphic movement. Orpheus, as a mythico-historical figure,

17

Burkert 1985: 276.
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occupies a position in myth; his travels with the Argonauts (Pindar, Pyth. iv) established
him in the Heroic Age around the time of the Trojan War. Homer himself was silent
about Orpheus, yet the historian Hellanicus claimed Homer to be the genetic descendent
of Orpheus (FGrHist 4 F 5 Jacoby). By the sixth century BCE, the mythical Orpheus was
already ὀνομακλυτός, “famous in name,” according to Ibycus of Thegium (fr. 25 PMG).
Orphism as a cult appeared as early as the fifth century BCE when Herodotus (ii.81) first
attested to an Orphic ritual, associated the ritual with Pythagoras, and publicized the
Egyptian origins of the Orphic and Bacchic rites. The oldest Gold Tablet from
Hipponion, and the Olbian bone tablet, both date to the early fifth century BCE and assert
the genesis of an Orphic cult.
Orpheus’ historicity has always been contentious and confusing even for the
ancients. But the study of the Orphic cult, or “Orphism,” and specifically Plato’s Orphica
is not concerned entirely with Orpheus. The focus of my thesis is on the texts attributed
to Orpheus such as the Katabasis, the Hymns, and the Orphicorum fragmenta. I suggest
that the study of Orphism is the study of a collection of texts attached to the mythology of
Orpheus, rather than the study of a mythical personage. Although Martin West defined
Orphism as “the fashion for claiming Orpheus as an authority,”18 my investigation relies
on Linforth’s insightful definition:
If we must call something Orphism, it must be the entire religion of teletae and
mysteries with their magical ritual, the poems of Orpheus and others in which
their sacred myths are told, and the ideas concerning god and man which were
inherent in poems and ritual.19

18
19

West 1983: 3.
Linforth 1941: 173.
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Linforth’s definition suggests that the legendary figure known as Orpheus simply
represents the genesis of the Mysteries and its institutions within Greek culture, just as
Homer is not necessarily meant to be understood as a single personage, but rather as a
metonymic representation for the oral tradition which produced the Homeric epics.20
From this point of view I argue that Orphism is less about Orpheus as a mythological
figure, but rather that Orpheus and his mythology represent the Orphic tradition and its
specific doctrine. Orphism is the tradition of the teletae “the Mysteries,” and the extant
Orphic fragments testify to that tradition. Although Linforth was skeptical of Orphism as
an organized cult and he disregarded the Gold Tablets as evidence for Orphism, these
important archeological finds validate his definition of Orphism. As Rohde argued, “The
Orphic sect had a fixed and definite set of doctrines,” suggesting the Tablets would have
been part of such defined doctrine.21
I read the eschatological scheme of the Gold Tablets as reliable evidence for the
defined doctrine of Orphic thought. Because the eschatology of the Tablets associates
Eleusinian and Bacchic mysteries, I speak about Orphism as a reform of pre-existing
Eleusinian and Bacchic cults. Therefore I speak about the eschatology of Orphism as
including the beliefs of these other cults. In his magisterial study of Greek Religion,
Walter Burkert (1985) identified three schools within “the sphere of Orphica”22—the
Eleusinian, Bacchic, and Pythagorean—and in a later work suggested that Bacchic
mysteries could have been a substitute for Eleusinian mysteries in some places.23 Burkert

20

Nagy 1999: 79.
Rohde 1925: 338.
22
Burkert 1985: 300.
23
Burkert 1987: 38.
21
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even identified the extant Orphic hymns as part of the Bacchic mysteries,24 of which
Orpheus himself was thought to be the founder.25 This integration of Bacchic, Eleusinian,
and Orphic mysteries was made clear by the Gold Tablets, such as the lamella from
Hipponion, which addresses both μύσται καὶ βάκχοι, “Mystics and Bacchants!” (L1-6
Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal), as well as the beautiful Pelinna leaf which declares,
εἰπεῖν Περσεφόνᾳ σ᾽ ὅτι Β<άκ>χιος αὐτὸς ἔλυσε, “Tell Persephone that Bacchus
himself released you!” (L7a-b Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal). The Tablets are
evidence for the association between Bacchic and Eleusinian mysteries and their links to
Orphism. This association is also supported by the literary record. Euripides portrayed
Hippolytus as an Orphic hero who ascends the ranks of the Mysteries when he first sees
the holy rites at Eleusis (Hippolytus 24-25), and then becomes an Orphic-Bacchant (cf.
953-955).26 The ancients believed Orpheus instituted the Mysteries, and both the
archeological and literary evidence verify Orphism in the context with other known
mystery cults (Bacchic and Eleusinian). Therefore, I claim “Orphism” to be the
designation for the entire system of Mystery religions in the Greek world, whether it be
the branch of Eleusinian, Bacchic, or Pythagorean.
Scholars have long noticed the striking similarities between views of the afterlife
in the Orphic remains and the eschatology mapped out in the Platonic dialogues. While
some scholars27 have suggested that Plato directly borrowed from lost Orphic poems such

24

Burkert 1987: 18.
Cf. Rohde 1925: 335.
26
Barrett’s argument (1964: 342-343) that we should not take Hippolytus to be an actual Orphic in the play
does not vitiate my claim that Euripides’ rhetorical association between the Eleusinian mysteries and
Orphism points toward a real-life connection between the two cults.
27
Dieterich 1893: 72-83; Guthrie 1993: 176; West 1983: 11; Kingsley 1996: 115.
25
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as the Krater or Katabasis, other scholars28 have focused on the differences between the
Orphic and Platonic viewpoints in order to suggest that Plato borrowed from a variety of
sources that are not necessarily Orphic. The brilliant philologist Ulrich von WilamowitzMoellendorff ushered in an age of skepticism by affirming there was no such thing as
Orphism when he declared: “Orpheus ist darum noch kein Religionsstifter” [“Orpheus
therefore is not a religious founder”],29 and he argued against Dieterich’s comparisons
between Orphic and Platonic eschatology. Although Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal
pointed out the geographical similarity of the afterlife on the Gold Tablets and in Plato’s
dialogues,30 they rejected Guthrie’s conclusion that Plato relied on an Orphic κατάβασις
schematic for the afterlife,31 a view that was held by Dieterich32 and followed by
Harrison.33 Burkert proposed that the Orphic Katabasis would have been contemporary
with Homer’s Nekyia as an alternate mythological schematic for the afterlife.34 Most
recently, Kingsley argued against Wilamowitz that in fact the underworld myth in the
Phaedo “allows us to reconstruct a whole prehistory of Platonic myth.”35 Kingsley argued
that the original outline for Plato’s underworld must be based on a poem ascribed to
Orpheus.36 Kingsley suggested that if the motif of lying in the mud is Orphic, then the
entire geography of the Phaedo is also Orphic in origin.37 This argument is enhanced by
28

Wilamowitz 1931-1932: I.329; Thomas 1938; Dodds 1959: 373; Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal
2008: 54.
29
Wilamowitz 1931-1932: II.195.
30
Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 54.
31
Cf. Guthrie 1993: 177.
32
Dietrich 1893: 72-83.
33
Harrison 1922: 599.
34
Burkert 1985: 296. It has also been argued, however (cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 86-87, followed by
Johnston 1999) that Homer’s Nekyia was a sixth-century BCE interpolation by a commentator in the
tradition of Orphic mythopoeia. The Nekyia may have been based on a katabasis of Herakles, and thus
coincided with the appearance of Herakles’ apotheosis in the sixth century.
35
Kingsley 1996: 171, against Wilamowitz 1931-1932: I.329.
36
Kingsley 1996: 115.
37
Kingsley 1996: 119.
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Proclus’ testimony that the four rivers in the underworld of the Phaedo were interpreted
allegorically (Damascius, In Phaedonem 1.497.3-5 and 541.1-6). Furthermore, according
to Guthrie,38 “allegorical philology” was a key component of Orphism, as demonstrated
by the Derveni papyrus.
I propose that while Plato can appear critical of Orphism, he still uses an Orphic
schematic for his eschatology. Archaeology can help vindicate this claim. Although the
skeptical tradition was carried on by Linforth (1941) and still lingers, Wilamowitz (19311932) was hardly acquainted with all the evidence we possess today. In 1879 Domenico
Comparetti excavated the burial mounds of Thurii in southern Italy, which yielded the
first Gold Tablets.39 Since Comparetti, further Tablets have been discovered throughout
southern Italy and Greece.40 The Derveni Papyrus was discovered in a grave near
Thessaloniki in 1962 and finally published in 2006 (Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and
Tsantsanoglou 2006). The papyrus is a fifth-century BCE allegorical commentary on an
Orphic cosmological poem written in hexameter. The discovery of the Derveni Papyrus
clearly demonstrated that allegorizing Orphic poetry was extant long before Plato’s era
and was not merely a Neo-Platonic creation.41 Critics who are opposed to Plato’s direct
borrowing of an Orphic schematic often draw attention to the Orphic initiators described
negatively in the Republic (364b-c). But some scholars, such as Peter Kingsley, have
demonstrated how they are indistinguishable from the priests depicted in the Derveni
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Papyrus (cols. 18.3-20.12),42 which suggests that allegorizing of Orphic poems can exist
simultaneously with distrust for peddlers of “secrets.”43 The archeological evidence
attests to organized communities following a specific eschatological scheme that can be
identified as Orphic.
I argue that Plato developed his eschatological myths described in Gorgias (523527), Republic (Book X), and Phaedo (109-114) from a now lost Orphic κατάβασις
poem, and contend with Wilamowitz that Plato is in fact utilizing an eschatological
scheme developed from an Orphic source and modifying it to fit his philosophical
agenda. Plato’s goal was to dispel the orthodox Homeric views of the afterlife, and
replace the realm of shades with his own view of the immortal life of the soul. But this
view was only achievable by the select few—namely, the philosophers. Thus Plato
transposed the Orphic idea of salvation for religious initiates with his own view of
salvation through knowledge available only to philosophical initiates. The transposition
theory of Bernabé and Diès is based on the premise that Plato may have had a negative
view of Orpheus, yet adopted Orphic material to suit his philosophical needs and purged
the undesirable aspects of the Orphic doctrines.44 I hope to prove that the evolution of
Platonic eschatology had its roots in Orphism, and confirm Kingsley’s conclusion of
“Plato’s role as a mere link in the chain of transmission of earlier Pythagorean and
Orphic tradition.”45
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Scholars have begun to speak about Plato’s eschatology as an “esoteric
network,”46 and Radcliffe Edmonds III has recently identified a system of topoi, which is
evident in the literature of Empedocles, Plato, and the Gold Tablets.47 This system
suggests the use of mystical formulae in order to indicate a specific eschatology, which
would have been utilized by an author who was expressing Orphic beliefs. The four
narrative themes identified by Edmonds are: TI. the dichotomy between initiated (pure)
and uninitiated (un-pure); TII. the divine lineage of mankind that provides release of the
soul after death (Phaedo 82.d6, Zagreus myth); TIII. the journey of the soul to the
afterlife and the fountain of memory from which the soul may drink to recall what it
knows from its previous state of existence; and TIV. the rewards (dwelling with
gods/heroization) or punishment (rebirth) meted out to the souls of the dead. I argue after
Kingsley that Plato developed his eschatological myths described in Phaedo (109-114),
Gorgias (523-527), and Republic (Book X) from a now lost Orphic κατάβασις poem,
and that we can identify the features of such a Katabasis from these topoi identified by
Edmonds. For instance, consider the topos of the dichotomy between the initiated who
dwell with the gods and behold the true reality of the Platonic Forms, and the uninitiated
who sit in the pelos “filth” (Republic 363c-365a; cf. Aristophanes Frogs 145-150).
According to Kingsley, the dichotomy between the uninitiated lying in the mud and the
initiated freeing himself to live with the gods is a uniquely Orphic belief, and therefore
the dichotomy as presented in the Republic is a topos derived specifically from Orphic
beliefs.48
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Soteriology and the Cycle of Rebirth: An Introduction
The goal of the Mysteries was the release of the soul from the cycle of rebirths.
This was accomplished by teletai “initiations” and katharmoi “purifications.”49 Likewise,
Plato asserts (Phaedo 69bc) that philosophical truth is a καθαρσίς or release from the
cycle of rebirth, and that those who die uninitiated lie in the πηλός “filth.” Plato’s
commentator Olympiodorus says that Plato here is referring to an Orphic myth (OF 235
Kern). In the Republic, Plato contrasts the uninitiated who lie in the πηλός “filth” with
those initiates who dwell at an eternal drinking party (Republic 363d). When the soul
ceases from the grief of incarnation in the physical body and comes into communion with
its divine source, it forms a union with the divine that Plato calls φρόνησις “wisdom”
(Phaedrus 79d). The καθαρσίς “purification” which leads to φρόνησις is performed
through the Mysteries, and Plato spells out the dichotomy between the uninitiated and
initiated and its intimate relation to the Mysteries in the Phaedo:
οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται
ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε
ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς,
“ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι.”
Those who established the Mysteries for us were not thoughtless, but in reality by
speaking in ancient riddles that whosoever arrives in Hades uninitiated and
unperfected, he will lie in the filth, but whosoever arriving there after having
purified and initiated himself, he will dwell with the gods. “For there certainly
are,” as they say in the Mysteries, “many thrysus-bearers, but few Bacchae.”
(Plato Phaedo 69c1-d1)
This passage highlights how Plato assimilates the teachings of the Mysteries into his
philosophy. Plato’s dichotomy between the uninitiated and the initiated points to Plato’s
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assimilation of Orphic doctrine. The term πηλός“filth” seems to be a specifically Orphic
term, which may indicate Plato’s familiarity with the Orphic underworld and his eventual
adoption of the Orphic afterlife scheme. The idea evoked by πηλός “filth”(or
βόρβορος50) is contrasted with the idea of blessedness achieved by initiation, which
suggests Plato is making reference to a specific Orphic text.
Plato deploys a subtle description of the Underworld that affirms his association
with the Mysteries and an Orphic Katabasis schematic. Kingsley remarked how “Orphic
literature itself was focused to a very large degree on the figure and fate of Persephone,”
and how ritual fasting depicted in the Hymn to Demeter is similar to the Gold Tablets.51
The points of contact between Orphic and Eleusinian Mysteries is explicitly evident not
only from the Tablets, but also from the Orphic literary production at the important
Eleusinian center of Syracuse,52 which produced Orpheus of Camarina’s Descent to
Hades. Kingsley examined similarities between the seasons represented in the Hymn to
Demeter and the Platonic underworld in the Phaedo.53 Plato describes the underworld
with the color κυανός (Phaedo 113b8-c1), which is intimately associated with the
mourning of the Mysteries of Persephone and Demeter.54 In the Hymn, Demeter’s
mourning veil is night-dark: κυάνεον δὲ κάλυμμα (Homeric Hymn to Demeter 42), and
the epithet κυανόπεπλον “dark-veiled” occurs frequently in the hymn, as well as
appearing in an Orphic hymn (35.1 Athanassakis). I suggest that Plato’s use of this word
indicates his Eleusinian coloring of the Orpheo-Pythagorean underworld, suggesting a
50
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kind of cohesiveness between the Mysteries, as well as Plato’s in-depth knowledge of the
Mysteries’ secrets.
The “secret” knowledge bestowed on its initiates in the Mysteries was chiefly
concerned with the experience of death—and the salvation promised through initiation.
According to Plutarch, the soul’s experience through initiation was similar to the
experience of death:
Οὕτω κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ὅλον μεταβολὴν καὶ μετακόσμησιν ὀλωλέναι τὴν
ψυχὴν λέγομεν ἐκεῖ γενομένην· ἐνταῦθα δ' ἀγνοεῖ, πλὴν ὅταν ἐν τῷ
τελευτᾶν ἤδη γένηται· τότε δὲ πάσχει πάθος οἷον οἱ τελεταῖς μεγάλαις
κατοργιαζόμενοι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τῷ ῥήματι καὶ τὸ ἔργον τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ
τελευτᾶν καὶ τελεῖσθαι προσέοικε.
Thus we say that the soul that has passed thither (ἐκεῖ) is dead, having regard to
its complete change and conversion. In this world (ἐνταῦθα) it is without
knowledge, except when it is already at the point of death; but when that time
comes, it has an experience like that of men who are undergoing initiation into
great mysteries; and so the verbs teleutân (die) and telesthai (be initiated), and the
actions they denote, have a similarity.
(Plutarch fr. 178.5-7, trans. Sandbach)
Plutarch relates τελευτή, a word for death, with τελεταί, the word for the institution of
the Mysteries, thereby highlighting the Mysteries as an institution for investigating the
mystery of death.55 The τέλος, “ultimate goal” or the promise of salvation of the
Mysteries was to lead its initiates back to the divine origins from which they were
believed to descend.56 In a similar way, Socrates explains the true manner of studying
philosophy as the study of death (Phaedo 64a). Plato later elaborates on this idea when he
explains how true philosophers ἀποθνήισκειν μελετῶσι, “practice dying,” in order to be
more prepared for the experience (Phaedo 67e). I argue that Plato’s philosophical way of
life replaces the Orphic way of life. Plato’s philosophical practice of living as if dead to
55
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corruptions of the flesh is the transposition of the Orphic life of vegetarianism and
initiations. In these passages Plato declares philosophy to be the practice of learning how
to die well. Plato, I argue, is expounding the same teaching as the Mysteries reconfigured
through philosophy.
The Mysteries unilaterally claimed this “special knowledge,” of death and
rebirth. The culminating arguments of the Phaedo (75cd-79c), Symposium (211-212),
Republic (479, 490a-b, 500b-d, 508d, 514ff), Phaedrus (249e-250c, 247d), and Meno
(81c-d) also claim such special knowledge. Two of these passages (Symposium and
Phaedo) are represented with mystical knowledge acquired during an inspired state. Plato
attributes the telestic or inspired madness connected with the Mysteries to Dionysus
(Phaedrus 265b), and he represents Socrates as an Orpheus-like figure in the Republic
(327a) when Socrates begins the dialogue with the subtext of mystery initiation:
Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ, “I went down to Peiraeus yesterday.” According to Jacob
Howland, a scholar of Platonic philosophy and Greek religion, “the structure of the
Republic imitates that of initiation into the Mysteries.”57 I suggest this portrayal indicates
that Socrates functions as an Orphic initiator within the Platonic dialogues. Throughout
his corpus, Plato portrays Socrates as a charismatic personality with mystical insights into
nature and a loyal following of admirers. But Plato’s “Orphic” Socrates also downplays
the credibility of Orphic initiators, thus elevating his own philosophy when he declares,
εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις μέν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, “Certainly, I am a seer, but not a very
serious one!” (Phaedrus 242c). I will argue that Plato adopts the tradition of
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disseminating special “mystical knowledge” concerning the cycle of death and rebirth
and uses it as a platform for his pursuit of philosophical perfection.
Students of Greek have always been intrigued by the Orphic traces in Plato’s
dialogues. Yet scholars have often been troubled about how to account for the persistent
and mysterious citations of Orphic testimony, as well as any possible influence of Orphic
ritual on Plato’s philosophy. According to Plato’s commentator Proclus: ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ
παρ' Ἕλλησι θεολογία τῆς Ὀρφικῆς ἐστὶ μυσταγωγίας ἔκγονος, “For the entire
theology among the Greeks is the offspring of Orphic mystagogy” (Theologia Platonica
1.25.26-7). Proclus then attributes Plato’s knowledge directly to Pythagoras and Orpheus.
But even if we are unwilling to give Proclus’ late testimony much authority, Aristophanes
(Frogs 1030-1036) includes Orpheus as the founder of the τελεταί “mysteries” before
Homer and Hesiod in his canon of Greek theologians, and in the Protagoras (316d), Plato
himself specifically associates Orpheus with the τελεταί “mysteries,” and represents
Orpheus as a theologian who disguises his wisdom like the sophists.
Modern scholars have alluded to the connections between Orphic and Platonic
beliefs in immortality. Rohde referred to Platonic ideas such as the immortal soul and
Katharsis without directly implicating Orphism, whereas Burkert suggested Platonism
was firmly established on the foundations of Orphism, and Kingsley discussed the
similarities between Orphic and Platonic eschatology at large.58 In this thesis, I focus on
the similarities between Orphic and Platonic beliefs in the immortality of the soul. I
equate soteriology with the doctrines of belief in the soul’s divine and immortal
condition. These beliefs provide the theoretical basis for savior religion. Soteriology

58

Rohde 1925: 463-489, Burkert 1985: 322, Kingsley 1996: 79-132.

20

investigates the Orphic belief in the promise of salvation for the soul by performing
initiations and purifications. This thesis will be concerned with the Orphic and Platonic
doctrines that promise salvation and heroization to the initiate or philosopher.
Orphic fragment 229 (Kern) depicts “the cycle of birth,” and an Olbian bone
tablet preserves the soteriological formula bios—thanatos—bios, “life—death—life,” as
well as the name Dionysus.59 This simultaneously demonstrates an Orphic belief in
reincarnation and firmly establishes Bacchic Mysteries within the context of Orphism in
the 5th century BCE. This view of life as a cycle is distinctively Orphic. The Gold Tablet
from Thurii says: κύκλο δ᾽ ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο, “I flew forth from the
painful cycle of deep sorrow” (L9 Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal). The cycle is
typically interpreted as the cycle of birth and death. In the Phaedo (70c), Plato speaks of
an ancient tradition that souls reincarnate into new bodies. This begins the “cyclical”
argument (70c-72) of how opposites are generated from opposites, such as night from
day, just from unjust, and the living from the dead. Plato uses terminology similar to that
found in the Gold Tablet when he says ἡ γένεσις “generation” occurs in κύκλῳ “in a
cycle.” It was an Orphic idea of the cycle that Plato clearly adopts. He also discusses this
Orphic idea of reincarnation in the Meno (81c5). I argue that Plato’s description of the
cycle of souls in the Republic (615a), Phaedrus (249a), and the Phaedo (107e) was
influenced by the Orphic idea of the cycle of rebirth. I aim to demonstrate how the
Platonic doctrine of reincarnation is a direct development of Orphic teachings by
comparing Plato’s arguments for the immortality of the soul with the known Orphic
evidence.
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Overview: Chapter One
In the first chapter I analyze Plato’s borrowing of an Orphic Hieros Logos in
order to give an authoritative framework to his philosophical arguments for the
immortality of the soul, and I examine Plato’s deployment of formulaic language
pertaining to the dualities life/death and body/soul also found on Orphic bone and Gold
Tablets.
The goal of Orphism was the release of the soul from the body, and its reunion
with the divine after it is “freed from the necessity of rebirth.”60 Plato’s frequent
references to the “release of the soul” indicate his knowledge of Orphic Mysteries. In the
Gorgias (524b) Plato describes death: ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, “Death happens to
be, as it seems to me, nothing other than the separation of two things, the soul and the
body.” Plato’s use of the dual form δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν suggests the soul and body are a
naturally bonded pair. The body cannot live without the soul, but for the Orphic initiate,
the soul’s true home without the body was in the afterlife. Death is described as a release
in the Phaedo: διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἣ τῇ ψυχῇ, “release from the body for the soul”
(88b). The idea of διάλυσις “release” is similar to the view expressed on the Tablets that
instruct the initiate: εἰπεῖν Φερσεφόναι σ᾽ ὅτι Βακχιος αὐτὸς ἔλυσε, “Tell Persephone
that Bacchus himself released you” (L7a, b Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal).
Although the connection of release between body and soul is not as explicit on the Tablet
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as it is in Plato, the ritual context of the Tablets implies death and a separation from the
body.
I hope to prove the connection between Plato’s διάλυσις and the Gold Tablet’s
ἔλυσε suggests that Plato inherited the parlance of the Mysteries and developed his own
system for instructing the Orphic rites. I compare the Orphic doctrine of the immortality
of the soul expressed in the Orphic fragments and Gold Tablets with the Platonic views
of the soul in the Phaedo, Phaedrus, Meno, and Republic in order to argue that Plato has
revealed a comprehensive Orphic psychology within his dialogues. I read the Platonic
doctrine of the soul as a philosophized representation of the Orphic doctrine of the soul in
order to demonstrate how Plato applied methods of systematic thought to ancient
knowledge, and developed a scientific methodology expounding the Orphic mysteries by
means of the Socratic dialectic method.

Overview: Chapter Two
The soul not only regenerates, but as the Republic (611e) and Phaedrus (246d-e)
tell us, the soul partakes of the divine, which is the pivotal justification for the soul’s
salvation, and the central tenet of Orphism. Kingsley says the Gold Tablets “ascribe a
fundamental role to the process of heroization.”61 This unique heroization of an initiate
was modeled on Herakles as the archetypal spiritual hero, whose cult center at Thurii has
produced the highest concentration of Orphic Gold Tablets. Pindar’s “Orphic” Olympian
2 begins with Herakles, and Empedocles claimed that purified souls become ἥρωες
ἁγνοί “pure heroes” (B146 DK). The Orphic Tablets from Thurii depict the initiate’s
61
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death as a result from being struck by lightning (300-1.5, 302-3.5, 304-5.5 Zuntz).
Heroization and immortalization by lighting, which was thought to be the purest form of
fire, was a fundamental Greek theme.62 Herakles was immortalized by lighting
(Theocritus, Idyll 24.82-3; Ovid, Metamorphoses 9.250-5. 262-5), as was Semele, the
mother of Dionysus (Pindar, Olympian 2.27) and even Pythagoras (Lucian, Alexander
40). Rohde explored the connections between lighting and immortality, but it was Burkert
who ascertained a suitable and illuminating etymology for the word Elysian, from
enelysios “struck by lighting” through the verb eleusomai “I will go.”63 Burkert’s
argument firmly associated heroization with immortalization. The schema for apotheosis
by fire occurs earliest when Demeter attempted to immortalize Demophon (Homeric
hymn to Demeter 239-45).64 Empedocles’ supposed death in the crater of Etna highlights
the important association between death by descent or fire and initiation. Kingsley
situates Empedocles’ death within the ritual context of the Mysteries, whereby an initiate
dramatically descends into the underworld.65 The ritualistic effect of fire resulting in
heroization/immortalization is described by Empedocles as he became “an immortal god,
no longer mortal” (B112.4 DK). This recalls the tablets from Thurii: “happy and most
blessed, you will be a god instead of a mortal,” or “from a man you have become a
god.”66
The aitiological Orphic myth of Chthonian Dionysus explains the necessity and
justification for heroization. The obscure myth whereby humans were thought to be
composed of a portion inherited from Dionysus and a portion from the Titans later came
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to be known as the Neo-Platonic “Zagreus” myth. The myth of the dismemberment was
described in detail by the Damascius and Olympiodorus in their commentaries on Plato’s
Phaedo. The infant Dionysus roused the wrath of Hera. She incited the Titans to distract
the infant with toys and a mirror after which the Titans killed Dionysus, dismembered
him, and fed upon his flesh. The Titans were subsequently blasted by a bolt of Zeus, and
from their ashes sprung the human race, which contained a portion of Dionysus and a
portion of the Titans. This myth formed an “original sin” story. The Titanic portion
constitutes the human body and its “sin,” whereas the portion that originally was
Dionysus constitutes the human soul and offers the possibility of “salvation.” The goal of
Orphism was to purify the Titanic portion through a series of incarnations by refraining
from the παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν φύσιν “ancient Titanic nature” (Plato Laws 701c) or carnal
appetite, where the ultimate goal was to be saved from the cycle of incarnations. Zagreus
was already associated with Dionysus by Euripides in a fragment of his Cretans quoted
by Porphyry of Tyre (De Abstinentia 4.19). Pausanias informs us that Onomacritus
“organized the Mysteries and made the Titans the authors of Dionysus’ suffering”
(συνέθηκεν ὄργια καὶ εἶναι τοὺς Τιτᾶνας τῷ Διονύσῳ τῶν παθημάτων ἐποίησεν
αὐτουργούς, 8.37.6). Yet like everything else Orphic, scholars are still divided as to
whether the Zagreus myth was an authentic ancient doctrine67 or rather a Neo-Platonic
fabrication in response to the rise of Christianity.68
In the second chapter I focus on the authenticity of the Zagreus myth as
constituting fundamental Orphic doctrine. In particular, I survey the word ποινή “bloodpayment (Wergeld), recompense” and its role in the Orphic Zagreus myth as well as in its
67
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various manifestations in Plato’s Meno, Homer, Pindar, and the Derveni and Gurôb
papyri, and I explore the etymological connections between ποινή and τιμή in order to
demonstrate Plato’s use of Orphic terminology. I go on to argue that this Dionysus-Titan
myth circulated as part of an original secret Orphic initiate myth, as Burkert concludes:
“the dismemberment of Dionysos was an unspeakable doctrine of the mysteries,”69 and
“Herodotus [2.171] considered it a secret although he has several allusions to it.”70 In
order to argue for the antiquity of the myth, I draw attention to the obscure references to
the Zagreus myth in the classical sources.
First, I demonstrate how Plato’s Orphic phrase sōma sēma “the body is the
tomb/sign [of the soul]” suggesting the idea of imprisonment is a reference to the myth of
Dionysus-Zagreus. In the Zagreus myth, the Titans represent the prison for the immortal
soul or Dionysus. According to R. S. Bluck, a respected commentator on Plato’s works,
Plato’s pupil “Xenocrates associated the body-prison idea with the Titans and with
Dionysus.”71 In the Cratylus Plato refers specifically to an Orphic belief that the soul is
imprisoned in the body (400c). In the Phaedo (62b), Plato reveals how the myth that the
soul is imprisoned in the body (ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν, “we are in a certain prison”) is a
part of secret literature (ὁ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, “the doctrine
about these things that is taught in secret”). The word aporrheton is a word used
specifically in the Mysteries,72 which suggests that Plato is alluding to the “secret”
Zagreus myth. This is strengthened by Xenocrates’ remark that the φρουρά is Titanic,
and its meaning is hidden in the myth of Dionysus (Xenocrates fr. 20 Heinze). Plato
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refers to the φρουρά in the Gorgias (525a), as the place where the soul endures πάθη
“sufferings.” The word for the soul’s “sufferings,” πάθη is related to the word πένθεος,
the “grief” of Persephone from the “Orphic” fragment of Pindar quoted in the Meno
(81b7). This fragment of Pindar says Persephone will immortalize those who pay the
price for the ancient πένθεος “grief.” Tannery and Rose both argued that the πένθεος of
Persephone (Meno 81b7) is a reference to the Orphic myth of the dismemberment of
Dionysus by the Titans.73
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Chapter One: Life-Death-Life Formula

Introduction

Scholars typically assign certain eschatological beliefs in Plato’s dialogues as
being derived from Orphic sources without providing much clarification or even original
Orphic textual evidence. On the one hand, a specific belief of Plato’s can seem vaguely
Orphic, which may lead a commentator to qualify it as such without further evidence. On
the other hand, scholars may dismiss one of Plato’s eschatological beliefs as an Orphic
idea based on Plato’s infamous declaration of the beggar priests who present a “hubbub”
of Orphic books and spells and other negative connotations of Orphism (Republic 364ce).74 The latter argue for the entire incompatibility between the two eschatological
systems by pointing out isolated discrepancies such as Plato’s elaborate descriptions of
judges in the afterlife compared to the apparent lack of judges represented in the extant
Orphic texts.75 Several of these problematic discrepancies in Plato’s Orphica have been
pointed out in the introduction. My thesis attempts to dispel these discrepancies by using
a philological approach in order to point out the ways in which Plato made use of Orphic
discourse as evidenced by his use of specific terminology and formulae. I argue in this
thesis that Plato is not simply emulating and re-imagining Orphic myths through
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Edmonds (2013: 99) argues that the Greek word ὅμαδον (“hubbub”) refers specifically to the
competition for authority among authors of books.
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Edmonds (2013: 359) points out that the Gold Tablets do not mention Titans or the dismemberment of
Dionysus; Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008: 36) mention that the Platonic conception of
punishment is not found in the Gold Tablets. I will respond to Edmonds argument in Chapter Two of my
thesis by arguing that the dismemberment myth is in fact evoked in Plato’s use of the word ποινή, and I
allege that the conception of punishment is implied by the eschatological context, whereby punishment is
concieved of as reincarnation.
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“transposition,”76 but rather that Plato’s dialogues are a direct continuation of the Orphic
mysteries and rites through the revised methodology of philosophy. Furthermore, I
explain Plato’s Orphic criticism to be a natural and expected outcome of the transposition
process. Moreover, I claim, we can better read Plato with an understanding of Orphism.
My methodology for reading Plato’s Orphica relies on Diès’ (1927) original
theory of Plato’s “transposition” of Orphic texts, an idea that Bernabé (2007, 2011, 2013)
has developed extensively, particularly in Platon é el Orfismo (2011). The theory argues
that Plato transposed traditional Orphic motifs into a new philosophical setting and so
redefined Orphic themes. Traditional Orphic myths become re-imagined within Plato’s
thought as a result of the process of transposition, which accounts for perceived
differences between Orphic and Platonic eschatology. In this chapter I will pursue Diès’
insight in an attempt to reconstruct the authentic Orphic doctrine by comparing Orphic
elements in Plato’s writings with other Orphic fragments that have not undergone such
transposition, such as the Gold lamellae, Olbian bone tablets, the Derveni Papyrus, and
the Gurôb Papyrus.
In my attempt to read Plato’s transposition process as a part of his reception of
Orphic beliefs, I make use of the approach laid out by John Palmer in his illuminating
study, Plato’s Reception of Parmenides (1999). Palmer argues: “we must try to
understand Parmenides as Plato did if we are to be in any position to speak meaningfully
about Parmenides’ influence on Plato.”77 I apply the same view to understanding the
Orphic influence on Plato by reading Plato’s works as a reception of the Orphic tradition.
As a corollary, transposition and reception of Orphic myths involves John Bussanich’s
76
77

A term coined by Auguste Diès 1927: 432 ff. For discussion, see Bernabé 2007: 41-44, 2013: 135.
Palmer 1999: 13.
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theory of the process of “ethicization,” whereby Plato invokes the religious authority of
Orpheus in order inject “eschatological themes into the dialogues.”78 The original Orphic
idea of reincarnation and salvation is developed by moral logic and philosophic dialectic.
My reading of Platonic texts consists in identifying a constellation of Orphic
elements and their associated terminology. These terms are always introduced within the
context of a Hieros Logos “sacred story,” a term which will be introduced in Part I below.
The elements ascribed to the Hieros Logos include the belief in the immortality of the
soul, the soul’s release from the body, its judgment in the afterlife, and the payment of a
penalty in order to achieve a blessed afterlife. I aim to demonstrate how the concordant
occurrence of these elements implies an Orphic eschatological model. The central Orphic
myth of Zagreus functions as an eschatological syntagm because it both collects and
organizes the entire manifold of ideas in Plato: (1) that the soul is immortal; (2) that death
is a release of the soul from the body; (3) that the soul owes a primordial “debt”; (4) that
salvation is possible for the soul. These themes and their specific terminology formulate
the Orphic eschatological system and they are discussed at length in the following two
chapters. Chapter One is further divided into Part I, which introduces Plato’s
transposition of the Orphic Hieros Logos and his use of the soteriological formula
life/death/life derived from the Olbian bone tablets; and Part II, which focuses on Plato’s
use of the body/soul formula and his ideas of the release from the body/soul duality.
Chapter Two will approach ideas of the soul’s primordial debt and the Orphic Zagreus
myth.
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Bussanich 2013: 248. Bussanich summarizes his argument in terms of Plato’s aim to ‘ethicize’
Orphic/Pythagorean theories of the immortality of the soul and its transmigration into other bodies: “I shall
delineate, first, the basic elements in Plato’s rebirth eschatology, focusing briefly on its sources and then
more critically on his program to ethicize the phases of the rebirth cycle” (244, emphasis added).
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I.1 The Orphic Hieros Logos: Platonic ta legomena (Apology 41c7)79

Plato’s Socrates presents a positive view of death and the afterlife in the Apology
(40b-42a),80 a view of death that Socrates elaborates in the Phaedo (63b5-c8).81 In the
Apology, Socrates famously professes the benefit of dying if he is able to meet and crossexamine famous Greek heroes and poets who dwell in Hades, such as Orpheus (Ὀρφεῖ
συγγενέσθαι, Apology 41a6). Plato engages with ideas of the immortality of the soul and
a blissful afterlife in order to promote his own philosophical agenda. In both the Apology
and Phaedo Socrates proclaims his belief in the immortality of the soul as way to comfort
his friends about the fear of death and in order to promote a life dedicated to
philosophical inquiry. Socrates argues that philosophy is the means to prepare for death
and achieve a blissful afterlife, and he frames his own “blissful” afterlife of perpetual
philosophical examination and establishes his eschatological beliefs within an elusive
tradition referred to only as τὰ λεγόμενα “what is said”: εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ,
“if indeed the things which are said are true” (Apology 41c7). Although Socrates does not
79

I cite the texts of Plato from the most recent available OCT editions (e.g., Duke et al. 1995, Slings 2003).
Editions of Orphic texts cited below are identified by editors’ names. I refer to the most recent editions of
Orphic texts (Graf and Johnston 2007, Bernabé and San Cristobál 2008, and Bernabé 2004). I choose to
refer to a variety of editions in order to not be beholden to a specific interpretation of the Orphic sources.
All translations are my own unless stated otherwise.
80
See especially Apology 40b7-c1: “For it may be the case that this thing that has happened to me [i.e.,
being condemned to death] is a good thing, and that however many of us think death to be an evil thing,
surely we do not suppose correctly” (κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ
οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι).
81
Socrates frames his positive view of death as the εὔελπις “hope” that he will achieve a blessed afterlife,
namely because he is philosopher. Socrates uses the word “hope” to describe death or as he calls it “going
out of town” (67b11). The philosophers alone achieve the βέλτιστον τόπον “best place” in the afterlife
(Phaedo 82a10). Philosophers purify themselves by living apart from the body and thus come to the more
beautiful part of the afterlife (Phaedo 114c5).
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explicitly identify the origin of these beliefs, I argue we can establish that his beliefs in
the immortality of the soul and the possibility of a blissful afterlife are derived from
Orphic dogma by observing how Plato’s specific vocabulary, phraseology, formulaic
constructions, and thematic choices coincide with surviving Orphic texts.
In the Apology, Socrates proclaims death to be either one of two possibilities:
either death is a like a pleasant dream (40d),82 or it is a transition or transmigration for the
soul from one place to another (40e-41d). Although Socrates endorses the second
possibility, he affirms that both possibilities would be a κερδός “benefit, profit” (40e2),
an evaluative term which demonstrates that Plato’s Socrates has a positive view of death:
ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν
τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις
τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον.
For either it is nothing, nor does the man who has died have any perception of
anything, or according to what is said, (death) happens to be a certain change and
transmigration for the soul from the place here to another place.
(Plato Apology 40c 7-11)
The idea that death consists in the soul’s departure from one place to another implies the
concept of the immortality of the soul. Plato uses the phrase κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα to
introduce this idea of transmigration of the soul, which is a central Orphic belief.83 I argue
82

We first see the association between sleep and death expressed in Homer with the motif ὕπνος καὶ
θανάτος διδυμάονε (cf. Iliad 16.672). Albinus (2000: 121) argues that this affinity between sleep and
death “carried the meaning potential of immortality in the context of mystery initiation, which, in contrast
to the epics, made it an immediate consequence of ritual imitation.” Death is also described as a sleep
which frees the soul from the body in the Orphic hymn to Death (87.3 Athanassakis), and as the brother of
death (85.8 Athanassakis).
83
For the Orphic belief in transmigration, see Burkert 1985: 299. For the eastern origin of beliefs in
transmigration and metempsychosis, see West 1983: 19. The apparently distinct ideas of transmigration and
metempsychosis are semantically no different, and scholars tend to use the terms interchangeably. West
(1983: 222) attributes the doctrine of reincarnation preserved in later neo-Platonic theogonies to the
prototype of the Derveni Papyrus, the Protogonos Theogony. Column 16 and 17 of the Derveni Papyrus
(Betegh 2004) explains that beings are generated from things that already subsist, suggesting that new
beings are “reborn.” Some scholars also interpret the Pelinna leaf as depicting the idea of metempsychosis
(see Graf and Johnston 2007: 132). The Thurian tablet (3.3 Graf 2007) says that the initiate has endured a

32

Plato’s ta legomena is a specific borrowing from Orphic dogma, since the phrase is found
in Orphic texts in specific contexts dealing with Orphic eschatological beliefs.
The phrase τὰ λεγόμενα84 is used in Orphic texts such as the Derveni Papyrus
when speaking about “secret” or “hidden” knowledge. The Derveni Papyrus, a
commentary on a hexameter poem attributed to Orpheus, was discovered in 1962, but not
officially published until 2006.85 The Papyrus it is not a simple “bible” or sourcebook of
Orphic dogma, but rather a kind of commentary on Greek religious thought by a later
“rationalist.”86 Papyrologists assign the date of the Derveni Papyrus to the second half of
the fourth century BCE, and the editors of the most recent edition of the Papyrus,
Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou (2006), date the manuscript between 340320 BC.87 Although the date of the Papyrus is a little later than the traditional dates given
for Plato’s life (ca. 428-347 BCE), there is little doubt that Plato had access to the
original Orphic texts that are the subject of the commentary of the Derveni Papyrus.
Indeed, the Papyrus comments on a verse from the opening of an Orphic theogony,
noting “for by ordering them to put doors to their ears [θύρας γαρ ἐπιθέσθαι κελεύσας

painful thing before, but is now a god instead of a mortal, a claim that implies the initiate has him- or
herself been reborn. Albinus (2000: 117) attributes the belief in metempsychosis to the Orphic discourse
citing as evidence Orphic fragments 226, 229, and 230 (Kern 1922), although he agrees with Burkert
(1972: 126 n.32) that an Orphic doctrinal notion of metempsychosis is not directly attested by any ancient
source. Nevertheless Albinus (2000: 124) points to the Olbian bone tablets as evidence for
metempsychosis. Some scholars also attempt to reconstruct the idea of metempsychosis from Pindar fr. 133
(Race 1997 which I will discuss in Chapter Two below. For Plato’s beliefs in reincarnation, see also
Guthrie 1993: 164-171. For the definitive study on Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines of metempsychosis,
see Casadio 1991. On the difference between metempsychosis and reincarnation, see Edmonds 2013: 280283.
84
It is important to note that the Greek term τὰ λεγόμενα does not refer to a specific “tradition,” but rather
the term is used within various genres to refer to a given “tradition.” For my part, I argue that Plato’s use of
the term refers to the Orphic tradition when τὰ λεγόμενα makes reference to eschatological beliefs.
Furthermore, τὰ λεγόμενα can refer to specific ritual passwords: Bernabé and San Cristobál 2007: 234,
236, 238; Albinus 2000: 148; Graf 1993: 247.
85
Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou 2006.
86
See Janko’s review of Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou in BMCR 2006.10.29
87
Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou 2006: 8-9; cf. Betegh 2004: 61.
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τοῖς ὠσὶν he [sc. Orpheus] says that he does not legislate for the multitude, but that he
teaches those whose hearing is pure [...]” (Col. 7.9-11). At Symposium 218b Alcibiades
quotes this same formula as he begins to speak only to those initiated in the “Bacchic
frenzy of philosophy”; to all other profane and vulgar non-initiates he commands, “close
the great doors of your ears [πύλας πάνυ μεγάλας τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐπίθεσθε].”88 The Papyrus
has demonstrated that philological speculation of Orphic texts goes back to the early fifth
century BCE, and, along with the Gold tablets, has helped propel Orphic studies into new
areas. In particular, the Derveni Papyrus provides evidence of Plato’s knowledge of
Orphic texts.
On column 18 of the Papyrus, the Orphic commentator reveals the ‘secret’
interpretation of the goddess Moira and concludes: [. . . . . . . ἄ]νθρωπ[οι οὐ
γιγνώσκοντ]ες τὰ λεγόμενα, “humans [not understand]ing what is said” (18.14
Betegh). Although the text is fragmentary, the commentator uses the phrase to refer to a
previously revealed ‘secret’ Orphic interpretation of the text. On column 20, the
commentator declares: θαυμάζω μή γινωσκειν. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἀκοῦσαι ὁμοῦ καὶ
μαθεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα, “I wonder less that they do not have knowledge. For it is not
possible to hear and at the same time to understand what is being said” (20.2-3 Betegh).
Here again the commentator uses the phrase to describe ‘secret’ knowledge or
interpretations of the text.
Both Graf and Johnston (2007) and Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008)
associate the phrase τὰ λεγόμενα with an Orphic Hieros Logos “sacred story”—that is,
an explanatory account either of proper ritual procedure, a god’s true nature, or even the
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For discussion, see Tsantsanoglou 1997: 124-126.
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origin of the world.89 Herodotus is our earliest source for a specifically Orphic Hieros
Logos when he describes the Bacchic and Orphic rituals as Egyptian and Pythagorean in
origin and affirms the existence of a Hieros Logos treating the ritual practices of the cults
(Histories ii.81). Scholars conjecture that the Orphic Hieros Logos depicted the birth,
death, and rebirth of Dionysus, along with descriptions of the toys used in the ritual.90
Orpheus is associated with a Hieros Logos at column 7 of the Derveni Papyrus when the
Orphic commentator states that Orpheus “recounts a Hieros Logos [ἱερολογεῖται] from
the first to the last word” (7.7 Betegh).
The question of what constitutes a Hieros Logos is complicated by the diversity of
the subject matter attributed to so-called Hieroi Logoi. 91 Graf and Johnston (2007)
observe that “virtually any narration that explained or described the nature of ‘divine
things’ was a candidate for hieratic status.”92 Albert Henrichs (2002) argued that a Hieros
Logos is characterized by its “secret” status.93 This secrecy is attested by the edict of
Ptolemy IV, dated between 250-200 BCE, which ordered all Dionysiac initiators to
deposit their Hieroi Logoi sealed and signed for safe-keeping at the Great Library of
Alexandria.94
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Graf and Johnston 2007: 177, 182; Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 232; Albinus 2000: 101;
Bernabé 1998, Bernabé 2003: 37.
90
Henrichs 2002: 27-29. The Gurôb Papyrus is the best evidence for an Orphic Hieros Logos depicting the
myth of Chthonic Dionysus. The fragmentary text calls itself a Hieros Logos and describes a ritual
involving Dionysus and using specific toys.
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The question of authorship of the Orphic Hieros Logos is even more complicated, according to West,
who notes: “The Suda, which gives us our most accurate bibliographical description of the poem (Hieroi
Logoi in 24 rhapsodies), reports that is was said to be the work of Theognetus the Thessalian, or
alternatively of Cercops the Pythagorean” (West 1983: 248). The Hieros Logos along with the Εἰς Ἅιδου
κατάβασις, “Descent into Hades” were attributed to Orpheus by the elusive fourth-century BCE figure
Epigenes (West 1983: 9). Linforth (1957: 117-118) argued that this Epigenes was in fact the Pythagorean
friend of Socrates mentioned in Apology (33e) and Phaedo (59b).
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Graf and Johnston 2007: 178.
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Graf and Johnston best define a Hieros Logos as a supplementary religious text,
which disseminates ritual instructions and stories from a Mystery cult.95 The “hieraticstatus”—to use Graf and Johnston’s term—of a text is often determined by its ‘secrecy’:
a cult might disseminate two levels of cultic beliefs, well-known stories and secret
‘hieratic’ stories, to distinguish between non-initiates and those initiated in the cult.
Furthermore, Graf and Johnston suggest the Hieros Logos comprised ‘ritual
prescriptions’—what I call formulae—such as the repeated phrases “I come pure from the
pure” or “now you are dead now you are born,” which are now known from the Gold
Tablets.96 They conclude that a Hieros Logos had a performative function that helped
those initiates who possessed them to win a blessed afterlife.97 According to Bernabé, the
Orphic lamellae provide us the opportunity to reconstruct an original Orphic Hieros
Logos;98 Graf and Johnston likewise believe both the gold lamellae and the Gurôb
Papyrus contain excerpts from an Orphic Hieros Logos.99

I.2 The Orphic Hieros Logos: Plato’s Seventh Letter

I argue that Plato’s use of the phrase τὰ λεγόμενα in the Apology within the
context of death and the afterlife refers to Orphic texts known to Plato, specifically a lost
Orphic text known as a ἱερὸς λόγος, a “sacred story.” We may perhaps find evidence of
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Plato’s knowledge of Orphic Hieros Logos in his Seventh Letter where he makes explicit
reference to such a doctrinal text and precisely defines its subject matter:
πείθεσθαι δὲ ὄντως ἀεὶ χρὴ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, οἳ δὴ
μηνύουσιν ἡμῖν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν εἶναι δικαστάς τε ἴσχειν καὶ τίνειν τὰς
μεγίστας τιμωρίας, ὅταν τις ἀπαλλαχθῇ τοῦ σώματος.
But truly one ought always to obey the ancient and sacred stories, which
certainly reveal to us that our soul is immortal and that it is both judged and pays
the greatest penalties, whenever one is released from the body.
(Plato Letter 7, 335a2-5)
Some scholars claim that Plato’s Seventh Letter is not genuine.100 But even if the letter is
spurious, I argue that it still provides proof of the existence of Orphic Hieroi Logoi.
Moreover, I maintain that since ideas attributed to the Hieros Logos appear in other
Platonic texts, it is at least plausible that Plato himself was aware of an Orphic Hieros
Logos and transposed some of it into his own thought in various dialogues.
The author of the Seventh Letter defines the contents of a specific Hieros Logos as
the belief in the immortality of the soul, and its judgment and payment of penalties
(τίνειν τιμωρίας)101 once it has been “released” from the body (ἀπαλλαχθῇ).102 These
ideas are central Orphic beliefs,103 and their attribution to Hieroi Logoi indicates that
Plato is referring to a specifically Orphic Hieros Logos. Furthermore, the Seventh Letter
uses the verb μηνύουσιν (μηνύω), which conveys that the Hieros Logos “reveals a
secret”;104 this verb elsewhere appears in contexts describing of mystery religion.105 Plato
uses the verb in the Republic (366b) when he says that that the poets and prophets
100

See, for instance, Edelstein 1966 and Burnyeat and Frede 2015.
I provide full discussion of these terms in Chapter Two below.
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A full discussion of these terms is given at section I.3.
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We find the same ideas expressed in the Gold Tablets: the belief in the payment of a penalty (e.g. 6.4
Graf and Johnston), and the belief in “release” of the soul from the body (e.g. 26a, b.2 Graf and Johnston).
104
Cf. Homeric Hymn to Hermes 254, 373.
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“reveal” (μηνύσουσιν) that the mysteries (τελεταί) and the liberating gods (λύσιοι θεοί)
possess the power to judge human sins in Hades. Plato frequently refers to the elements
mentioned in the Seventh Letter when speaking about death—namely the immortality of
the soul, its judgment, the payment of penalties, and its release or separation from the
body. The following sections will analyze Plato’s use of eschatological terminology
defined within the context of a Hieros Logos.

I.3 The Orphic Hieros Logos: Plato’s Apology

The idea of the soul’s “release” from the body and its “judgment” in the afterlife
are assigned to a Hieros Logos in the Apology. After Plato’s Socrates introduces the
“beneficial,” albeit fallacious, description of death (see Apology 40c above), he proceeds
to describe what he believes is a “true” account of death:
εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων
ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί
ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς
ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσι πάντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ
ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γάρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τουτωνὶ τῶν
φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ
λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ
Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν
βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ
καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν;
Therefore, if death is like this (a dream), I say it is a benefit. For indeed all time
seems to be nothing more in this way than a single night. But if in turn death is
like going out of town from here to another place and the things that are said
are true, namely that all those who have died are there, then what would be a
greater good than this, jury men? For if someone, upon arriving in Hades after
being freed from those here who claim to be judges, he will discover the true
judges, which very ones indeed are said to judge there, both Minos and
Rhadamanthos and Ajax and Triptolemos and however many others of the demi38

gods who became judges in their own life—would going out of town (i.e., death)
be horrible then? Or in turn, how much would any of you pay to associate with
Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer?
(Plato Apology 40e-41a)
In this passage, Plato’s Socrates likens death to the Greek word ἡ ἀποδημία “going out
of town.” The word conveys the idea of the soul migrating to another place (εἰς ἄλλον
τόπον), and evokes the idea of the soul’s immorality with the implication of continued
existence in a new location. Plato frames the idea of death as ἡ ἀποδημία in order to
suggest that death is a foreign experience, and that the afterlife is a foreign land. This
implies that one must prepare for the journey during life. Socrates claims this doctrine or
Hieros Logos concerning the mystery of death is true (ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα). The
designation of “true words” in opposition to a false doctrine recalls the formulae of
Olbian tablet A (Graf 2007), which proclaims the Orphic soteriological doctrine to be
“true.”
Furthermore, I argue that Plato emphatically positions Orpheus as the first poet
Socrates would associate with in the afterlife as a rhetorical move to hint to the reader
that he is building upon Orphic beliefs from the Hieros Logos. Plato describes death with
the participle ἀπαλλαγείς, “being set free,” which, due to its ultimate derivation from the
adjective ἄλλος “another,” carries the connotations of migration to another place.106 Plato
also says we face judgment in the afterlife (δικαστάς). As in the passage quoted from the
Seventh Letter, Plato refers to a Hieros Logos and conveys the idea of immortality with ἡ
ἀποδημία “being out of town,” and includes the terminology ἀπαλλαγείς and δικαστάς
in the Apology. Socrates also equates dying to being released from troubles (ἀπηλλάχθαι
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See Beekes 2010: I.71-72, s.v. ἀλλάσσω on the etymological derivation from ἀλλός.
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πραγμάτων, Apology 41d) and invests the judges of the Apology with the power “to
punish” (τιμωρήσασθε, 41e). This verb is related to the noun τιμωρίας used in the
Seventh Letter, and will be discussed at length in Chapter Two below.
In the Apology Plato strategically incorporates all the elements of an Orphic
eschatological syntagm (the Orphic Hieros Logos, the immortality of soul, the soul’s
post-mortem judgment, and its payment of penalties) with the rhetorical purpose of
promoting philosophy as the only means to achieving a blessed afterlife. Plato describes
death as ἡ ἀποδημία in order to give comfort to the audience and his friends and to
promote the philosophical life. By incorporating and redefining Orphic elements such as
a Hieros Logos about the soul’s immortality, Plato effectively elevates his own
philosophical system of cross-examination to the level of a sacred text.

I.4 The Orphic Hieros Logos: Orphic Soteriological Formulae in the
Apology

In the previous sections I have claimed that we can identify Plato’s use of Orphic
ideas by his specific diction, namely by his introduction of an eschatological belief within
a tradition of a Hieros Logos and by his incorporation of specific Orphic terminology and
repeated phraseology. In particular, Plato refers to specific Orphic ideas with specific
terminology arranged in what I identify as “formulae,” which I argue have their basis in
the Orphic cult. I use the term formula to describe the repeated pattern of a specific set of
words such as life/death or body/soul that are used in the context of a Hieros Logos.

40

Orphic theology engaged in “allegorical philology.”107 I argue that the cult established
soteriological formulae such as “life/death/life” in the form of dichotomies between basic
concepts such as life/death.108 The use of ritual formulae as passwords (synthemata or
symbola) was a common feature of Greek mysteries in general for initiates to recognize
one another.109 In this way, the formulaic dichotomy life/death is answered by life to
represent a “soteriological” point of view.
Three tiny bone tablets discovered together in 1952 in Olbia, published in 1978
and dated to the fifth century BCE provide evidence for an Orphic cult, which celebrated
Dionysus and believed their doctrine of soteriology to be the “true” doctrine.110 These
Orphic Olbian bone tablets attest to the formulae pairing of life/death/life and body/soul;
moreover, these formulae are significant because they inform the eschatological contexts
of Plato’s dialogues.
εἰρήνη πόλεμος | ἀλήθεια ψεῦδος | Διόν(υσος)
Peace/War | Truth/Lie | Dion(ysus)
(Tablet B, Recto)
Διό(νυσος)111 | ἀλήθεια | σῶμα ψυχή
Dio(nysus) | truth | body/soul
(Tablet C)
βίος θάνατος βίος | ἀλήθεια
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“[A]llegorical philology was a feature of Orphic speculation. To σῶμα = σῆμα we have now to add
Ἀΐδης = unseen. . .” (Guthrie 1993: 191n4), a conclusion supported by Bremmer 2002: 4.
108
Graf and Johnston 2007: 182.
109
Graf and Johnston 2007: 152. I will use the term symbolon to refer to a ritual password or formula,
following Graf and Johnston 2007: 154. Plutarch tells us that σύμβολαe“passwords” were used in the
mysteries (Cons. Ad ux. 10.611d), and Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008: 153) argue that symbola
function as “bearers of doctrine, a kind of slogans that were easy to recall, and synthesized religious
contents.”
110
See West 1982.
111
Graf and Johnston (2007: 187) give Διό(νυσος) for Tablets A and B. West (1982: 23) reads tablet 3
(Tablet C Graf and Johnston) as ΔΙΟ plus the zig-zag pattern (which appears on each of the tablets), and he
conjectures the abbreviation is in the dative case as in a ritual dedication to the god (21).
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Life/Death/Life | Truth
(Tablet A)
Διό(νυσος) Ὀρφικοί [or Ὀρφικόν] (the edge is damaged)
Dio(nysus) Orphics [or Orphic]
(Graf and Johnston 2007:187)
Despite the numeration of the Olbian tablets, I conjecture we can read the inscriptions as
building a rhetorical argument for Orphic soteriology. Furthermore, I argue we can read
the physical tablets as a type of Hieros Logos. First, on Tablet B the author depicts two
straightforward dichotomies: war and peace, and truth and lie. Then he associates
Dionysus with this mode of thinking in dichotomies. Tablet C takes this reasoning further
to propose the dichotomy between the body and the soul, which according to the Tablet is
a true doctrine of the Dionysian cult. Finally, tablet A associates this Dionysian doctrine
with the Orphic cult,112 and proposes the dichotomy of life and death expressed in the
formula “life/death/life.” The presumably Orphic author indicates “life” a second time in
order to emphasize the repeated or cyclical pattern of the dichotomy, and thereby portrays
not only the idea of a second life or afterlife but also the idea of the immortality of the
soul and the cycle of incarnations. I designate this repeated pattern “life/death” a
symbolon-like formula, which the initiate in the cult would know is to be answered by
“life.” The rhetorical effect of adding “life” after “life/death” not only implies a future
life of the soul after the death of the body, but also a continuous pattern between life and
death as a cycle.113 I read the oscillation between life and death and between body and
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This tablet definitively established the conjunction of Orphic and Bacchic cult in the fifth century BCE:
cf. West 1983: 18.
113
There is also a mysterious symbol inscribed on the tablet in the shape of a “Z.” West (1982: 19)
conjectured that it is “a symbol of the principle of the cyclical alternation which guarantees a future life. It
might be a snake, symbolizing rebirth. Or it might represent lightning (though this is usually represented in
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soul as central Orphic soteriological formulae that may well have functioned as
passwords indicating identity and membership in the cult. It is my claim that we can
identify these same formulae not only in the Olbian tablents, but also in the Orphic Gold
lamellae, and all throughout Plato’s corpus.
I argue the formulae attested by the Olbian tablets are also expressed on the
Orphic Gold lamellae. These lamellae or tablets have been discovered throughout the
sphere of known Orphic influence including southern Italy, Sicily, Thessaly, and Crete
and are found exclusively in funerary contexts.114 In 1882 Domenico Comparetti
published the first tablets, which were discovered with the deceased during the
excavations of the tombs at Thurii in Calabria in 1879. The emphasis on purity, the
mention of Persephone and the allusion to the cycle of rebirths convinced Comparetti to
identify them as Orphic. These tablets first comprised the A group of Zuntz, who argued
that the tablets were Pythagorean and not Orphic.115 The lamella from Timpone Grande in
Thurii offers the reward for an initiate: θεὸς ἐγένου ἐξ ἀνθρώπου “you have become a
god instead of a human” (3.4 Graf); and the lamella from Timpone Piccolo states θεὸς
δ᾽ἔσῃ ἀντὶ βροτοῖο “you will be a god instead of a mortal” (5.9 Graf). These ivy-shaped
lamellae were discovered in the grave at Pelinna in Thessaly along with a statue of a

Greek art as a stylized bundle of flames, with prongs at both ends). Dionysus was born in lightning, and
Orpheus according to one account died by it. It is associated with heroization, and Walter Burkert has
stressed its connection with the name of Elysium.” See further Burkert 1960-1961: 208-213, Burkert 1985:
198, 427n36.
114
Scholars point out the crucial relationship between the funeral context and the direct textual testimony of
cult practices in eschatology of the Tablets suggests that the Tablets had a liturgical function (cf. Albinus
2000: 141; Graf 1993: 248; Guthrie 1993: 172).
115
Zuntz’ argument in his Persephone (1971) was discredited after the Hipponion tablet was discovered
and published by Pugliese Carratelli in 1974. The Hipponion tablet incorporates the same eschatology as
the other tablets (including mention of underworld deities and release from cycle of reincarnation) but also
situated the initiate among other mystics and Bacchoi. See further Graf and Johnston 2007: 62. Graf (1993:
243) has argued that the use of the hexameter in parts of the tablets is an indication of its association with
the Orphic Hieros Logos.
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Maenad and they express the dichotomy immortality/mortality, which I argue is a
variation of the formulaic life/death. The Pelinna tablets’ request that Bacchus set free the
initiate decisively confirmed all the previously discovered tablets as belonging to Bacchic
mysteries. The Pelinna lamellae begin: Νῦν ἔθανες καὶ νῦν ἐγένου “you just died, and
now you have been born” (26a.1 Graf).116 The gold lamellae from Thessaly depict the
same soteriological formulae life-death as the Olbian bone tablets, demonstrating that the
life/death formula was a central Orphic belief. The ritualistic maxim “I am a son of earth
and starry sky” (1.10 Graf) is formulaically repeated on tablets from Calabria (1 Graf),
Thessaly (29 Graf) and Crete (10, 12, 14 Graf). This formula conveys the cosmological
dichotomy between earth and sky as well as the self-proclaimed Heavenly and Titanic
origins of Orphic initiates. The Orphic gold and bone tablets depict soteriological
formulae with the dichotomies death and birth, divinity and mortality, and even the
cosmological dichotomy earth and sky.
I read these formulae as depicting a cyclical relationship because the view of life
as a cycle is distinctively Orphic. In addition to the Olbian bone tablet which preserves
the soteriological formula bios/thanatos/bios, “life/death/life,”117 Orphic fragment 229
(Kern) depicts “the cycle of birth,” and the Gold Tablet from Thurii proclaims: κύκλο δ᾽
ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο, “I flew forth from the painful cycle of deep sorrow”
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Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008: 66) translate Νῦν ἔθανες as “you have just died,” which
emphasizes the continuity between life and death.
117
According to Albinus (2000: 124), “The tripartite structure . . . seems to suggest a continuity of life
through death that breaks with the cycle of opposites changing into each other. The inscription may thus
indicate, and confirm the initiatory release from the process of metempsychosis that took place in Orphic
mystery cults.” Edmonds (2013: 289) disagrees that the Olbian tablets express the idea of metempsychosis
or reincarnation.
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(5 Graf = L9 Bernabé). The symbol of the cycle is typically interpreted as the cycle of
birth and death.118
Plato expresses these cyclical dichotomies in the Apology and Phaedo.119 In the
Phaedo (70c), Plato speaks of an “ancient tradition” that souls reincarnate into new
bodies. This begins the “cyclical” argument (70c-72) of how opposites are generated
from opposites, such as night from day, just from unjust, and the living from the dead.
This cyclical belief is explicitly introduced as a Hieros Logos at 70c6. Plato uses
terminology similar to that found in the Gold Tablet when he says at Phaedo 72b2 that
γιγνόμενα “generation” occurs in κύκλῳ “in a cycle.” I conjecture that Plato adopts the
Orphic idea of the cycle of rebirth in order to provide a mythological authority for his
philosophical agenda, and that Plato’s descriptions of the cycle of souls in the Republic
(615a), Phaedrus (249a), and the Phaedo (107e) were influenced by the Orphic idea of
the cycle. The Platonic doctrine of reincarnation redefines the Orphic tenets and
transposes the elements and terms. In the Apology, Socrates concludes his speech to the
jury men by employing the Orphic soteriological formula life/death in order to
demonstrate that the philosopher exclusively achieves a blessed afterlife:
τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν
λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς
χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἕν τι τοῦτο
διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι
οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα.
For those ones there (the dead) are more blessed with respect to other things than
those here, and already for all future time they are immortal, if indeed the
things that are said are true, at any rate. But indeed, jury men, you ought to be
very hopeful for death, and you ought to consider this single truth, that there is
118

For the Orphic concept of the cycle, see Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 117-122.
The Orphic evidence indicates a specific method of reasoning in dichotomies. Plato also utilizes a
similar method of reasoning by engaging in the oscillation between questioning and answering called
philosophical dialectic: cf. Phaedo 78d2.
119
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nothing bad for a good man, neither while he is living nor after he has died, nor
are his sufferings uncared for by the gods.
(Plato Apology 41c-d)
In these concluding statements, Plato’s Socrates emphasizes the inherent immortality of
those who have died (τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί) and once again invokes an Orphic
Hieros Logos (τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ) as the true doctrine. Bluck (1961) suggests the
phrase τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί is a “technical expression associated with the
Mysteries.”120 The phrase is also reminiscent of Pindar’s description of the heroization of
initiates after paying the ποινή of Persephone: ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ,
“pure heroes for all future time” (Pindar fr. 133 Race). I argue Plato in the Apology is
referring to the same Orphic Hieros Logos as Pindar does.121 From what we know about
surviving Orphic texts, the sacred Orphic doctrine contained ritual formulae such as
Plato’s οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, “neither for one living nor after he is dead.”
The Orphic soteriological formula life/death is expressed variously in the extant
texts, such as on the Pelinna leaf where we read, νῦν ἔθανες καὶ ἐγένου, “now you have
died, now you were born” (26a/b.1 Graf), and the Olbian bone tablet cited above:
bios/thanatos/bios, “life/death/life.” Although the ritual formulae differ in word choice
and grammatical form, the message is consistently a cyclical pattern between life and
death. 122 I suggest that Plato’s use of the present participle ζῶντι in contrast with the
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Bluck 1961: 285. Cf. Phaedo 81a: ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν
χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγούσῃ; and Republic 469a: καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν δὴ χρόνον ὡς δαιμόνων
θεραπεύσομεν αὐτῶν τὰς θήκας.
121
It is significant that Pindar’s fr. 133 (Race) is preserved by Plato himself (at Meno 80c). I will discuss
the fragment of Pindar at length in Chapter Two below.
122
Plato’s use of these ritual and soteriological formulae extend to the Symposium where Diotima informs
Socrates that the ultimate Beauty is ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, “always being and
is neither becoming nor perishing” (211a). John Palmer (1999: 4) brilliantly pointed out the parallel
between Diotima’s description of Beauty and Parmenides’ first proposition, ὡς ἀγέωητον ἐὸν καὶ
ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, “that Being is ungenerated and imperishable” (B8.3 D-K). Palmer’s reading of Plato
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aorist participle τελευτήσαντι (in the phrase οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι at Apology
41d) expresses Plato’s own conceptualization of life as cyclical and continuing after
death as found in Orphic theology. This soteriological belief is succinctly expressed in
the finale of the Apology with a poignant μὲν/δὲ clause by Plato’s Socrates: ἀλλὰ γὰρ
ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· “But indeed now is
the departing hour, for me who is going to die, and for you who are going to live” (41e).
Here Plato uses future participles to convey the same idea conveyed by τὸν λοιπὸν
χρόνον of 41c, and his use of future time emphasizes the Orphic belief in the hereafter
and an existence beyond the present time. In other words, the dichotomy between life and
death in this world and a future life in the next is suggested again in the temporal aspect
of the participle βιωσομένοις (Apology 41e).
In the Apology, Plato employs a characteristically Orphic way of speaking about
death and its cyclical partner, life. This oscillation between life and death that the soul
endures is uniquely Orphic. Rohde (1925) eloquently described an Orphic initiate’s soul
as “perpetually alternating between an unfettered separate existence, and an ever-renewed
incarnation—traversing the great ‘Circle of Necessity’ in which it becomes the life
companion of many bodies both of men and beasts.”123 But the Orphic cult believed there

substantiated the long held claims of Parmenides’ influence on Plato, and he recognized “the parallels
between the proem and Orphic accounts of the initiate’s experience of the afterlife” (1999: 18). But
Palmer’s conjecture ends with only the hint of an earlier Orphic influence on Parmenides, whereas Guthrie
felt that Parmenides’ “language contains expressions which had their origin in the Orphic writings” (1993:
231). For Orphic influence on Parmenides see the following: Dieterich 1911: 413 on Dikē as an Orphic
goddess; Pfeiffer 1916: 126 for the Daimōn; and Cornford 1933: 100n2 for Parmenides’ address to mortals
paralleled by Orphic fragments. Parmenides describes the goddess Δίκη “Justice” as πολύποινος
“punishing severely” (1.37). According to Proclus, Orpheus first assigned Justice with the epithet
πολύποινος and quotes a hexameter line from an Orphic poem with the same formulaic diction as found in
Parmenides (Orph. fr. 158 Kern). This epithet is used by Parmenides only once and exclusively with Δίκη.
I suggest the epithet can be identified as Orphic based on the epithet’s derivative from ποινή, “bloodguilt.” The epithet relates Justice to the sphere of Orphic gods such as Persephone who receive the ποινή. I
will argue this point in Chapter Two below.
123
Rohde 1925: 342.
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was a “release” from this perpetual cycle of life and death, which was accomplished by
initiation and ritual purifications.
I have pointed out the way in which Plato invokes a Hieros Logos and then uses
key terms and formulae to create a systematic eschatological doctrine. Plato effectively
builds his eschatological program on the Orphic doctrine in order to give his
philosophical agenda a mythologically authoritative framework. In the Apology Socrates
depicts the benefit of “going out of town” as a metaphor for dying by explaining that a
blessed afterlife awaits him. His belief is not only structured upon the Orphic belief in the
immortality of the soul, and its release and judgment in the afterlife, but Socrates also
uses the Orphic soteriological formula in order to depict the cyclical nature of life and
death.124

I.5 The Orphic Hieros Logos: Plato’s Phaedo

Plato’s Socrates also presents a positive view of the afterlife in the Phaedo and
frames the eschatological view expressed in that dialogue within the tradition of a Hieros
Logos. The Phaedo primarily deals with the immortality of the soul, although Socrates
does not explicitly conclude that the soul is immortal until he has made an elaborate
succession of arguments for its proof.125 At the beginning of the dialogue Socrates once
124

It is significant that Plato even incorporates the soteriological formula life/death in his infamous passage
concerning a “hubbub” of Orphic books: λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς
ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, “Liberation and
purification through sacrifices and enjoyable games, for those who are still living and for those who have
died” (Republic 364e- 365a). I argue that by including the Orphic formula life/death in a passage referring
specifically to Orphic books implies that the formula was alluding to authentic Orphic belief.
125
Phaedo 105d-e: Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νυνδὴ ὠνομάζομεν; Ἀνάρτιον,
ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Εἶεν·
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again uses the word ἡ ἀποδημία to describe death as merely “going out of town”
(Phaedo 61e). Phrasing death in this way suggests the soul’s immortality and thereby
offers a comfort to his friends. Socrates then proclaims that he is going “to mythologize
about going out of town” (μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, Phaedo 61e). This
is Plato’s first allusion in the Phaedo to a Hieros Logos concerning death. Plato goes on
to establish three other beliefs within the frame of a Hieros Logos: that we humans are in
a sort of corporeal prison (62b), but that there is a hope for a better afterlife for the good
over the bad (63c), and that the living are reborn from the dead (70c). The ideas of the
body as a prison, the blissful afterlife, and the cyclical argument for life/death/life all
feature into what we know of Orphic beliefs.126
Socrates explains that the soul’s immortality hinges on an “ancient belief” that
men are imprisoned in bodies. This belief is explicitly presented as a Hieros Logos at
62b:
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ
ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ'
ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν·
The story told about these things which is told in secret, that we humans are in
sort of prison and we certainly must not release oneself from it nor run away
from it, seems to be both great and not easy to understand.
(Plato Phaedo 62b)

ὃ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Οὔ.
Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή. “Then what do we call that which does not admit the idea of the even? ‘Uneven’ he
said, Well then, what do we call that which does not admit justice and that which does not admit music?
‘Unmusical, and unjust’ he said. Well then, what do we call that which does not receive death? ‘Immortal’
he said. Therefore the soul does not receive death? ‘No.’ Then the soul is immortal.”
126
The idea of the body as the place of suffering which must be escaped in order for the soul to become like
a god and enjoy a blessed afterlife is expressed on the Thurian tablet (3 Graf and Johnston); see my
discussion of the Orphic idea of the cycle life/death/life in section I.4 above.
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Plato’s word ἀπόρρητος “secret” is used elsewhere specifically to refer to the
Mysteries,127 which suggests that Plato is alluding to a “secret” story known only to
initiates, and that Socrates is using the authority of this “secret story” to explain why it is
not right to kill oneself. The story explains that humans are in a sort of prison (ἔν τινι
φρουρᾷ); while Socrates explains that humans are possessions of the gods (ἓν τῶν
κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς, 62b). Socrates then poses a rhetorical question:
Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ
ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν
αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν;
If one of your possessions killed itself when you did not indicate that you wish it
to die, would you not be angry at it, and would you not punish it, if you had some
punishment?
(Plato Phaedo 62c)
Here Plato uses another key Orphic term τιμωρίαν, one of the elements included in the
Seventh Letter, which will be discussed in due course in Chapter Two below.
Socrates invokes the Hieros Logos again at Phaedo 63c and gives a positive
outlook of the afterlife: εὔελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ
πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς, “I am hopeful that there is
something for the dead, just as has been said even long ago, something much better for
the good than the bad” (Phaedo 63c). Then at Phaedo 64a, Socrates assigns the hope for
a blessed afterlife exclusively to those who practice dying—namely philosophers. Plato
builds his philosophical program upon the existing Mystery tradition by framing his
philosophical beliefs within the tradition of a Hieros Logos. Continuing within this
127

Burkert 1985: 276. Albinus (2000: 156) argues the aporrheton was a taboo on divulging or imitating the
Mysteries “outside the proper frame of ritual.” The rites of Dionysus are called ὄργιον ἄρρητον “a secret
rite” at Orphic Hymn 52.5 (Athanassakis 1977). See Edmonds 2013: 129 for a different argument, namely
that the use of terminology like “secrets” in the context of mystery rites is part of a rhetorical device
employed to enhance a speaker’s expertise in arcane matters.

50

authoritative tradition Plato argues that death is a “release” of the soul from the body
(τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν, Phaedo 64c), making use of the same
terminology as he does in the Seventh Letter and Apology (40e), as discussed above. The
concept of death as a release of the soul from the body depends on the soul’s immortality
because its very survival away from the body entails its inherent immortality.128
According to Plato, the philosopher’s soul releases from the body easier because of his
disassociation with bodily pleasures (Phaedo 65a, d). Socrates argues further that the
body is considered to be an evil thing that must necessarily be avoided in order to reach
the truth (66b). Plato thereby develops the Orphic idea of “release” within a framework
of philosophical morality, and simultaneously replaces the Orphic life of asceticism with
a philosophical life of moral logic.
Plato’s final recruitment of the Hieros Logos occurs at Phaedo 70c, where
Socrates affirms that that souls who have died are born again:
παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι
ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων.
Therefore there is an ancient story which we have remembered, that (souls) are
over there after arriving from here, and they come back here once again and are
generated from dead.
(Plato Phaedo 70c)
It is significant that here Plato uses the verb μεμνήμεθα (from the verb μιμνήσκω “to
remember”) to recall the ancient story because memory also plays a key role in
distinguishing initiates in the eschatology of the Gold Tablets and thereby securing their
salvation.129 The Orphic cyclical argument appears again here: the fact that the souls of
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Plato’s various uses of “release” are discussed at length in Part II below.
The connections between Memory and truth are brilliantly pointed out by Bernabé and Jiménez San
Cristóbal 2008:17. Plato also argues that it is the “exercise in death” (Phaedo 81a, 67a) by way of
129
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living beings are reborn from the dead necessitates a belief that souls must exist apart
from the body, as they continue to exist in the afterlife even after they depart this world
of the living (εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, 70c).
Beginning at Phaedo 108e Plato concludes his argument for the soul’s
immortality with an elaborate description of the regions of Hades and the fate awaiting
souls corrupted by the senses of the body. These ghastly regions of Hades are contrasted
with the higher realms, which are described as pure (ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν)
and more beautiful (114c). According to Socrates, the philosopher achieves these higher
realms by purifying his soul and living apart from the body. Purity also plays a key role
in sending the initiate to the groves of Persephone in the eschatology of the Gold
Tablets.130 Plato transposes the prerequisites for achieving a blessed afterlife (purity) and
redefines the Orphic suppliant as the philosopher. Socrates concludes both the dialogue
and his life by demonstrating why he approaches death with cheer—because he is a
philosopher and he will attain these pure regions of the afterlife.
Peter Kingsley (1996) demonstrates that the original outline for Plato’s
underworld in the Phaedo must be based on a poem ascribed to Orpheus,131 and argued
that if the motif of lying in the mud is Orphic, then the entire geography of the Phaedo is
also Orphic in origin.132 My argument in this chapter, however, focuses on Plato’s
specific diction and his use of terminology in the Phaedo. Plato compares the escape
philosophical “recollection” that wins the soul’s salvation—in other words, the soul must remember its
divine origins in order to be saved. Therefore, reincarnation for Plato is dependent on whether the
initiate/philosopher drinks of the river Lēthē and returns to a mortal body (cf. Republic 621a). As Albinus
(2000: 129) points out, the rivers Lēthē and Mnemosyne “had a ritual function of demarcation between
‘this’ world and ‘the other,’ or between the ‘profane’ and the ‘sacred.’”
130
The Thurian tablets use the terminology in their ritual prescription: ἔρχομαι ἐκ καθαρῶν καθαρά ...
ὥς με πρόφρων πέμψῃ ἕδρας ἐς εὐαγέων, “I come pure from the pure ... so that (Persephone) may
send me to the seats of the pure” (6.1-7, 7. 1-7 Graf).
131
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from the regions of Tartarus as a release from prison (ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ
δεσμωτηρίων 114c) and uses the verb ἀπαλλάσσω, whose forms we have already seen
in the eschatological contexts of the Apology and the Seventh Letter. The verb and its
forms feature prominently in the eschatology of the Phaedo and are discussed in the
following sections.

I.6 The Body/Soul Formula: The Corruption of the Human Soul

As I have argued in Part I above, Plato’s Socrates makes several rhetorical claims
for the soul’s immortality. Plato sets up these eschatological arguments in a way similar
to that found in the Orphic texts. I argue that we can identify the beliefs expressed by
Socrates as derived from such Orphic texts based on Plato’s rhetorical use of Orphic
formulae and incorporation of Orphic themes. In one of his arguments for the immortality
of the soul, Plato proposes that opposites are generated from opposites (Phaedo 71d), and
because the living are generated from the dead (Phaedo 72a) Plato makes a case for the
soul’s previous and future existence. Martin West (1982) connects Plato’s idea of
opposites with the Olbian tablets, yet he doubts whether reincarnation was what the
bios/thanatos/bios formula was expressing.133 Nevertheless, the Orphic formula still
preserves a soteriological point of view.
The soul’s immortality is defined by its relation to the body. Plato’s Socrates
expresses that humans are composed of both body and soul: τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ
ψυχή (Phaedo 79b). He goes on to conclude that because the body is mortal, then its
133
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guiding force, the soul, must resemble that which naturally rules—the divine (ἡ μὲν
ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θνητῷ, Phaedo 80a). Olbian tablet C (Graf) expresses
another important Orphic formula: σῶμα/ψυχή “body/soul.” I argue that Plato’s
opposition of body and soul in the Phaedo is a specific echo of the Orphic formula
expressed on Olbian bone tablet C (Graf), and that Plato employs a μὲν/δὲ construction
not only to show the contrast between body and soul, but also to show their natural
affinity.134 The two Orphic dichotomies life/death and body/soul are also intertwined in
their meaning; these formulae are an important way of speaking about eschatological
concepts for Plato. Throughout the Phaedo, Plato often compares the body to something
dead, namely a corpse (80c), or a mortal construct such as a prison (62b, 67d, 81e, 82e83, 114c). The body is defined as an evil thing from which the soul ought to free itself,
whereas the soul is defined by its immortality and its association with the divine.
This Orphic method of speaking in dichotomies is also exercised in the Gorgias,
where I argue Plato expresses both the Orphic soteriological formulae “life/death” and
“body/soul”:135
{ΣΩ.} Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι
θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων –
τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;
καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη γάρ του ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσα τῶν
σοφῶν ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ
ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶ τυγχάνει ὂν οἷον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ
μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἴσως
Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ
πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους.
134

Plato explains in the Phaedo that when the body and soul are joined, nature commands that one should
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135
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But certainly as you say, life is strange. For indeed I would not be amazed if
Euripides speaks the truth in the following, by saying:
“Who knows, if living is dying,
and dying is living?”
Indeed perhaps in reality we are dead; For already I have heard of this from the
wise men, that now we are dead and the body is our grave, and this part of the
soul in which the desires are happens to be able to persuade and to change
position up and down, and someone mythologizing this, a clever man, perhaps a
certain Sicilian or Italian, by portraying it by name he called it a “jar” [πίθον]
because it is both plausible [πιθανόν] and persuasive, and he called the senseless
ones uninitiated.
(Plato Gorgias 492e-493a)
In line with his previous eschatological arguments, Plato sets up this passage as a Hieros
Logos with the phrase λέγει ἀληθῆ “he speaks the truth” and attributes the soteriological
formula life/death to Euripides in order to give the belief more authority. In the Gorgias
Plato utilizes the construction σῶμα/σῆμα attributed to the Orphics in Cratylus 400c in
order to explain the belief that living is really dying, and dying is really living. However,
Dodds136 and others137 reject that the phrase τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα “the body is
our grave” is Orphic in origin. Dodds’ argument rests on his critical interpretation of
Cratylus 400c. In the Cratylus, Plato attributes to the Orphics the belief in the dichotomy
between body and soul, and the philological speculation that the body (σῶμα) can be
represented as the grave or sign (σῆμα) of the soul.
The Orphic idea that the body is a transitory representation of the immortal soul is
an inversion of the traditional Greek religious belief that the soul is the image (eidolon)
of the mortal body.138 At Cratylus 399d, Socrates proposes to analyze the etymology of
two Greek words, soul and body—the formula that we have seen on Olbian tablet C (Graf
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and Johnston). Socrates explains the word ψυχή to be derived from ἀναψῦχον “to
revive,” a compound from the verb ψύχειν “to refresh/revive,” because ψυχή revives the
body when it is incarnate, and the body decays when the soul leaves it (399e). This
etymological connection was also expressed by the author of the Hipponion tablet, who
explains that souls in the Underworld are able to perform two forms of “refreshment.”
The common souls of the dead refresh themselves (ψύχονται) at the first spring (1.4
Graf and Johnston), but the initiated soul passes beyond this first spring and gives a
password in order to drink the cold water (ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ) from the spring of Memory
(1.12 Graf and Johnston). The word ψυχρόν “cold,” cognate with ψύχειν,139 here
functions as part of the ritual password the initiate’s soul must present to the guardians of
the spring of Memory in the afterlife. Therefore we see on the Hipponion tablet the sort
of etymological speculation and philological word play that we have seen is characteristic
of Orphic thought. I argue, therefore, that Plato is adopting this Orphic etymology and
transposing it into his own scientific doctrine of etymology in the Cratylus. Then at 400b
Plato takes this idea further by creating his own more scientific (τεχνικώτερον)
derivation of the word ψυχή from ἔχει and φύσιν, because the soul holds the nature of
the body. Here we see the transposition process in full force: Plato begins by relying on
an Orphic etymology, but then expands into a more rational explanation of the idea by
redefining the word in his own terms. Then Socrates explains the etymology of the word
“body” and he explicitly identifies it as an Orphic etymology:
{ΣΩ.} Τὸ σῶμα λέγεις; {ΕΡΜ.} Ναί. {ΣΩ.} Πολλαχῇ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε· ἂν
μὲν καὶ σμικρόν τις παρακλίνῃ, καὶ πάνυ. καὶ γὰρ <σῆμά> τινές φασιν αὐτὸ
εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τούτῳ
<σημαίνει> ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ “σῆμα” ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι.
139
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δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς
δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον
ἔχειν, ἵνα <σῴζηται>, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο,
ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, [τὸ] “σῶμα,” καὶ
οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδ' ἓν γράμμα.
[Socrates:] Do you mean the body? [Hermogenes:] Yes. [Socrates:] For many
reasons this seems best to me at any rate; if someone alters it a little, even very
(little). For indeed some say it is the tomb of the soul, as if (the soul) is buried in
the present moment; and furthermore for this reason by means of this thing [i.e.,
the body] the soul indicates whatever it indicates, and for this reason (the body) is
called correctly “sign.” However, the Orphics140 seem to me to especially apply
this name, since the soul is paying the penalty on account of the things which it
pays, and (the soul) has this (the body) as its enclosure, just like a prison, in order
that it is kept safe (or saved); and therefore that this is the “body” of the soul, just
as the thing itself is called, until (the soul) can pay off what it owes in full, and it
is not even necessary to change a single letter.
(Plato Cratylus 400c)
Dodds’ argument that the σῶμα/σῆμα idea is not Orphic141 rests on three critical
premises. First, he claims that what is attributed to the Orphics is a derivation of σῶμα
from σῴζηται, which is confirmed by the last phrase καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδ' ἓν
γράμμα, and not a derivation of σῆμα from σῶμα, which he claims would conflict with
the last phrase (οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδ' ἓν γράμμα). But this argument disregards
the deliberate phrase “σῆμα” ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι “it is correctly called “tomb/sign.” Plato
is clearly speaking about the body here (τὸ σῶμα λέγεις), and therefore, I argue, he must
be referring to the σῶμα as σῆμα. However, Dodds’ argument is still useful, and his
emphasis on the connection between σῶμα and σῴζηται strengthens the σῶμα/σῆμα
idea as an authentic Orphic belief because the phrase ἵνα σῴζηται has ἡ ψυχή as its
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implied subject, which denotes that the soul has the possibility of salvation—a central
Orphic belief.142
Dodds’ second contention that σῶμα/σῆμα is not Orphic in origin is that it is
attributed to τινές “without further specification.”143 I argue, rather, that οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα
is the further specification of the σῶμα/σῆμα idea because of the adverb μάλιστα which
helps explain τινές. As I read it, Plato says some people hold the σῶμα/σῆμα idea,
especially the Orphics. Lastly Dodds argues, “we cannot suppose ‘the Orphic poets’ to be
either identical with, or included among, ‘some persons.’”144 But I argue that τινές must
be the same as the οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα because of the phrase “σῆμα” ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι,
“called correctly ‘a tomb/sign,’” where once again the adverb μάλιστα further qualifies
the Orphics as claiming this belief.
Lastly, I argue we can identify the belief as Orphic based on the verb ἐκτείσῃ, the
aorist subjunctive of ἐκτίνω “to pay in full.” The verb is related to a family of words that
express economic ideas of exchange and debt such as τιμή/τίω and ποινή/τίνω, and as I
argue the entire family can refer specifically to the Orphic belief of salvation for the soul
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by paying a penalty or debt.145 Therefore, I argue the occurrence of the word ἐκτίνω
within this Orphic context of Cratylus 400c adds to the evidence of the σῶμα/σῆμα idea
as an authentic Orphic belief.

I.7 The Body/Soul Formula: Pythagorean Beliefs in σῶμα/σῆμα

The Orphic belief that the soul is imprisoned in the body and must pay a penalty
for its “release” was also proclaimed by the Pythagoreans, whose beliefs and ideas Plato
expressed.146 Although scholars typically consider Pythagoreanism and Orphism to be
distinct cults, their fundamental doctrine of the soul was identical.147 In fact according to
Proclus, Plato inherited the Orphic teachings from Pythagoras, who was initiated by
Aglaophamus;148 Iamblichos proclaimed Pythagoras was another link in the chain of
initiates in the line of Orpheus.149 According to Clement of Alexandria,150 the Socratic
grammarian Epigenes studied the symbolism and authorship of the Orphic poems known
as the Εἰς Ἅιδου κατάβασις “Descent into Hades” and the Ἵερὸς λόγος “Sacred
story,” which Epigenes maintained were written by Pythagoreans.151 As early as the fifth
century BCE, Ion of Chios attributed Orphic poems and beliefs about the afterlife to
Pythagoras, and Herodotus stated that the Orphic rites were associated with the
Pythagoreans.152 The fact that our ancient sources inform us that Orphic and Pythagorean
145
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doctrines overlapped not only affirms the intimate connections between the various
mystery sects, but also suggests that we can make use of Pythagorean doctrines to help
explain features of Orphism.153 According to Philolaus, the first Pythagorean to write
down the Pythagorean doctrine (as reported by Clement of Alexandria):
μαρτυρέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες, ὡς διά τινας
τιμωρίας ἁ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται καὶ καθάπερ ἐν σήματι τούτῳ
τέθαπται.
The ancient theologians and priests testify that the soul is yoked to the body
because of some punishments and for that reason has been buried in this tomb.
(Clement of Alexandria Stromateis 3.3.17)
Here we have evidence of a Pythagorean belief that the soul was buried in the body, and
that the body is specifically the “sign/tomb” of the soul (ἐν σήματι τούτῳ τέθαπται).
This belief is expressed with the same formula σῶμα/σῆμα as in Plato’s Cratylus.
Philolaus also uses the term τιμωρίας, which we have already seen in Plato’s Seventh
Letter. The noun τιμωρία is related to the verb ἐκτείσῃ of Cratylus 400c (ἕως ἂν
ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, “until [the soul] can pay off what it owes in full”) through their
common Proto Indo-European root.154 Although this citation of Philolaus comes from a
late source (Clement of Alexandria = Titus Flavius Clemens, ca. 150 CE), I suggest it can
inform our reading of the σῶμα/σῆμα idea in Plato’s Cratylus and help confirm it as
Orphic in origin.155 Because the Pythagorean theory of the soul and the group’s way of
life was identical to the Orphic belief system, I argue this passage of Philolaus helps to
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demonstrate that Plato was attributing the σῶμα/σῆμα idea to the Orphics. Furthermore,
Philolaus, as a Pythagorean, attributes this idea to ancient theologians (οἱ παλαιοὶ
θεολόγοι), who could be none other than the disseminators of Orphic doctrine.
Returning to the passage of the Gorgias (492e-493a) quoted above, I argue we
can identify the belief as Orphic not only based on the σῶμα/σῆμα idea, but also on
Plato’s use of Orphic formulae. The oscillation156 between living and dying is an Orphic
idea, as Olbian bone tablet A attests. Plato suggests that this idea is ἀληθῆ “true,” which
we also find on the bone tablet. Furthermore, the attribution of these ideas (life/death,
σῶμα/σῆμα) to wise men and Plato’s reference to “a certain Sicilian or Italian” (ἴσως
Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, Gorgias 493a) strongly suggest that he is referring to a
Pythagorean or Orphic source, since both Sicily and southern Italy were epicenters of
early Orphic and Pythagorean development. Moreover, the Pythagorean evidence quoted
above adds to this conclusion because it records the same use of terminology (i.e.,
σῶμα/σῆμα).

I.8 The Body/Soul Formula: Plato’s ἀπαλλαγή “Release” of the Soul
from the Body

Now that we have outlined the corresponding Platonic and Orphic beliefs in the
dichotomy between body and soul, it is possible to understand why the soul must pay a
penalty for its bondage, why it has the possibility of salvation, and why it can be
156
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“released” from both the body and ultimately from the cycle of (re)incarnation. Socrates
defines death in the Phaedo as a release of the soul from the body, such that death is not
evil but rather a kerdos/agathon “profitable/beneficial thing.” Plato emphatically
describes death as a “release” at Phaedo 64c5 with ἀπαλλαγήν, and he echoes the verbs
again in a tricolon construction at 64c6 (ἀπαλλαγὲν) and 64c7 (ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν) in order
to establish the standard terminology for speaking about death—namely, as a release of
the soul from body. This is significant because ritual language often occurs in a tripartite
structure.157 I argue that Plato here is transposing ritual language and redefining it to suit
his goal of showing that Philosophy is the correct means to achieve a better release from
the body and thus a better afterlife.
We have already seen that the author of Plato’s Seventh Letter was aware of an
Orphic Hieros Logos in the specific diction pertaining to the soul’s “release” from the
body, and now we see the same concept and terminology used in the Apology and
Phaedo. The noun ἀπαλλαγή “release” is derived from the verb ἀπαλλάσσω “to set
free,” a compound of the preposition ἀπὸ “away from” and the verb ἀλλάσσω “to
change, alter.” This is the verbal form of the adjective ἄλλος “another,” as in the soul’s
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departure from here to another place (see my discussion in Part I above on Apology
40c11).
The verb ἀλλάσσω also yields economic terms such as the noun ἀλλαγή “to
exchange, barter,” and the verb καταλλάσσω “to change money.”158 The verb
καταλλάσσω figures into Socrates’ argument at Phaedo 69b that pleasure and pain
should not be exchanged with pleasure and pain, but rather that wisdom is the correct
coinage to obtain truth. Socrates then asserts at 69c that truth is a purification for the
pleasures and pains of the body. This extended simile demonstrates the semantic range of
the root verb ἀλλάσσω because it conveys both the idea of the release of the soul from
the body—namely death—as well as the idea that the soul is corruptible by the body’s
purchase or exchange of pleasure for pleasure. Plato asserts that only wisdom (φρόνησις,
69b1) ought to purchase pleasures. He then equates the idea of philosophical truth with
καθαρσίς “purification” as a release from the cycle of rebirth. Plato goes on to invoke
the tradition of the mysteries whose teachings proclaim that those who die unpurified will
lie in the βορβόρῳ “filth,”159 but that those who are κεκαθαρμένος “purified” will
dwell with the gods. In the Republic, Plato contrasts the uninitiated who lie in the πηλός
“mud” with those initiates who dwell at an eternal drinking party (363d). When the soul
ceases from the grief of incarnation in the physical body and comes in communion with
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Frogs (145-151; 274), and he even pokes fun at Euripides’ use of the life/death formula (cf. Edmonds
2013: 272). It is interesting that the word “mud” in both Greek (βορβόρος) and Hittite (mirmirrus) is
onomatopoeic, and we even find similarities between the Orphic myth of Persephone and Dionysus in the
Hittite myth of the voyage of the soul of the Sun goddess of the earth and her son “the desired one”; cf.
Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal: 214.
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its divine source, it forms a union with the divine that Plato calls φρόνησις “wisdom”
(Phaedrus 79d). The καθαρσίς “purification” which leads to φρόνησις was a special
element of initiation into the Mysteries, as Plato explains in terms of the dichotomy
between the afterlife for those uninitiated and those initiated in Mysteries:
οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ
ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου
ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος
ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς
τελετάς, “ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι.” οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν
κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς.
Those who established the Mysteries for us were not thoughtless, but in reality by
speaking in ancient riddles that whosoever arrives in Hades uninitiated and
ignorant of the rites will lie in filth, but whosoever arriving there after having both
purified and initiated himself will dwell with the gods. “For there certainly are,”
as they say in the Mysteries, “many thrysus-bearers, but few Bacchae.” These
(mystics), in my opinion, are none other than those who have practiced
philosophy correctly.
(Plato Phaedo 69c1-d2)160
Plato quotes from a poem attributed to the Mysteries and marks the beginning of Cebes’
questioning on the soul as material derived from the Mysteries. Cebes begins with
another ritualistic tripartite repetition by using the verb ἀπαλλάσσω at 70a2 (ἀπαλλαγῇ
τοῦ σώματος), 70a4 (ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος), and 70a7 (ἀπηλλαγμένη
τούτων τῶν κακῶν). Here again Plato asserts his philosophical agenda by redefining
ritual language within the framework of philosophical inquiry, such that those who
practice philosophy become equated with mystery cult initiates.
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Albinus (2000: 139) notes, “although Plato himself often clothed his thoughts in a veil of myth, he
clearly condemned the automatic solution of ritual. The only way ‘initiation’ (τελετή) and ‘purification’
(καθαρμός) could be regarded as processes of improvement was in the sense of being philosophical
practices.” Albinus’ point is that Platonic discourse transposes Orphic rites of purification into an exercise
in death (μελέτη θανάτου, Phaedo 81a); in other words, for Plato rites of purification are equated with
philosophical practice.

64

I.9 The Body/Soul Formula: Orphic Fragments Referring to “Release”

The noun ἀπαλλαγή is typically used in tragedy as a release from something
undesirable,161 such as the body at Phaedo 64c and 70c, but the noun ἀπαλλαγή is not
found in any surviving Orphic fragments. However, the verb ἀλλάσσω does occur once
in an Orphic fragment describing transmigration of the soul. In Orphic fragment 437 F
Bernabé (= 226 Kern), Clement of Alexandria quotes a few hexameter lines from an
Orphic poem which describe the soul’s cyclical journey through the elements:
ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῇ θάνατος, χὐδάτεσσι δὲ γαῖα
ἐκ δ᾽ ὕδατος <πέλε> γαῖα, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ γαίας πάλιν ὕδωρ,
ἐκ τοῦ δὴ ψυχὴ ὅλον αἰθέρα ἀλλάσσουσα.
Water is death for the soul, and earth is (death) for liquids,
but from water <comes> earth, and from earth, water once again,
from that indeed soul is (continuously) transferring to the entire aether.
Although the first line is corrupt, a fragment of Heraclitus (fr. 66(a) Marcovich = B 36
DK) is almost identical and describes a cyclical conversion of the elements. The Orphic
fragment also describes a cyclical transformation of the soul through various elements.
Although Martin West and Madayo Kahle162 argue that this fragment does not fit with
reincarnation doctrine, nevertheless I suggest the cyclical idea of reincarnation is implied
in line 2 in the exchange between earth and water. Furthermore, the cyclical idea is
evident in the grammar of the adverb πάλιν, which evokes the idea of palingenesis as
well as by the aspect of the present participle ἀλλάσσουσα which gives the sense of a
continuous, and hence cyclical, transformation.

161
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Rowe 1993: 137.
West 1983: 223, Kahle 2011.
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Simplicius also cites a line from an Orphic poem in reference to the word
“release” (Orphic fragment 348 F Bernabé = 230 Kern). He ascribes the belief in
“release” to the Orphics by explaining the cyclical relationship of generation and he uses
the infinitive form of ἀπαλλάσσω:
γενέσεως τροχῷ, οὗπερ ἀδύνατον ἀπαλλαγῆναι κατὰ τὸν Ὀρφέα μὴ τοὺς
θεοὺς ἐκείνους ἱλεωσάμενον
“οἷς ἐπέταξεν”
ὁ Ζεὺς
“κύκλου τ' ἀλλῆξαι καὶ ἀμψῦξαι κακότητος”
τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχάς.
In the wheel of generation, the very one from which it is impossible to be
released, according to the Orphics, unless one has propitiated those gods: Zeus
“commanded” the human souls “for them both to cease from the cycle and to be
relieved from evil.”
(Simplicius In Aristotelis de Caelio Comentarii 7.377.14 Heiberg)
From this fragment we learn there was an Orphic belief that humans could be released
from the cycle of generation by propitiating certain gods. The fragments use the
terminology ἀπαλλαγῆναι and ἀλλῆξαι, both forms of ἀλλασσω and its derivatives.
Furthermore, we also see forms of the verb ἀλλασσω used in the description of Zeus
mingling the cosmic elements in the Derveni Papyrus (IX.7, 9 Kouremenos, Parássoglou,
and Tsantsanoglou 2006), although here the word seems to mean “alter” or “change”.163
The Orphic sources seem to incorporate forms of the verb ἀλλασσω within descriptions
of primordial generation, and the word appears to signify a change at the elemental level.
I argue Plato transposes this verb into his descriptions of the soul’s “release” from the
body—that is a change between elements. In Plato’s use of the word, the soul is imagined
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Cf. Kouremenos, Parássoglou, and Tsantsanoglou 2006: 179-180, Laks and Most 1997: 13.
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as changing or “releasing” from its incorporeal condition to its original, and pure
condition.

1.10 The Body/Soul Formula: Forms of Release (ἀπαλλαγή) in the
Phaedo

Plato’s uses of ἀπαλλάσσω and its derivatives appear exclusively in arguments
concerning the immortality of the soul (Phaedo 70a, 84b, 107c; cf. [sc. ψυχή]
ἀπαλλαχθῇ τοῦ σώματος, Letter 7, 335a5, quoted above). To my knowledge the only
other attested uses of ἀπαλλαγή or ἀλλάσσω within the context of a soul’s immortality
are Orphic fragment 437 F (Bernabé) with its use of the participle ἀλλάσσουσα, and
fragment 348 F (Bernabé) quoted above. Plato frequently uses the verb ἀπαλλάσσω “to
set free,” “to separate,” or “to release” in descriptions of death. Plato defines death as a
“release” from the body and employs the grammatical construction of a genitive of
separation or the use of the preposition ἀπὸ plus the genitive of the body.
In the Phaedo, Socrates describes death as a release of the soul from the body:
Ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι
τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ
σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν [ἀπὸ] τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν
αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο;
Don’t (we believe that death) is nothing other than the release of the soul from
the body? And (we think that) being dead is this, the body’s having come to be
apart, separated from the soul, just by itself, and the soul’s being apart, just by
itself, separated from the body? Death can’t be anything other than this?
(Plato Phaedo 64c)164
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Plato uses ἀπαλλαγή frequently in Phaedo to describe death: ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, “since
at the release from the body (70a); ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, “at the release from the body” (84b); εἰ
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This idea of death as a release from the body is framed within the tradition of the Hieros
Logos, which Plato established at Phaedo 62b and 63c. I argue that Plato uses the word
ἀπαλλάσσω and its derivatives as an Orphic term for death because of the word’s
association with the immortality of the soul.

I.11 The Body/Soul Formula: Dialysis and Other Forms of Release in
Phaedo

In addition to the word family of ἀπαλλαγή and its verbal forms, Plato also uses
the word family of λύω and its nominal forms to express the idea of death as a release of
the soul from the body. In the passage from the Phaedo quoted above (62b), Plato uses
the verb λύω to describe death as a release. The goal of Orphism was the release of the
soul from the body, and its reunion with the divine after it is “freed from the necessity of
rebirth.”165 Plato’s frequent use of specific vocabulary expressing the idea of the “release
of the soul” (λύω and ἀπαλλαγή) strongly suggests his familiarity with Orphic
Mysteries. In the Gorgias (524b) Plato describes death as a release: ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει
ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ
σώματος, “Death happens to be, as it seems to me, nothing other than the release of two
things, the soul and the body.” Plato’s use of the dual form δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν suggests

μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε
σώματος ἅμ' ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὑτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, “for if death were a release from
everything, then it would be a god-send for the wicked, who, when they died, would be freed at the same
time from both the their body and the wickedness with their soul” (107c).
165
Rohde 1925: 345.
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the soul and body are a naturally bonded pair. The body cannot live without the soul, but
for the Orphic initiate, the soul’s true home without the body was in the afterlife.
In the Phaedo Plato’s Socrates first asserts with a present participle that the
philosopher frees his soul from the body: δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι
μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας “it is clear that the Philosopher
is the one who especially releases the soul from its communion with the body” (Phaedo
64e-65a). Plato establishes that it is the philosopher over and above other men who has
the capacity to release the soul from the body, and he goes on to affirm at 65d that the
philosopher also despises the body because of its corruption of the soul. Plato uses the
noun λύσις again to describe death as a release from body (θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις
καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, 67d5), and the phrase is formulaically repeated at
67d9. Socrates goes on to explain that the philosophers are the ones who practice this
state of release or dying during life in order to be prepared for the experience, which
illustrates Socrates’ hope for the afterlife. Furthermore, the practice of λύσις “release” is
directly tied to the practice of philosophy throughout the Phaedo (τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ. . . τῇ
ἐκείνης λύσει, Phaedo 82d7; ἡ φιλοσοφία ... τὴν ψυχὴν ... λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, 83a4; τῇ
λύσει ... ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ, 83b6; τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν ... λύειν,
84a4).166 Plato thereby refashions the Orphic ritual practice of release into a philosophical
goal.
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Plato uses many creative ways to speak of death as a separation in the Phaedo, such as a διάλυσις
“release” as we saw in the Gorgias quoted above: διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἣ τῇ ψυχῇ, “release from the
body for the soul” (Phaedo 88b), as well as with the separation preposition “χωρὶς” and its derivatives.
Death is described as separation and is related to cathartic practices and release (λύσις): ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται
χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος (Phaedo 67a). Purity is equated to freeing oneself from the body: οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ
ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης (Phaedo 67a). Purification consists in separating the soul
from the body: Κάθαρσις ... τὸ χωρίζειν ... ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν (Phaedo 67c). Death is
therefore a release or separation from the body: λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος (Phaedo
67d5).
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The idea of λύσις as a separation of body and soul is similar to the view
expressed on the Pelinna tablet, which instructs the initiate: εἰπεῖν Φερσεφόναι σ᾽ ὅτι
Βακχιος αὐτὸς ἔλυσε, “Tell Persephone that Bacchus himself released you” (26a, b
Graf = L7a, b Bernabé).167 Although the connection of release between body and soul is
not as explicit on the Tablet as it is with Plato, the ritual funerary context of the Tablets
implies that the release referred to is specifically death and the soul’s release from the
body.168 The connection between Plato’s λύσις and the Tablet’s ἔλυσε suggests that Plato
inherited the parlance of the Mysteries and developed his own system for instructing the
Orphic rites. I argue the Platonic doctrine of the soul’s release from the body is the same
Orphic doctrine of the soul represented on the Gold Tablets, but reworked and
represented within a philosophical context. Plato transposed the ritual language of the
Orphic mysteries and developed a scientific methodology for expounding the Orphic
doctrine by means of the Socratic dialectic method. Instead of Bacchus releasing the soul
from the body, Plato elevates philosophy as the correct way to release the soul from the
body. Plato thereby effectively redefines the mystical terminology and simultaneously
promotes his philosophical agenda.
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Compare ὁ Διόνυσος λύσεώς “Dionysus the liberator” (OF 350 Bernabé = OF 232 Kern) and the
Orphic hymn addressed to Dionysus the Liberator: λύσιε δαῖμον “liberating daimōn” (Orphic Hymn 50.2
Athanassakis). Graf (1993: 243) points out: “The term lusis cannot just mean death as the freeing of the
soul from the body: why should that be the work of Dionysus, and why should that be relevant to
Persephone? It has to be more, namely, release from punishment after death that would otherwise be in
store for humankind.”
168
Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008: 96) demonstrate that the situation of tablet L8 (3 Graf) is “the
moment when the soul leaves the light of the sun, that is, when it abandons its body in its passage to
Hades.”
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I.12 The Body/Soul Formula: The Soul’s Imprisonment and Its
Possibility of Salvation Expressed in the Zagreus Myth

As I have pointed out, Socrates describes death as a release of the soul from the
body at Phaedo 64c. This philosophical speculation concerning death is introduced at 62b
(see section I.5 above) when Socrates explains the reason for the unlawfulness of suicide.
As I have argued, Plato sets up this belief as a Hieros Logos with the phrase ὁ ἐν
ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος λόγος. The noun λόγος “story” is emphasized by the participle
form λεγόμενος, which is qualified as ἀπορρήτοις “in secret.” Here the secret doctrine
is literally “speaking” (λεγόμενος), which expresses the performative function of the
Hieros Logos argued by Graf and Johnston.169 In this passage, I argue that Plato
introduces the secret Orphic doctrine concerning the soul’s imprisonment in the body
(φρουρᾷ).170 The idea that the soul needs to be released from the body is dependent on
the body’s inherent evil or corruption (see Phaedo 66b) and the soul’s potential
corruptibility through its attachment to the body. This is why the body is compared to a
φρουρά “prison” in the Phaedo or as the σῆμα “tomb/sign” in the Cratylus. According
to Platonic and Orphic beliefs, the body corrupts and is therefore the prison for the soul.
Plato’s pupil Xenocrates remarked that the φρουρά is Titanic, and that its
interpretation culminates in the myth of Dionysus (Xenocrates fr. 20 Heinze).171 If we
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See Graf and Johnston 2007: 183. Furthermore, Albinus (2000: 111) points out the performative
function of Orphic texts: “Orphic discourse invited its participants to act out the past according to a certain
frame of myth, whereas the Homeric discourse invited its participants to listen to the past according to a
certain frame of ritual.”
170
Even Edmonds (2013:275) remarks that the scholiast identifies the word φρουρᾷ in this section of the
Phaedo as an Orphic term.
171
οὔτε τἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἡ φρουρά, ὥς τινες, οὔτε ἡ ἡδονή, ὡς Νουμήνιος, οὔτε ὁ δημιουργός, ὡς
Πατέριος, ἀλλ', ὡς Ξενοκράτης, Τιτανική ἐστιν καὶ εἰς Διόνυσον ἀποκορυφοῦται, “The φρουρά
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understand this elusive statement as a reference to an Orphic myth, then the φρουρά
corresponds to the portion that must be expiated—the body, which would explain why
Xenocrates says that the φρουρά is Titanic because according to the Zagreus myth the
Titans represented the body.
The aitiological Orphic myth of Chthonian Dionysus-Zagreus explains the
necessity and justification for the soul’s corruption by the body and its possibility for
salvation. The obscure myth whereby humans were thought to be composed of a portion
inherited from Dionysus and a portion from the Titans was described in detail by
Damascius and Olympiodorus in their commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. Yet, like
everything else Orphic, scholars are still divided as to whether the Zagreus myth was an
authentic ancient doctrine172 or rather a Neo-Platonic fabrication in response to the rise of
Christianity.173 But I point out that Zagreus was already associated with Dionysus by
Euripides in a fragment of his Cretans quoted by Porphyry of Tyre (De Abstinentia 4.19).
Pausanias informs us that Onomacritus “organized the Mysteries and made the Titans the
authors of Dionysus’ suffering” (συνέθηκεν ὄργια καὶ εἶναι τοὺς Τιτᾶνας τῷ
Διονύσῳ τῶν παθημάτων ἐποίησεν αὐτουργούς, 8.37.6).
According to the myth as preserved by Damascius and Olympiodorus,174 the
infant Dionysus roused the wrath of Hera. She incited the Titans to distract the infant

[prison] is not a good thing, as some claim: it is not pleasure, as Noumenios says, nor is it the demiurge as
Paterios says, but rather, as Xenocrates claims, it is Titanic and culminates in Dionysus.”
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Linforth 1941: 350, Burkert 1985: 298, Dodds 2004: 155-156, West 1983: 166.
173
Edmonds 1999 and 2013. Edmonds argues that because none of the four “strands” (Edmonds’ term) of
the Zagreus myth appear together, the myth must be a later fabrication. Furthermore, he argues that
doctrinal Orphism is convenient and easy to accept for scholars from a Christian background (Edmonds
2013: 395).
174
Edmonds (2013: 379) also contends that Olympiadorus’ story does not include inherited guilt (one of his
strands of the Zagreus myth). But Parker (2014: no pagination) counters, “in speaking of a fragment of
Dionysus within mankind, Olympiodoros was drawing out an implication of an existing story, not
constructing a new narrative sequence in the way postulated by Edmonds for the anthropogony.”
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with toys and a mirror, after which the Titans killed Dionysus, dismembered him, and fed
upon his flesh. The Titans were subsequently blasted by Zeus, and from their ashes
sprang the human race, which contained a portion of Dionysus and a portion of the
Titans. This myth formed what some scholars identify as an “original sin” story. The
Titanic portion constitutes the human body and its corruption, whereas the portion that
was originally Dionysus constitutes the human soul and offers the possibility of its
salvation. While we need not refer to the Titanic portion as “sin,” it can rather be
designated in economic terms as a “debt.” The goal of Orphism was to purify the Titanic
portion through a series of incarnations by refraining from the παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν
φύσιν “ancient Titanic nature” (Plato Laws 701c) or carnal appetites, and by paying off
the soul’s debt, with the ultimate goal of being saved from the cycle of incarnations.
For my thesis, I argue that Plato’s idea of the soul’s imprisonment at Phaedo 62b
is a direct albeit veiled reference to the myth of Dionysus-Zagreus. In the Zagreus myth,
the Titans represent the prison for the immortal soul or Dionysus and as Bluck points out,
Plato’s pupil Xenocrates “associated the body-prison idea with the Titans and with
Dionysus.”175 Plato also refers to the φρουρά in the Gorgias (525a), as the place where
the soul endures πάθη (“sufferings”) that correspond to Plato’s function of the body in
the Phaedo. The word for the soul’s πάθη (“sufferings”) is related to the word πένθεος
(“grief”). The word πένθεος occurs in a fragment of Pindar quoted in the Meno 81b7 (=
Pindar fr. 133), and is usually considered to express Orphic belief. This fragment says
Persephone will immortalize those who pay the price for the ancient πένθεος. Tannery
(1899) and Rose (1943) both argued that the πένθεος of Persephone at Meno 81b7 is a
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Bluck 1961: 279.
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reference to the Orphic myth of the dismemberment of Dionysus-Zagreus by the Titans.176
I argue that the “grief of Persephone” in Plato is a reference to the Titanic portion of
mankind177 and suggest that the idea of the body as a prison where sufferings are endured
is related to the “grief” of Persephone. If Pindar’s fragment of Persephone is evidence for
the Zagreus myth, then Plato’s use of φρουρά is also evidence. Burkert (1985) argued
that Plato’s repetitive use of the unusual word φρουρά indicates that this word was a
symbolon used to indicate a secret interpretation for initiates in Orphic cult.178
In the following chapter, I will argue that the φρουρά indicates the body or
Titanic portion, and Plato’s use of τινι in the Phaedo (ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ, 62b) refers
specifically to the Titans through the indefinite pronoun’s suggestion of a certain portion,
i.e., the body. This argument follows Yates’ detailed investigation into the Titanic origins
of men: “the Titans as the principle of separation are responsible for the world of
plurality.”179 The Titans as the Hesiodic strivers against the Olympians function as the
principle of the separation of the soul from the gods and its banishment into a physical
body. I argue that this Dionysus-Titan myth circulated as part of an original secret Orphic
initiate myth or Hieros Logos, as Burkert concludes: “the dismemberment of Dionysos
was an unspeakable doctrine of the mysteries,”180 and “Herodotus [2.171] considered it a
secret although he has several allusions to it.”181 The following chapter will focus on the
myth of Zagreus and the use of key Orphic terminology related to the repayment of the
soul’s “debt.” I will assimilate two opposing methods for investigating the Orphic
176

Tannery 1899: 126; Rose 1943: 247.
This fragment also seems to depict the rite concerning the descent of souls dramatized in the Eleusinian
mysteries.
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Burkert 1985: 302. On φρουρά as an “unusual word” and therefore marked, see Rowe 1993: 128.
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Yates 2004: 190.
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Burkert 1985: 298.
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Burkert 1987: 73.
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discourse. On the one hand, following the work of Bernabé I will speak of Orphism as
unified movement. On the other hand, following the work of Edmonds I will separate the
Christian idea of original sin, and read the Orphic fragments within their literary and
historical context. My approach will attempt to present a new understanding of doctrinal
Orphism free from the influences of Christian and Neo-Platonic dogma.
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Chapter Two: ποινή and the Zagreus Myth

Introduction

In Chapter One I argued that we could identify Plato’s formulaic transposition of
Orphic discourse by his use of a constellation of terminology expressed within the
context of death and the afterlife, a constellation that I have termed the Orphic
eschatological syntagm. I discussed Plato’s use of the following terminology: forms of
the words λέγω/λογός as way to invoke a Hieros Logos; the framing of the immortality
of the soul as a benefit; the use of formulae such as the duality between σῶμα/ψυχή
(body/soul) and βίος/θάνατος (life/death); and derivations of the verbs ἀλλάσσω and
λύω as ways to describe the soul’s “release” from the body.
I also pointed out several occurrences of the use of the verbs τίνω and τίω within
the Orphic eschatological context such as the phrase τίνειν τιμωρίας (“to pay the
penalty”) in the description of the Hieros Logos quoted in the Platonic Seventh Letter; the
imperative form τιμωρήσασθε (“to punish”) in the Apology (41e); the compound form
ἐκτίνω in the Cratylus (400c); and the use of the noun τιμωρίαν in the Phaedo within
the explicit context of Mystery cults (62c). The word τιμωρία as a derivative of τιμή and
τίω belongs to a semantic field of terms meaning “a penalty or debt”—including the verb
τίνω (“to pay”) and its cognate ποινή (“blood-price”). The French linguist Emile
Benveniste argued against a direct etymological connection between ποινή and τιμή
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through their root verbs τίνω and τίω;182 however, he did thoroughly explain the
connections between the forms:
In order to give the problem its full scope we shall first consider the etymological
group with which timḗ is connected. It constitutes a vast family of words, so
extensive and diversified that the connexions between the forms sometimes create
difficulty. We list the chief members: besides tíō, timáō, átimos ‘deprived of
timḗ’, we must cite the group of tínō (τίνω) ‘pay’, tínumai (τίνυμαι), ‘cause to
pay, cause to expiate’, tísis (τίσις) ‘punishment, vengeance’, átitos (ἄτιτος) ‘not
paid, unpunished’, etc. As we see, the terms refer to the payment of a debt,
compensation for some misdeed. Further relatives are poinḗ, (ποινή), debt which
must be paid to atone for a crime . . . they can all be derived from a root *kwei-.183
In addition to the overlapping semantics of the terms, these words and their verbal
derivatives frequently occur in the same afterlife context. The terms ποινή, τιμή, and
τιμωρία are the focus of Chapter Two. Whether or not the etymological connections
between ποινή and τιμή can be proved, I argue Plato uses these terms formulaically in
his transposition of the Orphic discourse. I maintain that Plato’s frequent use of τιμωρία
and its relative ποινή within eschatological contexts points to the words’ usage as Orphic
formulae.

II.1 Meno 80c and ποινή

The Greek word ποινή is used only once by Plato in his corpus when he quotes a
fragment of Pindar in the Meno (80c).184 Historically, scholars have assigned Pindar’s
fragment (133 Race) to the Orphic discourse and interpreted it as a reference to the
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Benveniste 1973: 344. A full discussion of the etymological connections is explored in section II.4
below.
183
Benveniste 1973: 340.
184
Pindar Fr. 133 Race (= OF 443 Bernabé).
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foundational Orphic myth of Zagreus discussed by Olympiodorus.185 But recently
Radcliffe Edmonds III contended that scholars have taken the Orphic fragments out of
their original context in order to fabricate a doctrinal Orphism based on the modern
conception of the Zagreus myth.186 Edmonds focuses his approach on the latest edition of
the Orphic fragments edited by Alberto Bernabé (2004, 2005):
Building upon these recent studies, the evidence Bernabé has compiled in his
collection of Orphica must be examined from a new perspective, with attention to
the context of each fragment, both the context of the individual author’s text in
which the fragment is preserved and the broader historical context in which the
author is writing.187
I intend to examine Pindar fragment 133 Race (OF 443 Bernabé) within the guidelines
set out by Edmonds in order to deduce the fragment’s authenticity as an Orphic belief.
My investigation takes a maximalist stance following Bernabé by arguing that the
Zagreus myth does refer to a specific Orphic doctrine. However, I follow Edmonds in
dispelling the Christian influenced notion of “original sin,” which removes the evidence
from its classical (i.e., Orphic) context. Rather than speaking of “original sin” I use the
economic terms “debt” and “recompense,” which I argue more accurately conveys the
meaning of the Greek term ποινή as Wergeld or “recompense paid for murder of kin.”188
Therefore, this chapter attempts to assimilate both the arguments of Bernabé and
Edmonds into a cohesive explanation for fragment 133 of Pindar quoted in Plato’s Meno.
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See, for instance, Rose 1967: 88, Bremmer 2002: 20-23, Graf and Johnston 2007: 157, and especially
Santamaría 2003: 397-405 and Santamaría 2008: 1161-1184.
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Edmonds 2013. This monumental work pursues the original argument in Edmonds 1999.
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Edmonds 2013: 68. See also Edmond III’s comments at 2013: 77, “This context cannot be taken into
account if the evidence is treated as a set of disjointed Orphic fragments, divorced from their context and
grouped by theme.”
188
See Schmidt 2004: 1325.
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Let’s begin with the broader historical context of Plato’s Meno. Although precise
dating of the Meno is contentious, many scholars assign the dialogue’s composition to
about 386/5 BCE following the Gorgias at about 387 BCE.189 The commentator Bluck
followed Dodd’s dating of the Gorgias after Plato’s first visit to Sicily in about 380
BCE.190 The area of Sicily and Southern Italy was the hub of Pythagorean and Orphic
thought and is where the oldest Orphic Gold Tablets were discovered.191 It is reasonable
to conjecture that Plato became acquainted with the doctrines of recollection and
reincarnation from his travels in Sicily and afterward incorporated the doctrines into his
philosophical dialogues.
In the Meno Socrates tackles Meno’s paradox that posits we cannot learn what we
do not already know by introducing the Platonic theory of ἀνάμνησις “recollection” and
the belief in reincarnation.192 Plato cites Pindar in order to justify reincarnation as an
ancient belief and thereby gives it mythological authority.193 If the fragment refers to an
Orphic belief, then Plato is providing specific Orphic authority for the belief in
reincarnation.
Plato’s Socrates begins by explaining that he has heard “divine things” from wise
men and women, which sets up the religious authority of his following statements. Meno
then asks Socrates what the logos is which he has heard from these wise men and women;
this question, I argue, sets up the passage within the frame of a Hieros Logos as discussed
in Chapter One:
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For discussion on the dating of Plato’s Meno see: Bluck 1961: 108-120.
Dodds 1959: 24-27.
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See Graf and Johnston 2007: 4-16 on the location of Gold Tablets 1-8.
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The theory of anamnesis was introduced in the Phaedo (72e) as one of the proofs for the soul’s
immortality.
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See, for instance, Latona 2004, on Plato’s view of the authority of traditional mythology.
190

79

{ΣΩ.} Ἔγωγε· ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα
πράγματα –
{ΜΕΝ.} Τίνα λόγον λεγόντων;
{ΣΩ.} Ἀληθῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν, καὶ καλόν.
{ΜΕΝ.} Τίνα τοῦτον, καὶ τίνες οἱ λέγοντες;
{ΣΩ.} Οἱ μὲν λέγοντές εἰσι τῶν ἱερέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερειῶν ὅσοις μεμέληκε
περὶ ὧν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον οἵοις τ' εἶναι διδόναι· λέγει δὲ καὶ
Πίνδαρος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θεῖοί εἰσιν. ἃ δὲ λέγουσιν,
ταυτί ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἴ σοι δοκοῦσιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. φασὶ γὰρ τὴν
ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν—ὃ δὴ
ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσι—τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε·
δεῖν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον.
S: For I for my part have heard from both wise men and women concerning
divine matters.
M: What is the story of those who were speaking it?
S: A true story, as it seems to me, and a fine one.
M: What is this and who are those who speak it?
S: Those speaking are among the priests and priestesses—of such as number and
such a sort as are concerned with being able to give an account of their practices.
But Pindar also says it and many other poets, as many who are god-like. And the
things they say is this—consider if they seem to you to speak the truth. For they
say that the soul of a human is immortal and at one time it comes to an end,
which they call dying, and at another time it is born again, but it is never
destroyed. Certainly on account of these things it is necessary to live life as
piously as possible.
(Plato Meno 81b)
In this passage, I argue Plato uses the word λογός and its various derivatives in order to
transpose the idea of a Heiros Logos.194 This ‘sacred story’ is that the soul is immortal
(τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἀθάνατον). The soul’s immortality is one of the
elements of a Hieros Logos defined by the Seventh Letter. Plato then, I argue, employs a
variation of the Orphic soteriological formula: τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν
γίγνεσθαι. The second life or palingenesis is implied by the word πάλιν “back again.” I
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Rose (1967: 80) points to the use of the word λογός as way to refer to a specific Orphic doctrine:
“What Plato does clearly imply is the agreement of the passage with some kind of organized and developed
theology, the teaching of an enlightened clergy, whether belonging or not to any State cult, who are ready
and willing to give a rational explanation, λόγον, of their practices. Our chief business will be to decide
whether or not these theologians are Orphics.”
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argue Plato’s use of the soteriological formula in this context underscores his argument
for the soul’s immortality as a belief derived from the Orphic discourse. Furthermore, the
idea of living as pure as possible (ὡς ὁσιώτατα διαβιῶναι τὸν βίον) is reminiscent of
the Orphic ascetic lifestyle that dictated strict purity, and reminscent of the Orphic tablets
from Thurii which begin with the formulaic claim to exceptional purity: “I come pure
from the pure.”195 Before citing the fragment of Pindar Plato gives several indications that
he is transposing Orphic ideas, namely by setting up the passage in terms of a Hieros
Logos, making a central argument for the soul’s immortality, including the soteriological
formula life/death, and focusing on purity.
Within this context Plato then provides Pindar as a secondary source for the belief
in the soul’s immortality:
οἷσι δὲ Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος
δέξεται, εἰς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊ
ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν, ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοὶ
καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι
ἄνδρες αὔξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ
πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλέονται.
Persephone will receive the blood-payment of the ancient guilt, the souls of
those, she delivers back again into the upper sun in the ninth year, from them will
arise as pure kings, men both swift in strength and the greatest in wisdom; and for
all time they are called pure heroes by humans.
(Pindar fr. 133 Race apud Plato Meno 81c)
Plato calls upon this fragment of Pindar within the context of a Hieros Logos and
specifically deploys it in order to support the belief in the soul’s immortality. Therefore, I
195

Compare the description of the “Orphic life” in Plato Laws 782cd: ἀλλὰ Ὀρφικοί τινες λεγόμενοι
βίοι ἐγίγνοντο ἡμῶν τοῖς τότε, ἀψύχων μὲν ἐχόμενοι πάντων, ἐμψύχων δὲ τοὐναντίον πάντων
ἀπεχόμενοι. “But for the men at that time, some of us were to said to live the Orphic Life, on the one
hand keeping all soul-less food, and on the other hand keeping away from all food with souls.” I contend
that Plato’s “Orphic life” corresponds to the conception found in the Gold Tablets where we read Ἔρχομαι
ἐκ κοθαρῶ<ν> κοθαρά, “I come pure from the pure” (5.1 Graf). See also Thurian Tablets 5, 6, 7 (Graf
and Johnston 2007: 12-15).
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argue, Plato indicates that the fragment should be read within the context of Orphic
eschatology. After quoting the fragment Plato’s Socrates concludes:
Ἅτε οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὖσα καὶ πολλάκις γεγονυῖα, καὶ ἑωρακυῖα
καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πάντα χρήματα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι οὐ
μεμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων οἷόν τ'
εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι, ἅ γε καὶ πρότερον ἠπίστατο.
Therefore since the soul is both immortal and is born often, and has seen both
the things here and the things in Hades and all things in fact, it is not possible that
(the soul) has not learned; the result is that it is not surprising that the (the soul) is
able to have remembered about virtue and about other things, the very things
which (the soul) even formerly knew.
(Plato Meno 81c)
In his conclusion, Plato assimilates the doctrine expressed in Pindar’s fragment 133. Plato
explains the meaning of the myth represented in Pindar’s fragment in his own terms: the
soul is immortal, and, after “death,” it is reincarnated, following the formulaic pattern
life/death/life as indicated by the phrase πολλάκις γεγονυῖα (Meno 81b). Plato
effectively frames Pindar’s “pure heroes” (ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ) as his own philosophers who
have the power of anamnesis (ἀναμνησθῆναι). The focus on memory as the means of
salvation for the soul also appears in the Orphic Gold Tablets, where Memory
distinguishes an initiate and grants his immortality.196
For over a century fragment 133 of Pindar has been the epicenter of the debate
over the authenticity of doctrinal Orphism as scholars from Herbert J. Rose (1943) to
Alberto Bernabé and Ana Isabel Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008) have defined it. In this
fragment we learn that Persephone is the goddess who accepts the ποινή “the bloodpayment” for the παλαιοῦ πένθεος “ancient guilt,” and then sends these pure heroes to a
blessed afterlife. The debate revolves around the meaning of ποινή in conjunction with
196

See, for instance, Hipponion Tablet 1 (Graf and Johnston 2007: 3-4) and my translation and discussion
in section II.3 below.
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πένθεος. Following Bernabé197 and Rose,198 Fritz Graf and Sarah Johnston199 have argued
that the word ποινή “almost always refers to requital for a blood-crime.” The only known
blood-crime related to Persephone is the murder of her son Dionysus, as narrated by
Olympiodorus as part of the Orphic discourse.
Rose explains Pindar’s fragment as proof for the authenticity of the Zagreus myth.
Scholars, including the minimalist Ivan Linforth,200 have tended to accept this conclusion.
Edmonds has contended with the notion of doctrinal Orphism and argued that the
Zagreus myth is a modern fabrication influenced by Christianity.201 His argument focuses
on the use of the word ποινή in Pindar’s fragment 133 quoted by Plato. Edmonds
contends that Pindar never uses ποινή with the sense of “blood-price,” and so he
proposes a radical redefinition of the Greek word ποινή as “reward” rather than its
original meaning of “blood-price”:
I argue that, in both these texts, the ποινή Persephone accepts is not a bloodprice, but rather ritual honors in recompense for her traumatic abduction to the
Underworld by Hades.202
Edmonds argues that Pindar’s use of ποινή is a reference to cult honors paid to
Persephone because of the sorrow (πένθος) of her traumatic rape by Hades.203 Edmonds’
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Bernabé 2002: 417.
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interpretation of the word ποινή aims to dismantle the long-standing argument of Rose
(1936, rpt. 1967), and severs the word’s link to Orphic discourse. It is worth noting that
Edmonds’ interpretation of πένθος as a reference to the rape of Persephone was in fact
first proposed by Rose, who dismissed it in favor of interpreting πένθος in conjunction
with ποινή. Rose’s interpretation points to the Orphic Dionysus-Zagreus myth because
the word πένθος has the specific sense of grief over the death of a family member.204
Rose concludes this can only be Persephone’s grief over Dionysus’ dismemberment for
which humans pay a ποινή “recompense.”
Edmonds also claims that Pindar never uses the word ποινή in the sense of
traditional Wergeld, or “blood price.”205 However, Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones (1990) pointed
out that Pindar’s usage of ποινή in fragment 133 is similar to the eschatological use of
ποινή in Olympian 2. Lloyd-Jones proposed Pindar was relating similar beliefs to the
initiatory rites depicted on the Gold Tablets, and he demonstrated that ποινὰς ἔτεισαν in
Olympian 2 (Line 58) is identical to the atonement of the ποινή accepted by Persephone
in fragment 133.206 His argument was strengthened by Graf and Johnston (2007) who
argue that the tripartite eschatological scheme of Olympian 2 seems to coincide with the
tripartite schematic of reincarnation depicted in fragment 133 and the Orphic Gold
Tablets. I discuss these connections further in section II.3 on Pindar’s use of ποινή
below.
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In his review of Edmonds’ book, Robert Parker (2014) responded to the
contention that ποινή does not have the sense of Wergeld in Pindar’s fragment 133:
In the particular fragment, however, the verb “accept” (δέχεσθαι) strongly
suggests a relation between an offender and an offended party, who may or may
not accept the proffered ποινά.207
I will proceed from Parker’s argument and look at the earliest usage of ποινή in Homer
in order to develop an accurate definition for ποινή. I will then return to the fragment of
Pindar and investigate the use of ποινή in Pindar’s poems. I maintain we should read
fragment 133 in the context of an Orphic afterlife because of how Plato frames fragment
133, and I argue the reference to Persephone and the use of the word ποινή specifically
identifies the fragment as Orphic.

II.2 ποινή in Homer

The locus classicus for ποινή as traditional Wergeld (“blood price”) occurs in
Ajax’s powerful speech against Achilles’ persistent refusal to accept Agamemnon’s
compensation for the seizure of his γέρας “gift of honor”—the κόρη “maiden” Briseïs.208
Ajax argues that a man accepts a blood-price (ποινὴν. . . ἐδέξατο, 9.633) for the murder
of his brother or even a son, but Achilles refuses to accept compensation for the seizure
of his geras. Ajax highlights Achilles’ relentless and merciless position with the poignant
contrast between a father’s acceptance of money for a dead relative and Achilles’ refusal
of compensation for the seizure of a his girl:
207
208

Parker 2014: no pagination.
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...
αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς
ἄγριον ἐν στήθεσσι θέτο μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν
σχέτλιος, οὐδὲ μετατρέπεται φιλότητος ἑταίρων
τῆς ᾗ μιν παρὰ νηυσὶν ἐτίομεν ἔξοχον ἄλλων
νηλής· καὶ μέν τίς τε κασιγνήτοιο φονῆος
ποινὴν ἢ οὗ παιδὸς ἐδέξατο τεθνηῶτος·
καί ῥ' ὃ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ μένει αὐτοῦ πόλλ' ἀποτίσας,
τοῦ δέ τ' ἐρητύεται κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
ποινὴν δεξαμένῳ· σοὶ δ' ἄληκτόν τε κακόν τε
θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι θεοὶ θέσαν εἵνεκα κούρης
οἴης· νῦν δέ τοι ἑπτὰ παρίσχομεν ἔξοχ' ἀρίστας.
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Achilles however, has placed a fierce, great-hearted thumos in his chest, merciless
Achilles! Neither does he show regard for the friendship of his companions, on
account of which we have honored him by the ships above the others, ruthless
Achilles! Someone even accepts the blood-price for the murder of his brother or
of his own son after he has died! And then the man [= the murderer] remains
among the people after he has paid back much for the crime, and the heart and
strong thumos of the other man [= the surviving family member of the deceased]
is checked after receiving the blood-price. But the gods placed a thumos in your
chest, an implacable and evil thumos for the sake of a single girl, whereas now we
offer you seven girls, and the best ones of all!
(Homer Iliad 9.628-638)209
In these lines we have the earliest literary reference to a traditional Wergeld system.210
The importance of these lines for my study is in the vocabulary used to describe the
blood-payment relationship between the two parties—the murderer and the next of kin
who will receive payment. It is important to note the idea of fault or personal
responsibility inherent in the term ποινή. From these lines we can deduce that the
209

This technical vocabulary is echoed in Thetis’ request for Achilles to accept compensation for the death
of Patroclus and return the body of Hektor to king Priam: Ἕκτορ' ἔχεις παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν οὐδ'
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tribal folk. We have seen that scholars are unanimous in holding that the Shield is of an essentially
Mycenaean and therefore Pelasgian pattern” (Treston 1923:38).
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technical term for receiving a blood-payment in the sense of Wergeld is articulated by the
verb δέχομαι plus ποινή (cf. ποινὴν. . . ἐδέξατο, Il. 9.633; ποινὴν δεξαμένῳ, Il.
9.636). In Pindar’s fragment 133 the word ποινή is expressed formulaically with the
same technical vocabulary as in Book 9 of Iliad (Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν . . . δέξεται,
133.1-2). This example confirms Parker’s observation, and, accordingly, I argue that in
Pindar’s fragment 133 we have clear evidence for a traditional definition of Wergeld
which points to the death of Persephone’s son Dionysus-Zagreus.
Edmonds, however, argues that ποινή does not have its original sense of Wergeld
in Pindar’s fragment 133, but rather the sense of “ritual-honors.” Therefore Edmonds
equates the meaning of ποινή with τιμή:
The mention of Persephone’s ancient grief and the compensation provided by
human activity would be easily recognizable as a reference to her abduction and
the τιμαί due to her as compensation.211
When Edmonds reads Pindar’s Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν . . . δέξεται as Persephone
receiving timai “ritual-honors” in compensation for being abducted by Hades, he
essentially claims that the meanings of ποινή with τιμή are indistinguishable. We find
evidence in Homer to vitiate this claim of Edmonds, however. In Book 3 of the Iliad
Homer describes an oath-sacrifice. Paris and Menelaus have agreed to single combat over
the right to Helen and her treasure. The battle is to be divinely sanctified by an oathsacrifice. After heralds have mixed wine with water and poured it over the hands of
Odysseus and Agamemnon, the son of Atreus prays to Zeus, Helios, and unnamed
Chthonic deities, who take vengeance (τίνυσθον) on those who swear false oaths.212
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Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἴδηθεν μεδέων κύδιστε μέγιστε,
Ἠέλιός θ', ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούεις,
καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ γαῖα, καὶ οἳ ὑπένερθε καμόντας
ἀνθρώπους τίνυσθον ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ,
ὑμεῖς μάρτυροι ἔστε, φυλάσσετε δ' ὅρκια πιστά·
εἰ μέν κεν Μενέλαον Ἀλέξανδρος καταπέφνῃ
αὐτὸς ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην ἐχέτω καὶ κτήματα πάντα,
ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν νήεσσι νεώμεθα ποντοπόροισιν·
εἰ δέ κ' Ἀλέξανδρον κτείνῃ ξανθὸς Μενέλαος,
Τρῶας ἔπειθ' Ἑλένην καὶ κτήματα πάντ' ἀποδοῦναι,
τιμὴν δ' Ἀργείοις ἀποτινέμεν ἥν τιν' ἔοικεν,
ἥ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται.
εἰ δ' ἂν ἐμοὶ τιμὴν Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες
τίνειν οὐκ ἐθέλωσιν Ἀλεξάνδροιο πεσόντος,
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειτα μαχήσομαι εἵνεκα ποινῆς
αὖθι μένων, ἧός κε τέλος πολέμοιο κιχείω.
Ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στομάχους ἀρνῶν τάμε νηλέϊ χαλκῷ·
καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέθηκεν ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἀσπαίροντας
θυμοῦ δευομένους· ἀπὸ γὰρ μένος εἵλετο χαλκός.
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“Father Zeus, ruling from Ida, most glorious and greatest, and Helios, who sees
and hears all things, and the rivers and the earth, and those under the earth who
punish men who have wasted way, whosoever swears a false oath: you all, be my
witnesses and guard trustworthy oaths: On the one hand, if Alexander kills
Menalaus, then let he himself have Helen and her belongings, and we will go back
home in our sea-faring ships. On the other hand, if blonde Menelaus kills
Alexander, then let the Trojans give back Helen and all her belongings, and pay
back (ἀποτινέμεν) a recompense (τιμὴν), whichever one is seemly, and which
will also be among men who are yet to come. But if Priam and his sons are not
willing to pay (τίνειν) recompense (τιμὴν) to me when Alexander has fallen,
nevertheless then indeed I shall fight for the sake of the punishment and
reparation due for the violation of the oath (ποινῆς), remaining here, until I
reach an end war.” He spoke, and he severed the throats of the lambs with the
pitiless bronze, and he let them fall gasping on the ground, with their spirit failing.
For bronze removed their strength.
(Homer Iliad 3.276-294)
This passage from Homer subtly highlights the issue of the precise definitions for τιμή
and ποινή, and makes it possible to determine that τιμή and ποινή cannot be used
interchangeably as synonyms. In the passage Agamemnon demands that, should
Menelaus kills Paris/Alexander in hand to hand combat, the Trojans will not only return
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Helen and her possessessions, but will pay additional “recompense” (ἀποτινέμεν/τίνειν
τιμήν). Should they refuse to pay “recompense,” however, then Agamemnon will seek
“punishment” (ποινή)—specifically beause of their failure to pay “recompense.” Hence I
translate ποινή as “punishment and reparation due for the violation of the oath,”
following Emile Benveniste’s elucidation of the differences between τιμή and ποινή
apparent in this scene:
It has been proposed to read into this passage an etymological link between tíno,
apotínō ‘pay’ and timḗ on the one hand and an equivalence between timḗ and
poinḗ on the other. In fact neither relation stands up to examination. The pact
envisages in the case of a victory by Menelaus that Trojans will give back Helen
and all the treasures and that they will pay in addition the timḗ to Agamemnon
and to the Argives. This is a tribute which goes beyond the simple restitution of
the property; it implies a recognition of royal power and the accordance of the
honour which accompanies such recognition. This being so in the conditions in
which the pact is concluded, the timḗ takes the form of a payment which the
Trojans will make over and above the property which they are to return It is only
chance and in this single example that timḗ comes to be associated with the verb
‘pay in return’. It follows that the poet did not conceive of timḗ as a
morphological correlative of apotíno. On the contrary this text clearly brings out
the gap separating timḗ and poinḗ. If the Trojans refuse the timḗ, then
Agamemnon will have the right to fight to obtain a poinḗ. That is quite a different
matter: poinḗ is the punishment and the reparation due for violation of an oath.213
Although some scholars may attempt to read ποινή and τιμή as synonymous through a
propsed etymological link between the two terms, as Benveniste points out ποινή and
τιμή must be understood as distinct terms. The noun τιμή can mean “payment,” but it
doesn’t imply the concepts of “fault” or “responsibility” like ποινή does: in this passage
ποινή clearly refers to the retribution/punishment for a personal fault for which the
Trojans will be responsible if they don’t pay τιμή “recompense.” Instead of reading τιμή
and ποινή as synonymns in this passage, the ποινή refers specifically to the violation of

213

Benveniste 1976: 344.

89

the oath and the refusal of the Trojans to pay the τιμή.214 There may also be a connection
between this use of ποινή and a more original sense of “blood price” in this passage
because this ποινή is discussed in the context of a blood sacrifice for the sake of oath
making (‘cutting oaths’) in which a slain animal stands in for party who breaks the oath.
Furthermore, the word ποινή is etymologically linked to the word τίνυσθον through the
verb τίνω, which highlights the association between ποινή and the gods who protect
blood-oaths (the Erinyes).215
Following Benveniste I argue that ποινή cannot have an interchangeable meaning
with τιμή in the way Edmonds redefines the term. However, I do affirm that the words
are semantically and etymologically overlapping, yet individually retain very specific
meanings: ποινή has the sense of a debt within a community of those at fault/responsible
for failing to abide by an oath and hence can be understood as a punishment, whereas
τιμή is a divinely bestowed honor and does not infer a personal fault/responsibility.216 As
Homer established in Book 9 of the Iliad, the word ποινή in conjunction with the
technical verb δέχομαι indicates a reading of traditional Wergeld (“blood price”) in
Pindar’s fragment 133. Therefore, I argue the word ποινή in Pindar’s fragment 133
points to the Orphic myth of Dionysus’ dismemberment.
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Within this context there is a causal relationship between τιμή and ποινή, such that ποινή only occurs
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(Works and Days 803).
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IΙ.3: ποινή in Pindar

Scholars have long debated Pindar’s involvment with the Orphic movement.
Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1922)217 and W. K. C. Guthrie (1993)218 both
argued that Pindar was catering to the Orphic beliefs of his patron Theron when he
composed Olympian 2. Erwin Rhode (1925)219 suggested Pindar learned Orphic doctrine
directly from his repeated visits to Sicily, and, more recently, Jan N. Bremmer (2002)220
pointed out the influence of Orphic thought on Pindar’s poetry. Domenico Comparetti
first remarked at the striking similarities between the Orphic Gold Tablets and Pindar’s
Olympian 2.221 Fritz Graf and Sarah Johnston (2007)222 and Dirk Obbink (2014)223 have
argued Pindar’s representation of the afterlife was based on a similar eschatological
scheme as the Gold Tablets. Pindar describes a tripartite division of souls in the
afterflife,224 and he even designates Chronos as “the father of all.”225 Martin West
(1983)226 questioned whether Pindar’s Orphic themed eschatology and cosmology was
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merely a coincidence. Sir Hugh Lloyd-Jones (1990)227 responded that Pindar could
invoke Time without implying Chronos as the primordial Orphic god, yet he catalogued
compelling observations between the afterlife depicted in Olympian 2 and the Gold
Tablets. Most recently Marco Santamaría (2008) has argued that in Pindar’s poetry,
“there are as many typically Orphic doctrines as there are images.”228
I claim that Pindar’s poetry contains ideas fundamental to Orphic belief, namely
the Zagreus myth, which do not survive in a complete form before Olympiodorus’ 6th
century CE commentary on Plato’s Phaedo (OF 220 Kern = 304 F, 318 F, 320 F
Bernabé), but are reflected in older texts—including, I argue, Pindar’s Odes and
Threnoi.229 According to Olympiodorus’ narrative, Hera, in her hatred of Dionysus, the
son of Zeus and Persephone, incited the Titans to kill Dionysus, dismember him, and feed
upon his flesh. In punishment Zeus blasted the Titans with lightning, and from their ashes
sprung the human race, composed of both Dionysus and the Titans. The Orphic Zagreus
myth can be considered fundamental because it contains specific assumptions that
resonate throughout Orphic thought: that the human soul is immortal because of its divine
origins; that it faces judgment in the afterlife; that there is a reward of heroization for the
initiate; but also that there is a need for salvation because of an “ancient transgression”
such that initiation functions as a kind of poinē (“blood price/penalty”) for the murder of

227

Lloyd-Jones 1990: 83: “Pindar could, I think, speak of Time the father of all things without having in
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Santamaría 2008: 1184. Santamaría (2008: 1183) argues “In various passages of Pindar (especially in
Olympian 2 and in different fragment of the Threnoi and Dithyrambs) numerous passages of Pindar are
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Dionysus implicit in mankind because of our Titanic portions; and, finally, that initiation
offers a better afterlife and distinguishes the soul based on her memory of this ancient
transgression. I contend that Pindar’s poetry contains ideas inherent in the Zagreus myth,
organized according its mythico-religous belief system, and, most importantly, expressed
in the same terminology as we find in Orphic texts, such as the Gold Tablets. I
specifically draw attention to the term ποινή, “penalty” or “blood-payment,” used in the
Threnoi and Olympian 2 and its corresponding use on the Gold Tablets. I suggest ποινή
functioned as an Orphic symbolon, or password exchanged between fellow initiates that
established their identity as initiates with one another through their knowledge of the
myth of the cannibalism of Dionysus by the Titans alluded to by the word. Hence,
Pindar’s use of the word signals his intimate knowledge of Orphic ritual. Following the
work of Graf, Johnston, and Obbink, I argue that the tripartite division of souls in
Olympian 2 and the depiction of the waters of Memory imparting immortality in Isthmian
6 are parallel to the tripartite scheme and the mnemonic function of immortalization on
the Gold Tablets. I read this as evidence that Pindar was not simply catering to a specific
audience, but that he was also working within the literary tradition that produced the
tablets. I propose Pindar learned Orphic doctrine by being initiated into its Mysteries,
after which he integrated Orphic myth into his poetry.
The poetry of Pindar is filled with ideas and imagery reminiscent of Orphic belief
and the Orphic Gold Tablets in particular. In the Threnoi, Pindar describes Orpheus as
“Orpheus of the golden lyre,”230 and in his description of the Isles of the Blessed,
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“flowers of gold are blazing,”231 and even Memory is “golden-robed.”232 Pindar’s golden
imagery and golden-robed Memory seem to recall the Orphic Gold Tablets, where
Memory plays a key role in heroization as she distinguishes an initiate and grants his
immortality. The Gold Tablets themselves functioned as a ritual mnemonic device for the
initiate in the afterlife, and they contained passwords to help the initiate enjoy his blessed
immortality. Immortality was promised to an initiate by his claim to divine lineage. This
belief provided a theoretical justification for salvation and was a central belief of the
Orphic cult. The Petelia tablet commands the initiate articulate a secret password in order
to gain access to the blessed afterlife: εἰπεῖν· Γῆς παῖς εἰμι καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος
| αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γένος οὐράνιον, “Say: I am a child of Earth and starry Sky, but my race is
heavenly” (2.6-7 Graf/Johnston = B1 Zuntz, L3 Bernabé). The γένος οὐράνιον of the
Petelia tablet is echoed in Pindar’s Nemean 6 where he, too, expresses the idea of divine
lineage of mankind. Ἓν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν | ματρὸς
ἀμφότεροι· “One is the race of men, one is the race of gods, and from one mother do we
both derive our breath” (Nem. 6.1-2, Race).
An Orphic initiate claimed divine lineage from Dionysus and his mother
Persephone. This aetiological myth of an ancient transgression formed the basis of the
Orphic cult. Although the antiquity of the myth has been questioned, Paul Tannery
(1899), who was followed by Herbert J. Rose (1943), developed the argument that
Pindar’s fragment 133 referred to the Orphic myth of Dionysus, and that, therefore,
Pindar and Plato knew about the myth before its Hellenistic elaboration. Martin West
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(1983),233 Walter Burkert (1985),234 E. R. Dodds (2004),235 Fritz Graf and Sarah Johnston
(2007),236 and even Ivan Linforth (1941)237 have all supported the myth’s antiquity;
Alberto Bernabé and Ana Isabel Jiménez San Cristóbal (2008)238 situated Pindar within
the same system of beliefs that produced the tablets, and Maria Cannatà Fera (1990)
likewise argues that fragment 133 (fr. 65 in her edition) is a reference to the Zagreus
myth. I contend that Pindar was himself an Orphic initiate as revealed by his intimate
knowledge of the method by which an initiate could atone for this primordial blood
crime—namely, through ποινή, “blood price, penalty,” by which the initiate expiated the
Titanic crime through initiation and ritual purifications.
233

West notes: “Let us recall the details of the story of Dionysus as it was told in the Rhapsodies, or rather,
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The goal of Orphism for the initiate was to atone for the ancient blood crime
throughout a cycle of rebirths until, upon paying the ποινή, he may once again become a
god instead of a mortal.239 In Pindar fragment 133, Persephone will recieve “the requital
of the ancient sorrow”:
οἷσι δὲ Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος
δέξεται, ἐς τὸν ὕπερθεν ἅλιον κείνων ἐνάτῳ ἔτεϊ
ἀνδιδοῖ ψυχὰν πάλιν, ἐκ τᾶν βασιλῆες ἀγαυοί
καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφίᾳ τε μέγιστοι
ἄνδρες αὔξοντ᾽· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥροες ἁγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλέονται.
But for those from whom Persephone accepts requital for the ancient grief, in
the ninth year she returns their souls to the upper sunlight; from them arise proud
kings and men who are swift of strength and greatest in wisdom, and for the rest
of time they are called sacred heroes by men.
(Pindar fr. 133, trans. Race 1997: 369)
Rose argued this fragment must refer to the Orphic myth of Dionysus based on the
conjunction of the words Φερσεφόνα, ποινὰν, and πένθεος. With regards to the ποινή,
which by its traditional definition of “blood-price” suggests the murder of Persephone’s
son Dionysus by the Titans, Rose argued “ποινάν is simple enough, for it always means
a recompense of some sort in Pindar, though generally keeping close to its proper sense
of wergelt.”240 Rose’s argument that Pindar is expressing an Orphic eschatology hinges
on the word πένθεος, for which only two events seem likely, the rape of Persephone by
Hades or the death of her son Dionysus Zagreus.
The passage from the oath sacrifice in Book 3 of Homer’s Iliad demonstrated the
difference between the two words τιμή and ποινή in terms of personal responsibility. The
word ποινή implies a fault or responsibility such that it is impossible to owe a ποινή
239
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without personal responsibility, whereas τιμή does not require responsibility of suffering
such that it is possible to owe a τιμή without personal responsibility, as in Demeter’s
request that the citizens pay τιμή to the goddess.241 In terms of the question of human
responsibility toward Persephone in Pindar fr. 133, Rose emphasized, “No human soul
could be expected to make requital to the goddess for what she underwent then. Remains
therefore only one possibility, the death of her son, Dionysus or Zagreus, at the hands of
the Titans.”242 Rose called attention to the fact that if the ποινή “blood-price/penalty” is
owed for the παλαιοῦ πένθεος “ancient grief,” then it implies punishment for some kind
of fault for which mankind is personally responsible. In this context, the term ποινή
points to the myth of Dionysus in which humans are personally implicated in his murder
due to our relation with the Titans, as opposed to any connection to Persephone’s
abduction at the hands of Hades, for which, as Rose notes, “No human soul could be
expected to make requital to the goddess for what she underwent then.”
Edmonds disputes the meaning of ποινή as Wergeld, and he proposes a
redefinition of the term as “ritual honors.” In the previous section I have shown that
ποινή indicates “blood-price/penalty” and not “honor” in Homer, and that ποινή cannot
be a direct equivalent to τίμη. Edmonds claimed that in Pindar fragment 133 ποινή
means “reward” rather than its original meaning of Wergeld, and Pindar’s use of ποινή is
instead a reference to cult honors paid to Persephone because of the sorrow (πένθος) of
her traumatic rape by Hades.243 Edmonds asserts that Pindar never uses ποινή with the
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sense of Wergeld, and he points to Odes Pythian 4.63 and Nemean 1.70 for evidence.244
However, the Scholia vetera at Pythian 4.63 clearly define Pindar’s use of ποινή in that
ode as “penalty”:
τίς ἔσται τῆς φωνῆς ποινὴ, τουτέστιν ἀπόλυσις· ἐπεὶ ἡ ποινὴ ἀπολύσεως
ἕνεκεν γίνεται.
What will be the penalty for speaking, this is the release, since the penalty comes
about for the sake of release.
(Schol. Vet. Pyth. 4.111, Drachmann)
The Pindaric Scholia vindicate the use of ποινή in its traditional sense of Wergeld in
Pindar through its gloss of ποινή with ἀπόλυσις “release.” Therefore I argue that it is
possible to find instances of ποινή as “penalty” in Pindar’s poetry. However I do concede
that Pindar’s use of ποινή as “penalty” is limited and therefore marked in its usage.
I propose that Pindar’s use of ποινή as “requital” in fragment 133 and Olympian 2
indicates that it is a marked term and has a specific usage within the particular
eschatological contexts shared by both poems. Furthermore, it is significant to recall that
Plato cites Pindar’s fragment 133 in the context of Socrates’ argument that anamnesis
“recollection” as a proof of the immortality of the soul and the doctrine of reincarnation
(Meno 81b-e). Plato is quoting Pindar as an authority for the belief in reincarnation and
the fragment informs Plato’s eschatological context. Therefore, I contend, we must
interpret fragment 133 within this specific context of reincarnation and the soul’s
immortality rather than within the context of Persephone’s rape by Hades.
We see a very similar eschatological description to Pindar’s fragment 133 on Orphic
tablet 6 from Thurii:
244
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4 ποινὰν ἀνταπέτεισ᾽ ἔργων ἕνεκ᾽ οὔτι δικαίων.
[...]
6 νῦν δὲ ἱκέτις ἥκω, ἥκω παρὰ Φερσεφόνειαν.
7 ὥς με πρόφρων πέμψει ἕδρας ἐς εὐαγέων .
I have paid the penalty for unrighteous deeds . . . Now I come as a suppliant to
Persephone, so that she may kindly send me to the seats of the pure.
(Thurii tablet 6.4-7, trans. Graf and Johnston 2007: 15)245
Note the use of the phrase ποινὰν ἀνταπέτεισ(α) “to pay the penalty,” which is an
example of the ποινή + τίνω pattern (ἀντί-ἀποτίνω) and demonstrates the Orphic
formulaic use of the word ποινή and its verbal derivative.246
On another tablet from Thurii the idea of paying the penalty is equated with
escaping the painful cycle of incarnations and achieving the crown of immortality:
5 κύκλο δ᾽ ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο
6 ἱμερτō δ᾽ἐπέβαν στεφάνō ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισι·
7 Δεσσποίνας δὲ ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας Βασιλείας.
I have flown out of the painful, grief causing circle, I have approached the
longed-for crown with swift feet, I have sunk beneath the breast of the Lady, the
Chthonian Queen.
(Thurii tablet 5.5-7, trans. Graf and Johnston 2007: 13)
The tablets from Thurii and Pindar fragment 133 both use ποινή when speaking about the
cycle of incarnations. Pindar associates the two ideas of ποινή and πένθος in fragment
133. In turn, I connect ποινή with πένθος on the Thuriian tablets since the idea of
retribution, or blood-payment, is a result of Persephone’s grief. The epithet Δεσσποίνας
on tablet 5 gives anaphoric resonance since Persephone is the goddess who recieves the
ποινή; the resonance may suggest a folk-etymology associating Persephone with “blood-
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price/penalty.”247 On tablet 5 the initiate “sinks into the breast of the Chthonian queen,”
and becomes a god instead of a mortal.248 Likewise on tablet 6 we read, “I have come
beside Persephone in order that she may willingly send me to the seats of the pure.” I
argue the word ποινή is used by both Pindar and the tablets as a technical term referring
to the specific Orphic belief known to initiates. In Pindar fragment 133, after souls have
atoned for the ποινή of Persephone they become ἥρωες ἁγνοὶ. The association between
purity and heroization is consistent with tablet 6 as Persephone sends the initiate to the
seats of the pure (ἕδρας ἐς εὐαγέων).
Pindar’s use of ποινή extends to Olympian 2, which scholars focus on when
speaking of Pindar’s Orphica.249 Pindar describes a marked division of souls by
designating separate destinations for the bad, the good, and the heroic souls. But scholars
have long disagreed on how to interprete the syntax of the eschatological scheme
described by Pindar beginning at lines 56-60. The ὅτι clause at verse 57 introduces the
afterlife as an explanation and expansion of τὸ μέλλον “the future,” and the destinations
in the Underworld are marked by an elaborate succession of μὲν and δὲ. The problem
with reading the eschatological scheme of Olympian 2 is how to make sense of the
complicated sequence of μὲν and δὲ:
εἰ δέ νιν ἔχων τις οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον,
247

I do not suggest a direct etymological relation between ποινή and Δεσσποίνας, since “δεσποινα is
from *δεσ-ποτ-νι̯α. The first part, IE *dems (whence Gr. δεσ-, Skt. dam- ), is the genitive of a word for
‘house’” (Beekes 2010: 319). But the anaphoric resonance of Δεσσποίνας in conjunction with
βαρυπενθέος in Thurii tablet 5 is striking nonetheless.
248
This line (ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν) is similar to the oldest description of Dionyus at Iliad 6.136 where
Dionysus leaps into the sea to avoid the crazed Lycurgus and is received beneath Thetis’s boosom (δύσεθ'
ἁλὸς κατὰ κῦμα, Θέτις δ' ὑπεδέξατο κόλπῳ): collocation of δύω (δύσεθ' = δύσετο) + κόλπος (and
even δέχομαι). Perhaps there is connection between Dionysus and the ideas of sinking into or sinking and
being nurtured by a motherly bosom, then the initiate in a way becomes a substitute child for Persephone,
in the place of Dionysus himself. This idea of sinking is also synonymous with the katabasis or the ritual
descent into the Underworld.
249
For Pindar’s Orphica, see Nisetich 1988: 1-19, Lloyd-Jones 1990: 80-109, Santamaría 2008: 1161-1184.
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ὅτι θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκ' ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες
ποινὰς ἔτεισαν—τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ
ἀλιτρὰ κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις ἐχθρᾷ
λόγον φράσαις ἀνάγκᾳ·
If one has it and knows the future, that the helpless spirits of those who have
died on earth immediately pay the penalty—and upon sins committed here in
Zeus’ realm, a judge beneath the earth pronounces sentence with hateful
necessity.
(Pindar Olympian 2.56-60, trans. Race 1997: 69)
Willcock (1995) in his commentary describes two prevailing scholarly interpretations of
these lines.250 Rohde and Wilamowitz explained the corresponding μὲν and δὲ of lines
56-60 of Olympian 2 as two separate points of view, that of the deceased and that of the
living.251 Rohde argued that the μὲν at line 57 (θανόντων μὲν) is coordinated with the δὲ
at line 75 (ὅσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρίς), which contrasts those who are punished with
those who live a painless life.252 Wilamowitz argued that the contrast is between the
world of the living (the realm of Zeus) and Hades, i.e., κατὰ γᾶς.253
However, the scholiast Aristarchus understood these lines as an indication of the
idea of rebirth. Willcock notes that recent scholars side with the interpretation of
Wilomawitz, but Dieterich and others accepted the view of rebirth argued by the Scholia.
The Scholia vetera at these verses of Pindar Olympian 2.56-60 reads:254
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Willcock 1995: 154-155.
Rohde 1925: 442n35, Wilamowitz 1922: 248n1.
252
Rohde (1925: 443n35) notes: “The θανόντων μέν of 63 is not answered till ὅσοι δ᾽ἐτόλμασαν ... 75,
just as the αὐτίκα of 63 does not receive its contrast till we come to what happens much late—after the life
on earth has been thrice repeated—described in 75 ff. The δέ of 64 and 67 are subordinate (not adversative)
to what is introduced by the μέν of 63 and they continue the thought.”
253
Wilamowitz (1922: 248 n.1) notes: ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ ... ist die Oberwelt ... im Gegensatze zu κατὰ
γᾶς [“in the world of Zeus … is the world of the living … in antithesis is under the earth”]. Wilamowitz
follows Rohde and also argues against Deubner (1908: 638-642), whose position is similar to the Scholia I
cite below. Deubner cites Aristophanes Frogs 82 as parallel: μὲν ἐνθάδ᾽ ... δ᾽ἐκεῖ.
254
See Willcock 1995: 155.
251
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<ὅτι θανόντων μὲν> ἕως <ἐχθρᾷ λόγον φράσαις ἀνάγκᾳ:> ἐγκρίνει τὴν
παλιγγενεσίαν. λέγει οὖν· εἴ τις οἶδε τὸ μέλλον, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ ζῆν
ἁμαρτάνοντες, ἐν Ἅιδου κολάζονται, οἱ δὲ ἐν Ἅιδου, ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ βίῳ ἐν
τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἀρχῇ· ταύτην γὰρ εἶπε τὸν ὑποκείμενον τῷ οὐρανῷ τόπον· καὶ
ἐάν τις ἐν ταῖς τρισὶν ἀναβιώσεσιν αἷς ὑφίσταται ἀναμάρτητος εἰς τρὶς
ἑκατέρωθεν μένῃ, τοῦτόν φησιν εἰς τὰς τῶν μακάρων νήσους
προπέμπεσθαι.
“That of the dead ...” up to “with hateful necessity”: [Pindar] judges it to be a
rebirth. He means it like this: If someone knew the future, namely that those who
do wrong while they are living will be punished in Hades, and that those in Hades
[who do wrong], in our life here in the realm of Zeus [they will be punished]. For
he said that it [= Zeus’s realm] is the place lying beneath heaven. And if someone
in the third return to life in which he keeps up without doing wrong should remain
so to the third return from the world beyond, he says this very person will be sent
forth to the islands of the blessed.
(Scholia vetera at Pindar Olympian 2.104 Drachmann)255
The idea explained by the Scholia is that there are two moments of punishment: those
who sin in this world are punished in the next (the afterlife), and those who sin in the
afterlife are punished in this world through reincarnation—presumably into an
undesirable life or the like. The souls of good people who can maintain a “blameless life”
for three cycles (however they are to be counted: life-death-life or perhaps even lifedeath/life-death/life-death) are freed from the punishment/reincarnation cycle altogether
and dwell in the Isles of the Blessed.
Following the scholiast Aristarchus I read these lines in Pindar Olympian 2.55-60
as representing two corresponding and cyclical ideas—death and rebirth. I interpret Διὸς
ἀρχᾷ not only as “here on earth” as suggested by Willcock,256 but also as a subtextual
reference to Pindar’s διόσδοτον ἀρχάν “Zeus-given beginning” from his fragment 137
(Race) on the Eleusinian mysteries which expresses the soteriological dichotomy between
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Drachmann’s edition of the Scholia vetera of Pindar’s odes follows a different numbering scheme that
can be followed in Snell’s edition of Pindar.
256
Willcock 1995: 155.
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life and death, in the same terms as an Orphic Olbian bone tablet does in its formula:
bios-thanatos-bios.257
ὄλβιος ὅστις ἰδὼν κεῖν᾽εἶσ᾽ὑπὸ χθόν᾽·
οἶδε μὲν βίου τελευτάν,
οἶδε δὲ διόσδοτον ἀρχάν.
Blessed is he who sees them (the mysteries) and goes beneath the earth; he knows
the end of life and knows the Zeus-given beginning.
(Pindar fr. 137, trans. Race 1997: 371)
The contrasting μὲν and δὲ in Pindar’s fragment 137 separate the idea of βίου τελευτάν
“the end of life,” and διόσδοτον ἀρχάν, “the Zeus-given beginning.” Here Pindar
depicts the contrast between the end of life—namely death—and the Zeus-given
beginning—namely life. This formula functions as a symbolon in the Orphic cult as we
have seen on the Olbian bone tablets, and the Gold Tablets:
Νῦν ἔθανες καὶ νῦν ἐγένου, τρισόλβιε ἄματι τωῖδε.
εἰπεῖν Φερσεφόν|αι σ᾽ ὅτι Β<ακ>χιος αὐτὸς ἔλυσε.
Now you have died and now you have come into being, O thrice happy one,
on this same day. Tell Persephone that the Bacchic One himself released you.
(Tablet 26a Pelinna, trans. Graf and Johnston 2007: 36-37)
The problem with reading the eschatological scheme of Olympian 2 is how to
make sense of the elaborate sequence of μὲν and δὲ. I argue that the first μὲν and δὲ can
be read by relying on the Orphic formula contrasting beginning and end (life-death) in
Pindar’s fragment 137. Note also the complimentary use of οἶδεν in Olympian 2 and
οἶδε in fragment 137. Based on my reading of fragment 137 as a life-death dichotomy, I
argue that in Olympian 2 we see the same elaboration of this dichotomy marked by the
contrasting μὲν and δὲ: θανόντων μὲν ... τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ. The similiar syntax
257

The top of tablet A (Graf and Johnston 2007: 185) reads βίος θάνατος βίος | ἀλήθεια; the bottom of
the tablet reads: Διόνυσος Ὀρφικοί (or Ὀρφικόν).
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between fragment 137 and lines 56-60 of Olympian 2 gives the reader false syntactical
signals, and what we would expect as functioning as the contrast instead recalls the lifedeath formula and thereby commences the Orphic themed afterlife represented in the
poem.
εἰ δέ νιν ἔχων τις οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον,
ὅτι θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκ' ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες
ποινὰς ἔτεισαν—τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ
ἀλιτρὰ κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις ἐχθρᾷ
λόγον φράσαις ἀνάγκᾳ·
If one has it and knows the future, that the helpless spirits of those who have
died on earth immediately pay the penalty—and upon sins committed here in
Zeus’ realm, a judge beneath the earth pronounces sentence with hateful
necessity.
(Pindar Olympian 2.56-60, trans. Race 1997: 69)
Furthermore, I suggest Pindar’s use of ποινή in addition to the Orphic formula life-death
indicates his intimate knowledge of Orphic mysteries. Pindar tells us at line 58 of the
second Olympian that for the category of bad souls, “when men have died here on earth,
wicked minds immediately pay the penalty (ποινὰς ἔτεισαν). Lloyd-Jones argued Pindar
was relating similar beliefs behind the initiatory rites depicted on the Gold Tablets, and
he first proposed that ποινὰς ἔτεισαν in Olympian 2 is identical to the atonement of the
ποινή accepted by Persephone in fragment 133.258 Following Lloyd-Jones, I read the
eschatological scheme of Olympian 2 as an elaboration of fragment 133, both of which
correspond to the scheme depicted on the tablets. In other words, I contend that Pindar’s
usage of ποινή in Olympian 2 and fragment 133 is employed identically as the term
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Lloyd-Jones 1990: 94.
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appears in the Orphic tablets and Pindar’s use of a marked Orphic term in eschatological
contexts affirms his Orphic status.
Pindar’s second category of souls (the good) is delineated by the δὲ at line 61.
This is the truer contrast with the souls marked by μέν at line 57:
ἴσαις δὲ νύκτεσσιν αἰεί,
ἴσαις δ' ἁμέραις ἅλιον ἔχοντες, ἀπονέστερον
ἐσλοὶ δέκονται βίοτον ...
But forever having sunshine in equal nights and in equal days, good men receive
a life of less toil ...
(Pindar Olympian 2.61-63, trans. Race 1997: 69)
These good souls “receive a life of less toil” (Ol. 2.62-63). The contrast with the bad
souls is implied by the force of the comparative ἀπονέστερον, but also emphasized by a
subordinated μὲν/δὲ clause:
. . . ἀλλὰ παρὰ μὲν τιμίοις
θεῶν οἵτινες ἔχαιρον εὐορκίαις,
ἄδακρυν νέμονται
αἰῶνα, τοὶ δ’ ἀπροσόρατον ὀκχέοντι πόνον.
No, in company with the honored gods,
those who joyfully kept their oaths
spend a tearless existence,
whereas the others endure pain too terrible to behold.
(Pindar Olympian 2.65-67, trans. Race 1997: 71)
The second division consists of the good souls (marked by μὲν), who “delighting in good
oaths, live a life free from grief among the gods who have honor” (Ol. 2.65-66), whereas
the first division consisting of bad souls (marked by δὲ) “endure toil not to be looked
upon” (Ol. 2.67). Pindar clearly delineates the distinction between souls in Olympian 2 as
does the author of the Hipponion tablet:
Μναμοσύνας τόδε ἔργον, ἐπεὶ ἂν μέλλεισι θανε σθαι
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εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμος εὐέρεας. ἔστ᾽ἐπὶ δ<ε>ξιὰ κρένα,
πὰρ δ᾽αὐτὰν ἑστακῦα λευκὰ κυπάρισος·
ἔνθα κατερχόμεναι ψυκαὶ νεκύον ψύχονται.
ταύτας τᾶς κράνας μεδὲ σχεδὸν ἐνγύθεν ἔλθεις.
πρόσθεν δὲ hευρέσεις τᾶς Μναμοσύνας ἀπὸ λίμνας
ψυχρὸν ὕδορ προρέον· φύλακες δὲ ἐπύπερθεν ἔασι.
τοὶ δέ σε εἰρέσονται ἐν φρασὶ πευκαλίμαισι
ὅ τι δὲ ἐξερέεις Ἄϊδος σκότος ὀρφέεντος.
εἶπον· ύὸς Γᾶς ἐμι καὶ Ὀρανο ἀστερόεντος.
δίψαι δ᾽ἐμ᾽αὖος καὶ ἀπόλλυμαι· ἀλὰ δότ᾿ ο[κα
ψυκρὸν ὕδορ πιέναι τες Μνεμοσύνες ἀπὸ λίμν[α]ς
καὶ δή τοι ἐρέοσιν hυποχθονίοι βασιλεϊ·
καὶ δέ τοθ δόσοσι πιεν τῆς Μναμοσύνας ἀπὸ λίμνα[ς].
καὶ δὲ καὶ σὺ πιὸν ὁδὸν ἔρχεα<ι>, hάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι
μύσται καὶ βαχχοι hιερὰν στείχοσι κλεινοί.

[5]

[10]

[15]

This is the work of Memory, when you are about to die down to the well-built
house of Hades. There is a spring at the right side, and standing by it a white
cypress. Descending to it, the souls of the dead refresh themselves. Do not even
go near this spring! Ahead you will find from the Lake of Memory, cold water
pouring forth; there are guards before it. They will ask you, with astute wisdom,
what you are seeking in the darkness of murky Hades. Say, “I am a son of Earth
and starry Sky, I am parched with thirst and am dying; but quickly grant me
cold water from the Lake of Memory to drink.” And they will announce you to
the Chthonian King, and they will grant you to drink from the Lake of Memory.
And you, too, having drunk, will go along the sacred road on which other
glorious initiates and bacchoi travel.
(Tablet 1 Hipponion, trans. Graf and Johnston 2007: 4)
On the Orphic tablet, “there is a spring on the right, and standing by it a white cypress”
(1.2-3). The tablet firmly commands not to approach this direction, indicating a first
division of souls (souls that don’t drink from the spring separated from those that do). On
the other side is the lake of Memory, which delineates a second division of souls (souls
that know the password and are granted access to the Lake of Memory separated from
those that do not, presumably). These good souls may only drink and become
immortalized if they know the correct password. Graf and Johnston argue that initiation
in the Orphic Mysery cult specifically allowed for separation of good souls from heroic
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souls (their good-plus).259 Knowing the password elevates the initiate from a good to a
heroic soul. The initiated soul must proclaim, “I am a child of earth and starry heaven,
grant me to drink from the lake of Memory” (1.10), then the soul passes down the sacred
road with the other initiates. The initiate is distinguished by his memory of knowledge
obtained through initiation, and the tablet thereby functions as a mnemonic tool for
achieving immortality. Pindar equates these privileged souls with heroes both in
Olympian 2 and fragment 133. Pindar’s heroes attain a blessed immortality after
completing the cycle of rebirths—a distinctly Orphic idea. Here at line 68 Pindar makes
his third contrast with the first category of souls described at line 57, this was also the
contrast that Rohde observed:
ὅσοι δ’ ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρίς
ἑκατέρωθι μείναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν ἀδίκων ἔχειν
ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρό
νου τύρσιν· ἔνθα μακάρων
νᾶσον ὠκεανίδες
αὖραι περιπνέοισιν· ἄνθεμα δὲ χρυσοῦ φλέγει,
...
ὅρμοισι τῶν χέρας ἀναπλέκοντι καὶ στεφάνους
But those with the courage to have lived three times in either realm, while
keeping their souls free from all unjust deeds, travel the road of Zeus to the
tower of Kronos, where ocean breezes blow round the Isle of the Blessed, and
flowers of gold are ablaze, some from radiant trees on land, while the water
nurtures others; with these they weave garlands for their hands and crowns for
their heads.
(Pindar Olympian 2.68-74, trans. Race 1997: 71)
Pindar’s heroic souls such as Peleus, Cadmus, and Achilles, after they have kept their
soul pure during the tripartite cycle of incarnations, dwell in a blessed afterlife. Likewise,
on the Petelia tablet after a soul pays the penalty: καὶ τότ᾽ἔπειτ᾽ἄ[λλοισι μεθ᾽]
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Graf and Johnston 2007: 101.

107

ἡρώεσσιν ἀνάξει[ς], “you will rule among the other heroes” (2.11, Graf and Johnston
2007: 7). Scholars have pointed out the similarity between Pindar’s Διὸς ὁδὸν (Ol. 2.70)
and the Hipponion tablet’s πιὸν ὁδὸν “sacred road” (1.15).260 In addition, I argue
Pindar’s tripartite formula ἐστρίς (Ol. 2.68) corresponds to a makarismos formula, which
grants heroization, such as on the Pelinna leaf (tablet 26a), which describes an initiate as
τρισόλβιε “thrice-blessed.”261 And on the Pherae leaf the initiate gives the tripartite
password: ἀνδρικεπαιδόθυρσον, after which he becomes ἄποινος, “reedemed” or
immortal.262 Succesfully paying the ποινή of the Titanic crime results in the initiate
becoming ἄποινος. The alpha-privative of this adjective articulates the distinction
between the initiated soul and other souls who have yet to pay a penalty.
Olympian 2 (line 74) and Thurii tablet 5 (line 6) both associate immortality with
the stephanos “victory crown.” The initiate who escapes the cycle of incarnation is
equated to a victorious and heroic athlete:
5 κύκλο δ᾽εξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο
6 ἱμερτο δ᾽ἐπέβαν στεφάνο ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισι·
7 Δεσσποίνας δὲ ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας Βασιλείας.
I have flown out of the heavy, difficult circle, I have approached the longed for
crown with swift feet, I have sunk beneath the breast of the Lady, the Chthonian
Queen.
(Thurii tablet 5.5-7, trans. Graf and Johnston 2007: 13)
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Willcock 1995: 159.
On Pelinna 26a, see Graf and Johnston 2007: 36-37 and my discussion above.
262
Pherae leaf: Σύμβολα· Ἀν<δ>ρικε- | παιδόθυρσον, ἀνδρικεπαι- | δόθυρσον· Βριμώ, Βριμώ.
εἴσιθ<ι> | ἱερὸν λειμῶνα· ἄποινος | γὰρ ὁ μύστης. | ΓΑΠΕΔΟΝ. “Passwords: Man-and-child-thyrsus.
Man-and-child-thyrsus. Brimo, Brimo. Enter the holy meadow, for the initiate is redeemed. GAPEDON
(apparently a nonsense word, written upside down)” (27 Graf and Johnston 2007: 39).
261
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Tablet 5 equates achieving immortality with winning a prize in a footrace. The stephanos
had ritualistic implications in Mystery cults since initiates were crowned like athletes.263
Likewise, in the epilogue of Isthmian 6, Pindar imparts immortality to the crowned hero:
φαίης κέ νιν ἄνδρ' ἐν ἀεθληταῖσιν ἔμμεν
...
πίσω σφε Δίρκας ἁγνὸν ὕδωρ, τὸ βαθύζωνοι κόραι
χρυσοπέπλου Μναμοσύνας ἀνέτειλαν παρ' εὐτειχέσιν Κάδμου πύλαις.
Among athletes . . . I shall offer them a drink of Dirce’s sacred water, which the
deep-bosomed daughters of golden-robed Mnemosyne made to surge by the
well-walled gates of Cadmus.
(Pindar Isthmian 6.72-75, trans. Race 1997: 193)
The Petelia tablet also imparts immortality to the crowned-initiate through Memory:
9 ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ προρέον τῆς Μνημοσύνης ἀπὸ λίμνης
...
11 καὶ τότ᾽ἔπειτ᾽ἄ[λλοισι μεθ᾽] ἡρώεσσιν ἀνάξει[ς].
12 [Μνημοσύ]νης τόδ<ε> ἔ[ργον
Grant me cold water flowing from the Lake of Memory
...
And thereafter you will rule among the other heroes.
This is the work of Memory.
(Petelia tablet 2.9-12, trans. Graf and Johnston 2007: 7)
Obbink (2014) maintained Pindar was disseminating some of the sacred Orphic doctrine
in Isthmian 6 as he does in Olympian 2, and, following Faraone (2002), Obbink argued,
“Pindar is alluding to the same myth and performative pattern found in the gold
leaves.”264 Perhaps it is only coincidence that Pindar’s heroic souls use golden leaves to
weave crowns in the afterlife, but the significance of Memory imparting and the use of
ποινή are unique conjunctions between Orphic eschatology and Pindar’s poetry, which
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See Euripides Bacchae 81 and Plato Republic 363cd, with discussion at Bernabé and Jiménez San
Cristóbal 2008: 123-124, and, more generally, Blech 1982.
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Obbink 2014: 308.
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suggest that Pindar performed a greater role in the development of the Orphic movement.
As Bruno Currie (2005) recently argued in his seminal work on Pindar and hero cult,
“Doctrines of rebirth and the immortality of the soul should be regarded as a development
of the general picture, not a wild deviation from it.”265 I argue that Pindar, just as Plato,
had access to Orphic texts, and he used his platform as an epinician poet in order to
disseminate the new ideas of Orphic personal salvation on a Pan-Hellenic scale. Pindar’s
wide assimilation of Orphic eschatology implies that his choice of themes and vocabulary
was a deliberate integration and assimilation of Orphic beliefs within epinician poetry. In
the following sections I explore the function of ποινή as an Orphic symbolon.

II.4 The Etymology of ποινή and τιμή

I have argued that the word ποινή used in Pindar’s fragment 133 retains its
original meaning of “blood-price” and that ποινή cannot be used interchangeably with
the word τιμή. In this section I explore the etymology of the two distinct terms. I have
already discussed the position of Benveniste who argued against an etymological
connection between the terms; however, Benveniste did point out that the terms are
semantically related and often thought to be derived from the same PIE root *kwei-.266
According to the linguist Pierre Chantraine (1968), the semantic field of τιμή “penalty” is
distinctly different from ποινή, although the words are often “contaminated.”267 But
according to Robert Beekes’ (2010) recent etymological study, the word ποινή and its
265

Currie 2005: 40.
Benveniste 1973: 340.
267
Chantraine 1968-1980: 925, “Le champ sémantique de ποινή est nettement différent de celui de τιμή,
bien que les deux familles de mots se soient parfois contaminées.”
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Indo-European root *kwoi-neh2- is ultimately derived from the IE verbal root *kwei-.268
Both Beekes and Chaintraine agree that the noun ποινή is etymologically related to the
Greek verb τίνω “to pay, atone, punish, avenge” through the shared Indo-European root
*kwei- “to punish, avenge.”269 However, they disagree on the connection between the verbs
τίνω and the τίω. Thanks to the reconstruction of Proto Indo-European, Beekes gives
evidence that τίνω is in fact cognate with τίω: “it is now customary to distinguish three
roots *kwei-: 1. ‘to observe’ (whence probably Gr. > τίω), 2. ‘to gather, pile up’ (whence
perhaps Gr. > ποιέω), and 3. ‘to punish, avenge’.”270 While these roots may be
customarily distinguished, Beekes gives us good cause to believe that they are in fact one
and the same, and he connects these semantically different verbs to the same IndoEuropean root *kwei-, which allows comparison of Indo-European cognates in Avestan,
Sanskrit, Anatolian and Lithuanian.271 Furthermore, Beekes points out that ποινή is
identical with Old Church Slavonic cena, which he glosses as the Greek word τιμή.272
Therefore, the noun τιμή “estimate, value, honor” but also “retribution” is derived from
the same Indo-European verbal root *kwei- as ποινή and τίνω.273 The separate families
τίω/τιμή and τίνω/ποινή are cognate from the same Indo-European root *kwei- and
belong to the same semantic field of economic terms. In addition to their shared field and
IE root, these words also appear in similar ritual and afterlife contexts in both Plato’s
dialogues and Orphic texts.
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The words in the *kwei- family developed differently from one another, such that
we can demonstrate distinct shades of meaning between terms like ποινή and τιμή.
However, some basic connections underlie the words in the family, allowing a certain
amount of semantic overlap. I suggest that the semantic overlap between both the
τίμη/τίω and ποινή/τίνω word groups allowed for terms in both groups to be used as
Orphic technical terms or symbola in specific eschatological and ritual contexts. I have in
mind specifically the phrase τίνειν τιμωρίας “to pay the penalty” in the Platonic Seventh
Letter, and suggest that this phrase refers specifically—albeit covertly—to the Orphic
myth of Zagreus because the phrase occurs within the context of a Hieros Logos and
speaks of the immortality of the soul. My argument is based on the semantic field
conveyed by τιμωρία, “penalty” or “retribution” and its nominal root τίμη “honor” or
“penalty” which has a shared meaning and is cognate with the term ποινή “blood-price”
or “penalty.”274 This argument is explored further in the following sections where I show
how the semantic field of the verbs τίω and τίνω function together in Orphic texts.

II.5 ποινή and Orphic Papyri

In the previous sections I have argued against the position of Edmonds regarding
the use of ποινή in fragment 133 of Pindar. Instead I have proposed that Plato transposed
the Orphic symbolon ποινή into his philosophical arguments for reincarnation and
anamnesis. But Edmonds also argues against the use of ποινή in Greek Papyri and he
274

“In Homer the word ποινή nearly always means ‘punishment’ or ‘revenge’ rather than ‘compensation’ .
. . there are only two instances in all Homer in which ποινή can formally be interpreted as wergeld”
(Treston 1923: 29). The first instance of Wergeld occurs in the speech of Ajax (Iliad 9.632-637): Treston
1923: 32.
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exploits the earliest attested Orphic evidence of ποινή in the Derveni Papyrus and the
Gurôb Papyrus in order to contend that ποινή does not have the sense of “bloodprice/penalty,” and therefore that the word does not have a specific technical meaning
within the Orphic discourse.
According to Edmonds, “the Derveni Papyrus provides an example of
recompense paid, not to Persephone, but to the spirits of the dead,”275 and he argues,
“Persephone’s ancient grief therefore belongs in this wider context of maiden stories
which are resolved by ritual honors to appease the Kore and avert her potential wrath, to
win her favor for the community and bring the benefits of fertility.”276 However,
Edmonds does not analyze in detail the specific usage of the word ποινή within these
maiden stories, and his best evidence concerning the use of ποινή within these stories is
attested only by later sources such as Pausanias.277 But since I argue ποινή is a
specifically Orphic term, it is necessary to analyze the usage of ποινή within the context
of attested Orphic beliefs, such as Plato’s discussion of the immortality of the soul in
Meno, as well as in cosmological and liturgical texts such as the Derveni Papyrus and
Gurôb Papyrus, and in the Orphic tablets from Thurii. In these texts the use of ποινή
occurs in specific contexts: belief in reincarnation relating to Persephone (Meno 81,
Thurian tablets), ritual relating to chthonic deities (Derveni Papyrus, Col.VI), and
chthonic Dionysus and Persephone (Gurôb Papyrus, Col. i.4). In other words the word
ποινή occurs in characteristically Orphic eschatological contexts.
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Martin West argued that the Derveni Papyrus belonged to an Orphic discourse,
which believed in salvation of the soul by Dionysus and he focused on the evidence of
column VI:
In my book [= West 1983], by analysis of the different Orphic theogonies, I came
to the conclusion that the Derveni poem belonged to that branch of Orphic
tradition which embraced the theory of reincarnation and a message of salvation
through Dionysus. In the Derveni text we see a man offering explanations of this
theogony and also of certain rituals, performed by initiates, which he connects
with the disembodied souls who are Eumenides; he speaks of Erinyes, of
daimons, of gods below, and of paying penalties to other-worldly powers. We
may guess that these things which he explains, the rituals and the theogony,
belonged together. The initiates that he mentions are those of an Orphic-Bacchic
cult society.278
I follow West’s observations and respond to Edmonds that the ποινή of column VI can
be the Orphic recompense paid to Persephone because she is traditionally associated with
“spirits of the dead” in her role as the Queen of the Underworld. I argue that column VI
contains several significant references to both Persephone and Bacchic ritual
characteristic of an Orphic milieu.
[εὐ]χ̣αι καὶ θυσ[ί]α̣ι μ[ειλ]ίσσουσι τὰ[ς ψυχάς,]
ἐπ[ωιδὴ δ]ὲ μάγων δύν[α]ται δαίμονας ἐμ[ποδὼν]
γι[νομένο]υς μεθιστάναι. δαίμονες ἐμπο[δών ὄντες εἰσὶ]
ψ[υχαὶ τιμω]ροί τὴν θυσ[ία]ν̣ τούτου ἕνεκε[µ] π̣[οιοῦσ]ι[ν]
οἱ μά[γο]ι, ὡσπερεὶ ποινὴν̣ ἀποδιδόντες. τοῖ‹ς› δὲ
ἱεροῖ[ς] ἐπισπένδουσιν ὕ[δω]ρ καὶ γάλα, ἐξ ὧνπερ καὶ τὰς
χοὰς ποιοῦσι. ἀνάριθμα [κα]ὶ πολυόμφαλα τὰ πόπανα
θύουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ψυχα[ὶ ἀν]άριθμοί εἰσι. μύσται
Εὐμενίσι προθύουσι κ[ατὰ τὰ] αὐτὰ μάγοις· Εὐμενίδες γὰρ
ψυχαί εἰσιν.

1

5

10

Prayers and sacrifices appease souls. And the song of the Magoi is able to
manipulate daimons which come into being on the path. Since Daimons on the
path are avenging souls, on account of this the Magoi make sacrifice, just like
atoning for the penalty. They pour water and milk on the offerings, from which
very ones they also make ‘chthonic libations.’ They sacrifice numberless and
278

West 1997: 84.
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many-knobbed cakes, because souls are also numberless. Initiates sacrifice first to
the Eumenides according to the same things as the Magoi; For the Eumenides are
souls.
(Derveni Papyrus, col. VI. 1-10 Betegh)
Several words set out the passage within the broader context of funeral rites. The verb
μειλίσσω (line 1) “to appease” carries funerary connotations. Among the various ways of
speaking of cremation or funeral rites, Homer once uses the phrase πυρὸς μειλισσέμεν
“to appease (the dead) with fire” (Iliad 7.410). The word τὰς χοὰς (line 7) is specifically
a libation made to the chthonic deities as we see in Homer’s Nekyia.279 In the Derveni
Papyrus, the libation consists of ὕ[δω]ρ καὶ γάλα, “water and milk,” (line 6) which is
similar to the libation in the Odyssey.280 It is within the broader context of funeral rites
and the afterlife that column VI should be interpreted.281 As West remarked, the rituals
depicted in the Derveni Papyrus are specifically Orphic.
The Greek word ἐπῳδή “song” (Line 2) is formally a song sung over a funeral
sacrifice.282 According to Plato the ἐπῳδή is able to appease or persuade in the same way
as a myth, it had the power to alleviate the fear of death, and it was also associated with
mystery rites.283 But a Magos is not exclusively a Persian priest; Graf argued that the
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Homer Odyssey 11. 26.
πρῶτα μελικρήτῳ, μετέπειτα δὲ ἡδέι οἴνῳ, τὸ τρίτον αὖθ᾽ὕδατι, “the first with honey-milk, the next
with sweet wine, and the third with water” (Od. 11.28-29).
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203, 220, 609-617.
282
According to Herodotus (i.132.3), the Magus is the Persian priest who sings a song of the birth of the
gods (ἐπαείδει θεογονίην τὴν ἐπαοιδήν) over a funeral sacrifice.
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Plato describes the persuasive power of myth as an enchantment: ἐπᾴδειν (Phaedo 114d7); τοῦτον οὖν
πειρῶ μεταπείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης,
ἐπᾴδειν αὐτῷ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας ἕως ἂν ἐξεπᾴσητε. “Therefore let me persuade him not to fear death just
like goblins. ‘Then it is necessary,’ Socrates said, ‘to charm him each day until he is deceived’”( Phaedo
77e-78a); Plato describes how a daimon’s function as an intermediary spirit between gods and men allows
priests to employ divinity through sacrifices, rites and chants: διὰ τούτου καὶ ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ
ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη τῶν τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδὰς καὶ τὴν μαντείαν πᾶσαν καὶ
γοητείαν, “every prophesy and the skill of the priests and of those concerned with sacrifices and rites and
spells and every mantic art and magic operates because of this (the function of daimons)” (Symposium
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Magos in the Derveni Papyrus belongs to the group of Orphic initiators.284 Furthermore,
Betegh pointed out that the Magoi sacrifice not simply τὰ πόπανα “cakes” (VI.7), but
specifically ἀνάριθμα [κα]ὶ πολυόμφαλα “numberless and knobbed cakes,” which
“were used in the mystic cults of Demeter and Dionysus.”285 Finally, the fact that in line 9
the μυσταί (“the initiates”) sacrifice in the same way as these Magoi implies the
commentator of the text is speaking about a rite associated with a mystery cult.
Following West and Graf, I maintain column VI should be interpreted within the
broader context of funeral rites characteristic of a Mystery cult. But more specifically
column VI describes a ritual for the appeasement of impeding souls associated with the
Eumenides, and, as Sarah Johnston (1999) explains, the column gives evidence for the
Erinyes in an eschatological context.286 As Johnston elucidates, “the priests of this
eschatologically oriented cult had to propitiate dangerous souls and perhaps also their
agents (the Erinyes) on behalf of those whom they were initiating before those initiates
could approach the gods.”287 Based on the eschatological function of the Eumenides in
the mystery rites depicted in column VI, I propose that the specific Orphic terminology
indicates these rites belong to an Orphic discourse.
The commentator of the Orphic text only identifies the Eumenides as souls at the
end of the column: Εὐμενίδες γὰρ ψυχαί εἰσιν “For the Eumenides are souls” (line 10).
The Eumenides were also known as the Erinyes, and by association with Hades and

202e-203a). The ἐπῳδή is also referred to in Euripides’ Cyclops (645) as the “song of Orpheus” which has
the power to automatically move the hot iron into the eye of the Cyclops.
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See Johnston 1999: 276-277. Sarah Johnston (1999: 252-253) says, “Crime between blood kin is by far
their predominant interest in late archaic and classical myth." But Johnston (1999: 257-258) points out that
sometimes the Erinyes are invoked outside of these familial relationships such as in Agamemmnon’s oath
sacrifice in Iliad 3. 279 (τίνυσθον).
287
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Persephone they also hear and answer the curses of parents.288 In the Iliad, the Erinyes
replace Hades and Persephone in a prayer: Γῆ τε καὶ Ἠέλιος καὶ Ἐρινύες, αἵ θ᾽ὑπὸ
γαῖαν, “Both earth and sun and Erinyes, who are under the earth” (Iliad 19. 259). This
suggests the Erinyes could stand in for the chthonic functions of Persephone.289 In fact
Homer identifies the Erinyes with the chthonic deities Hades and Persephone.290 The
Eumenides were said to be the daughters of Hades and Persephone in the Orphic Hymn to
the Eumenides, and they were again said to be the daughters of Persephone in the Orphic
Hymn to Persephone.291 Although Plato refers to Orphic Hymns in general, the antiquity
of the specific collection of surviving Orphic Hymns is contentious.292 Some scholars
assign the Hymns to the 6th century BCE, and other scholars to the late Byzantine era.293
The interpretation of the avenging Eumenides hinges on the word ἐμ[ποδὼν] (VI.
2, 3), which is usually interpreted as “impeding.” But its literal meaning is “at the feet”
and, I argue, metaphorically “on the path.” With this sense the phrase δαίμονες
ἐμπο[δών “Daimons on the path” (VI.2, 3) recalls Parmenides’ ὁδὸν δαίμονος, “the
road of the goddess” (Parmenides fr. 1.3-4 Tarán). Peter Kingsley argued that the
unnamed goddess who guides Parmenides is in fact the goddess Persephone.294
Parmenides’ goddess is even described as πρόφρων (fr. 1. 22 Tarán), an epithet used of
Persephone in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (494). Persephone is also described as
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πρόφρων (6.7 Graf) on an Orphic lamella from Thurii, which describes the initiate
paying the ποινή (6.4 Graf).
Edmonds adopts the reconstruction τιμω]ροί in line 4 of the Derveni Papyrus295
and reads it as “avenging” which affirms the argument that the souls or Eumenides “need
to be averted or appeased.”296 I also affirm this reconstruction but I argue that the word
τιμωροί means more than simply “avenging,” and functions in conjuction with the word
ποινή in the Papyrus. According to Beekes, “the word τιμωροί originally meant ‘to
preserve or guard τιμή’ from τιμάορος, a univerbation of the words τιμή ‘penalty’ and
ὁράω ‘to look over (protect).’”297 This definition of τιμή as a penalty is closer to the
sense of its relative ποινή. In fact the substantive τιμωροί is used frequently in the
Orphic Hymns to invoke the chthonic deities such as Dionysus, Persephone and the
Eumenides.298 Therefore, I argue the word τιμωροί is used on the Derveni Papyrus as an
epithet of specifically Orphic chthonic deities.
In Greek tragedy the Erinyes frequently identify themselves as Bacchic
maenads.299 The word τιμωροί, used to describe the Eumenides in the papyrus, is
intimately associated with Bacchic ritual sparagmos.300 The verbal derivative τιμωρέω
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occurs in Euripides’ Bacchae (1081), and I suggest we can use this Bacchic usage of
τιμωρέω to inform our reading of an Orphic-Bacchic ritual in the Derveni Papyrus. In
the Bacchae Dionysus commands the Maenads “to punish” Pentheus:
Διόνυσος, ἀνεβόησεν· Ὦ νεάνιδες,
ἄγω τὸν ὑμᾶς κἀμὲ τἀμά τ' ὄργια
γέλων τιθέμενον· ἀλλὰ τιμωρεῖσθέ νιν.
Dionysus shouted, “Young women!
I lead to you the one who set mockery
upon you and me and my rites!
Now punish him”
(Eurpides Bacchae 1079-1081)
As the worshipers and agents of Dionysus, the Maenads punish Pentheus for his crimes
against the Dionysus. Euripides uses the verb τιμωρέω to associate maenadic
punishment, i.e. sparagmos, with the verb τιμωρέω, which is marked by its single usage
in the play. In the Orphic Hymns the Erinyes are called τιμωροί and ἐρίβρομοι “loud
roaring,” an epithet otherwise used for Dionysus.301 Because of the Orphic context of the
Derveni Papyrus, I propose that the word τιμω]ροί (line 4) is informed by this Bacchic
subtext of ritualized punishment in the form of sparagmos.302 I argue that the Maenadic
subtext of the word τιμωροί and the frequent associations with the Eumenides to
Maenads suggests we can read the Eumenides in the Derveni Papyrus as performing an
Orphic function similar to that of Persephone, namely of accepting the penalty for the
murder of her son Dionysus. The connection between τιμωροί and the sparagmos of
Dionysus is articulated in the Derveni Papyrus by the use of ποινή (line 6). The
commentator of the Orphic text says that “Since Daimons on the path are avenging souls,
301

Orphic Hymn 69 Athanassakis 1977: 91.
Curiously, Dionysus is punishing Pentheus, whose name literally means “sorrow” and is the same word
as in Pindar’s fragment 133 concerning “the penalty of the ancient sorrow.” Does Euripides here allude to
the Hieros Logos about Dionysus?
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the Magoi do the sacrifice as if they are paying the blood-price” (ὡσπερεὶ ποινὴν̣
ἀποδιδόντες, VI.5).303 Here the commentator relates the word ποινή to the word
τιμωροί in an Orphic ritual context.
I argue the Eumenides, as the daughters or agents of Persephone, function as a
divine agent of vengeance on behalf of the goddess Persephone. I suggest the
commentator of the Orphic text calls the Eumenides daimones because, as Plato claims, a
daimon is an intermediary divinity, and therefore the Eumenides function as an
intermediary between the world of the living and the world of the dead.304 The μάγος is
able to manipulate (μεθιστάναι) these intermediary divinities through Bacchic-Orphic
rites. The context of column VI is within funeral rites, and their proper practice and
interpretation. These rites are Orphic because of the preliminary sacrifice to chthonic
deities.305 Therefore, I argue that in column VI of the Derveni Papyrus the Eumenides
function as Bacchic maenads who guard the ποινή on behalf of Persephone, and as
ψυχαὶ τιμωροί “vengeful souls” they perform Persephone’s Orphic function of
accepting the ποινή. I maintain that the occurrence of the terms ποινή and τιμωροί
indicate the author is referring to a specifically Orphic ritual.
The Gurôb papyrus provides some of the strongest evidence for the antiquity of
the Zagreus myth and its connection to the word ποινή. The third century BCE liturgical
text gives instructions for a ritual initiation (col. i.3) based around the death and rebirth of
Dionysus. The text invokes Demeter (col. i.5-7) and her Eleusininan cult title Brimo, as
303
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well as Dionysus and his Orphic cult title Eubouleus (col. i.18).306 Burkert identified the
Gurôb text as a Hieros Logos, and West pointed out the relevance to the Orphic poems of
the rites described in column I.307 According to Graf and Johnston, “the Gurôb text seems
to deal with ‘Orphic’ rites whose aim was salvation from afflictions.”308 The ritual
described in the Papyrus is performed for Persephone and Dionyus in payment for the
ποινή of lawless ancestors (col. i.4). I argue the use of the term ποινὰς suggests we are
dealing with the Orphic myth of Zagreus:
[ἕκ]αστα ἔ[χ]ων ἃ εὕρηι
τὰ] ὠμὰ δὲ συνλεγέ[τω
]... διὰ τὴν τελετήν.
δῶρον δέξ]ατ᾽ἐμὸν ποινὰς πατ[έρων ἀθεμίστων.
σῶισόν με Βριμὼ με[γάλη
5
Δημήτηρ τε Ῥέα [
Κούρητές τ᾽{ε} ἔνοπλοι [ ]ωμεν 7-8
ἵ]να ποιῶμεν ἱερὰ καλά
] νηι κριός τε τράγος τε
10
] ἀπερείσια δῶρα.
] ου καὶ ἐπὶ ποταμοῦ νομῶι
λαμβ]άνων τοῦ τράγου
] τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ κρέα ἐσθιέτω
]ος μὴ ἐφοράτω
15
]χου ἀναθεὶς εἰς τὸ ἀνηιρε
]αλων εὐχή
]νον καὶ Εὐβουλῇα καλῶμεν
]... εὐρήας κικλήσκωμεν
]... τε φίλους. Σὺ ἀπαυάνας
20
Δ]ήμητρος καὶ Παλλάδος ἡμῖν
Εὐβου]λεῦ Ἰρικπαῖγε
22a
σῶισόν με [ ]ητα
22b/23a
] εἷς Διόνυσος. Σύμβολα
23b
]υρα θεὸς διὰ κόλπου
ο]ἶν[ο]ν ἔπιον ὄνος βουκόλος
25
]...ιας σύνθεμα. ἄνα κάτω τοῖς
] καὶ ὅ σοι ἐδόθη ἀνήλωσαι
ε]ἰς τὸν κάλαθον ἐμβαλεῖν
κ]ῶνος ῥόμβος ἀστράγαλοι,
306
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]η ἔσοπτρος

30

…] having everything that he finds
…let him] collect the raw (meat)
...] on account of the ritual.
“[Receive my gift] as payment for law[less ancestors…
]Save me, Brimo, gr[eat
]and Demeter [and] Rhea [
]and the armed Curetes […]
]that we…
]so that we will perform beautiful rites
]…ram and he-goat
] immense gifts.”
] and along the river…
ta]king of the he-goat
]…let him eat the rest of the meat
]…let him not watch
]…, dedicating the chosen
]…Prayer:
“I call [Protogo]nos (?) and Eubouleus,
] I call the wide [Earth
]… the dear ones. You, having parched…
of De]meter and Pallas to us
Eu]bouleus, Irikepaios, save me
Hurler of lightn]ing…one(?) Dionysus. Passwords:
]…god through the bosom
]…I drank [wine?], donkey, herdsman
]…token: above below for the…
] and what has been given to you for your consumption
in]to the basket, and again
c]one (or spinning-top), bull-roarer, knuckle-bones
]mirror
Gurôb Papyrus Col.i (OF 31 Kern = fr. 578 Bernabé)
(trans. Graf and Johnston 1997: 188-190)
The fragmented column contains the technical term δέχομαι for receiving a ποινή
“blood-price,” which we have seen used in Homer, Pindar’s fragment 133, and the Gold
Tablets. The name Brimo was a commen epithet of Persephone, and the name in
conjunction with δέχομαι and ποινή is reminiscinet of the formulation in Pindar’s
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fragment 133.309 The ritual described in the Papyrus seems to offer salvation from the
ποινή “blood-guilt” of the murder of Dionysus, or in symbolic terms the salvation for the
soul from the body. In fact, the text also gives specific ritual symbola consisting of a
basket, a cone, a spinning top, knucklebones, and a mirror. These items are precisely the
toys used by the Titans to distract Dionysus before his dismemberment mentioned by
Clement of Alexandria in his explication of the Zagreus myth.310 The basket probably
refers to the cistae mysticae used in the mysteries of Dionysus.311 I allege that the
conjunction of Dionysus, Persephone, toys, and the accepting of ποινή is too specific not
to be the same story as Clement’s. I argue that the reference to ποινή indicates that the
Gurôb Papyrus is referring to Orphic rites related to Dionysus-Zagreus.

II.6 τίνειν τιμωρίας in Plato’s Dialogues

Plato uses many forms of the *kwei- root when speaking about death and the
afterlife, such as the marked usage of the term ποινή in the Meno, and the formula τίνειν
τιμωρίας from the description of the Hieros Logos quoted in the Seventh Letter. Plato
primarily uses the derivatives τιμωρία and τιμωρέω. The compound adjective τιμωρός
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For Brimo as an Orphic cult title for Persephone, see Graf and Johnston 2007: 133, 155.
ὡς ὁ τῆς Τελετῆς ποιητὴς Ὀρφεύς φησιν ὁ Θρᾴκιος· κῶνος καὶ ῥόμβος καὶ παίγνια
καμπεσίγυια, μῆλά τε χρύσεα καλὰ παρ' Ἑσπερίδων λιγυφώνων. “As Orpheus the Thracian poet of
the Mysteries says: pine-cone, a spinning top, and jointed dolls, and beautiful golden apples from the
clear-voiced Hesperides” (Clem. Alex. Protr. 2. 17. 2). Clement of Alexandria describes the toys or
symbola of the Bacchic mysteries in fuller detail: ἀστράγαλος, σφαῖρα, στρόβιλος, μῆλα, ῥόμβος,
ἔσοπτρον, πόκος, “a die, a ball, a spinning top, apples, a magic wheel, a mirror, a fleece” (Protr. 2. 18).
For a full discussion of these toys, see Guthrie 1993: 121. As Albinus (2000: 112n2) explains “the ‘Titanic’
toys are clearly ritual instruments, and the dismemberment may, on the symbolic level, quite safely be
regarded as an ordeal in the process of initiation.” For the use of the Titanic toys in Orphic mysteries, see
Levaniouk 2007: 175.
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For the κίστη in Orphic Mysteries, see Guthrie 1993: 122, Albinus 2000: 156; for the κίστη in
Eleusinian Mysteries, see Richardson 1974: 23, Leviniouk 2007.
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“protecting, protector, avenging, avenger” and its derivatives originally meant “to
preserve or guard τιμή.” 312 We saw the reconstructed form τιμωρός in column 6 of the
Derveni Papyrus in conjunction with the word ποινή. According to Plato, the verb
τιμωρέω “to take vengeance” is what Achilles does to Hector on behalf of his friend
Patroclus.313 In the Phaedo (62c), the verb is used of punishment for murder. Likewise, in
the Apology (39c) we learn that the τιμωρία is more difficult for the murderer than the
murdered, and τιμωρία is a response to the death of a loved one (Achilles and Patroclus),
but death also follows the avenger (Apology 28c). Achilles’ vengeance for Patroclus
brings a proportioned death for himself, and τιμωρία is equated with setting down δική.
In Plato’s earlier works we learn that τιμωρία means specifically the penalty for the
murder of a loved one, which manifests in the form of revenge. This definition is related
to the meaning of ποινή.
In the Laws, Plato defines τιμωρία as the penalty for murder (853a), but
specifically for the murder of kin (866b), and there are “punishments” in Hades (881a).
These uses of τιμωρία are similar to ποινή. In Book 10 Plato says the penalties are paid
to the gods (905a). The payment of a τιμωρία “penalty” to the gods is evocative of the
payment of ποινή to the goddess Persephone in Pindar’s fragment 133. But Plato’s usage
of the word τιμωρία is intimately connected with another deity: Dionysus.
In Book 2 of the Laws (672b), Plato proclaims that Dionysus established the
Bacchic rites in vengeance (τιμωρούμενος) because of his stepmother Hera:
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Beekes 2010: 1486.
See Plato Symposium 180a, Apology 28c. In Homer, Achilles’ rage is unleashed after the death of
Patroclos, and amid the murder he chooses Trojan youths to kill as a ποινή for the death of his companion:
ζωοὺς ἐκ ποταμοῖο δυώδεκα λέξατο κούρους | ποινὴν Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο θανόντος· “He
chose twelve living Trojan boys from the river as a blood-price for the death of Patroclos, son of
Menoetius” (Iliad 21.27-28). Here the word ποινὴν seems to have the sense of “revenge” equivalent with
τιμωρέω rather than the traditional meaning of Wergeld exhibited in Books 9 and 18.
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{ΑΘ.} Λόγος τις ἅμα καὶ φήμη ὑπορρεῖ πως ὡς ὁ θεὸς
οὗτος ὑπὸ τῆς μητρυᾶς Ἥρας διεφορήθη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν
γνώμην, διὸ τάς τε βακχείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν ἐμβάλλει χορείαν τιμωρούμενος·
[The Athenian:] A certain story and at the same time a tradition slips under in
some way, namely that this god [= Dionysus] was torn apart with respect to the
perception of his soul at the behest of his step-mother Hera; for this reason he
establishes both the Bacchic rites and all the mad dancing, in vengeance
(Plato Laws 672b)
The main verb of this sentence (διαφορέω) is traditionally translated as “robbed” or
“deprived” of his wits.314 The verb διαφορέω is the frequentative form of the more
common verb διαφέρω. But because of the Bacchic context of this passage, I argue we
can read the verb διαφορέω with a subtext of Bacchic ritual. In Euripides’ Bacchae, the
Messenger uses the verb διαφορέω to report the ritual act of sparagmos: ἄλλαι δὲ
δαμάλας διεφόρουν σπαράγμασιν. “And other Maenads were tearing apart young
cows in acts of sparagmos (ritual dismemberment)” (739). Euripides uses the same verb
in describing the act of ritual sparagmos at line 746 and 1210.315 In the Bacchae, the verb
διαφορέω appears to be a technical term for the ritual act of sparagmos. Plato frequently
uses the noun διάφορος “different,” and the verb διαφέρω, but Plato rarely uses the
verb διαφορέω.316 Therefore, I argue this usage of the verb διαφορέω indicates that the
term is highly marked. Due to the term’s technical usage in Bacchic ritual as indicated by
the Bacchae and the Bacchic context in which Plato deploys the term, I argue that Plato is
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See Saunders 1970: 113: “There is a little-known current of story and tradition which says that Dionysus
was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Hera, and that he gets his revenge by stimulating us to Bacchic
frenzies.”
315
θᾶσσον δὲ διεφοροῦντο σαρκὸς ἐνδυτὰ “the garments of flesh were torn apart quicker” (Euripides
Bacchae 746); ἡμεῖς δέ γ' αὐτῆι χειρὶ τόνδε θ' εἵλομεν | χωρίς τε θηρὸς ἄρθρα διεφορήσαμεν. “But
we at any rate with our own hand seized him and we tore apart the limbs of the beast” (ibid. 1209-1210).
316
See Lexicon Platonicum 515. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 85c, Letter 7, 351b, 337d.
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referring to a “secret” alternative interpretation in the same way as he refers to the myth
of Zagreus through the marked term ποινή in the Meno.
Plato presents this Bacchic story in the Laws as a Λόγος, and in particular it is a
Λόγος that “flows under,” which suggests Plato is alluding to a secret or hieratic
tradition.317 To describe the psychological result of Dionysus’ sparagmos conveyed in the
verb διαφορέω, Plato uses the word τιμωρούμενος, a participle form of the verb
τιμωρέω. In Euripides’ Bacchae Dionysus commands the Maenads “to punish” Pentheus
via sparagmos using the verb τιμωρέω in the single marked usage of the word in the
play. Likewise, Socrates in the Apology says the judges have the power “to punish” using
the verb τιμωρέω in a single marked usage within the Orphic eschatological context of
the dialogue, as I discussed in Chapter One above.318 Because of the semantic and
etymological connections between the verb τιμωρέω and ποινή, I propose that within
Orphic-Bacchic contexts both terms can refer to the Orphic Dionysus-Zagreus myth. I
argue the marked status of these terms (τιμωρέω, ποινή) points to the ritualistic
importance of their interpretation, and if my reading of a Bacchic subtext of sparagmos
in the passage quoted from the Laws is correct, then there can only be one possible story
that Plato is alluding to—the myth of Dionysus-Zagreus.319
Plato concludes this Bacchic passage by arguing that wine is in fact not a
“punishment” to make humans mad but rather a remedy (φάρμακον) for the health of
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Herodotus at ii.61, 86, 132, 170 uses the formula “it is not pious for me to say” when referring to myth
of dismemberment of Osiris (cf. Kahn 1997: 57); This suggests that there was also a certain degree of
secrecy involved with the complementary myth of the dismemberment of Dionysus. Burkert (1987: 73)
says: “Herodotus [ii.171] considered it a secret although he has several allusions to it.”
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τιμωρεῖσθέ Euripides Bacchae 1081; τιμωρήσασθε, Plato Apology 41e. See the following sections for
a full discussion.
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According to Obbink: “The rise of humankind from rebellion and guilt is re-enacted as an initiatory
pattern embedded in the political order and the life-cycle. This pattern is paralleled in Mesopotamian
anthropogony and reflected in the imagery of the gold leaves” (Obbink 1997: 51). Albinus (2000: 112)
argues the Zagreus myth “alludes to a ritual process of initiation.”
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the soul (Laws 672d). Plato’s phrasing here is evocative of the Orphic Pelinna leaves,
which say, “you have wine as your fortunate honor,”320 as well as Plato’s Orphic
description of the afterlife as an endless symposium.321

II.7 τιμωρία and Underworld Geography

Plato frequently uses the word τιμωρία and its derivatives in eschatological
arguments. This section deviates from my central argument in order to point out the
ubiquity of Plato’s use of τιμωρία, as well as to point out some of Plato’s geographical
descriptions. In Plato’s eschatological descriptions in Republic and Gorgias we learn that
there are “punishments” for the unjust in Hades as well as in life. Glaucon’s brother
Adeimantus uses the abstract noun form τιμωρήματα “penalties” (Republic 363e). A
wrongdoer happens upon τιμωρίας “penalties” (Gorgias 472d), and although a
wrongdoer is already wretched (ἄθλιος), he becomes more wretched by not paying the
penalty (Gorgias 472e). But punishment also makes human souls better (Gorgias 525b),
although that is not the case for Tantalus, Sisyphus, and Tityus: τοὺς ἐν Ἅιδου τὸν ἀεὶ
χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, “they suffer punishments in Hades for all-time” (Gorgias
525e). In Book X of the Republic Plato describes the journey of the warrior Er to the
Underworld. Using the words δίκας and τιμωρίας Er describes the “judgments and
penalties” of those in Hades before they return to a second life.
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Νῦν ἔθανες καὶ νῦν ἐγένου, τρισόλβιε ἄματι τωῖδε.εἰπεῖν Φερσεφόνεg σ᾽ ὅτι Β<ακ>χιος αὐτὸς
ἔλυσε…οἶνον ἔχεις εὐδαίμονα τιμήνν “Now you have died and now you have come into being, O thrice
happy one, on this same day. Tell Persephone that the Bacchic One himself released you. . . you have wine
as your fortunate honor” (Tablet 26a Pelinna Graf and Johnston 2007: 36-37).
321
Plato Republic 363cd.
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Plato’s eschatological emphasis on δικαστάς “judgement” in the afterlife is
typically considered to be a unique fabrication of Plato, which has no Orphic precedent.322
But the appearance of Minos as a judge in the Underworld is as old as Homer (Odyssey
11.568), and the notion of judgment was also a prevalent theme in Greek mystery cults.323
The Eleusinian goddess Persephone was understood to be a sort of judge in the afterlife.
According to Nicholas Richardson in his masterful commentary on the Homeric Hymn to
Demeter, “Either a failure to honour Persephone is classed as ἀδικία or the consequences
of ἀδικία could be avoided by honouring Persephone,” and “Homer shows traces of a
belief in Hades and Persephone as guardians of justice.”324 The fact that Plato innovated a
new class of judges in the afterlife based on traditional themes (Minos, Rhadamanthus, et
al.) is an outcome of the transposition process, but does not discredit Plato’s borrowing of
Orphic themes, as can be seen in the connection between Plato’s geographical
representation of judgment in the afterlife and that of the Orphic Gold Tablets.
In the Gorgias (524a), Plato says the judges of the Underworld make judgment at
a meadow at a crossroads, one path leading to the Isles of the Blessed and the other to
Tartarus. This eschatological scheme is similar to the scheme on the longer tablets from
Hipponion, Petelia, and Entella (1, 2, 8 Graf and Johnston).325 The initiate is presented
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Bernabé and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 54.
For a discussion on the analytical approaches to the authenticity of Odyssey 11, see Heubeck and
Hoekstra 1989: 77. The dating of Homer’s Nekyia is contested by some scholars; see, for instance,
Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 84, Johnston 1999: 7n3. For Judgment and Punishment in Orphic cult, see Rohde
1925: 344, Guthrie 1993: 156.
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Richardson 1974: 274, 272.
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Compare the shorter tablets, which tell the initiate to drink at the Cypress. The cypress functions as a
marker or landmark in the Underworld, and does not have an inherent right or wrong significance; the
cypress can be used to mark the right or the wrong direction. See Edmonds 2010: 226 for discussion.
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with two directions, one to the white Cypress, and the other to the spring of Memory.326
In the Laws (625b), Plato describes the road from Knossos to the temple of Zeus as full of
groves of Cypress trees and meadows. Plato depicts the tree as an image of relief from
the long road, and he perhaps alludes to the topography of the Underworld of the Tablets
where the Cypress offers refreshment for souls. Likewise, scholars contest that there are
no guides depicted on the tablets. I argue that the Gold Tablets themselves function as
guides for the afterlife. Furthermore, the cypress serves as the guide, since the bright
white of the cypress contrasts from the darkness of Hades, thus offering a guiding light in
the Underworld.327 Perhaps we can compare this imagery to Plato’s description of the
tripartite soul in the Phaedrus (253d) where it is the white horse that guides the soul
upward to gaze upon the Forms. The soul’s horses are yoked in pair and fight with one
another which direction to go—and the image of yoked horses moving in different
directions recalls the forked path in the underworld depicted on the Gold Tablets. It is the
initiated soul that knows the correct path in the Underworld just as Plato’s white horse
ascends to lead the soul to the banquet of the gods.

II.8 τιμωρία in Plato’s Apology, Cratylus, and Phaedo
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The tablets from Hipponion and Entella say the cypress is on the right, whereas the Petelia tablet says
the cypress is on the left. Edmonds solved this problem by pointing out that “the actual choice (right or left)
is less important than the fact that knowing the correct path is the key” (Edmonds 2010: 222).
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Compare the psychopomp Hermes who leads the souls of the suitors past a white rock, which stands out
from the gloom of Hades (Odyssey 24.11). Compare Odyssey 10.515 for a rock at the entrance to Hades;
the “white island” Leuke is where heroes end up in the afterlife (cf. Proclus’s epitome of the Aethiopis 2628). For White Rock in Hades, see Nagy 1990: 224-227. On the “white cyprus tree” in Hades, see Bernabé
and Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008: 25-28.
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In the previous sections I have pointed out the connections between ποινή and the
related forms of τιμωρία, and Plato’s frequent deployment of this specific terminology
that I argue can be characterized as Orphic. Finally let us return to Plato’s passages from
the Apology, Cratylus, and Phaedo discussed in Chapter One. At the end of his defense
speech Socrates equates dying to being released from troubles (ἀπηλλάχθαι
πραγμάτων, Apology 41d), and he then describes the judges of the Apology with the
power “to punish” (τιμωρήσασθε, Apology 41e). Plato only uses the aorist imperative
τιμωρήσασθε once in the Apology; it is therefore a marked term, and and I argue Plato is
drawing attention to it in the same way as he draws attention to the word ποινή, which is
only used once in his dialogues.328 Euripides also uses the present tense imperative
τιμωρεῖσθέ in the Bacchae in a marked usage.329 But as I have argued the word
τιμωρήσασθε also has etymological and semantic connections with ποινή. I contend we
can read a veiled reference to the Zagreus myth because of Plato’s use of this specific
terminology (τιμωρήσασθε) within the Orphic context that he has established in the
Apology. I argue Plato uses the word τιμωρήσασθε in order to frame the afterlife judges
as Bacchic Maenads.
Ιn the Cratylus (400c) Plato attests to the Orphic belief σῶμα/σῆμα and he
incorporates the verbal root of ποινή (τίνω) in his deployment of the form ἐκτείσῃ, the
aorist of ἐκτίνω “to pay in full,” a compound of the verb τίνω. I conjecture we can
confirm the σῶμα/σῆμα belief expressed in the Cratylus as an authentic Orphic doctrine
based on Plato’s use of the verb τίνω. As I have argued the verb τίνω is related to a
family of words that express economic ideas of exchange and debt that include
328

Euripides imbues the Maenads of the Bacchae with the same verb (τιμωρεῖσθέ, 1081) and the poet also
marks the term by its single usage in the play.
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Euripides Bacchae 1081.
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ποινή/τίνω and τιμή/τίω. I propose Plato created an eschatological system imbedded in
this family of words that refers specifically to the Orphic central belief of salvation for
the soul by paying a debt to Persephone. In the Cratylus, Socrates explains the etymology
of the word “body” and he explicitly identifies it as an Orphic etymology:
{ΣΩ.} Τὸ σῶμα λέγεις; {ΕΡΜ.} Ναί. {ΣΩ.} Πολλαχῇ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτό γε· ἂν
μὲν καὶ σμικρόν τις παρακλίνῃ, καὶ πάνυ. καὶ γὰρ <σῆμά> τινές φασιν αὐτὸ
εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι· καὶ διότι αὖ τούτῳ
<σημαίνει> ἃ ἂν σημαίνῃ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ταύτῃ “σῆμα” ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι.
δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς
δίκην διδούσης τῆς ψυχῆς ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα δίδωσιν, τοῦτον δὲ περίβολον
ἔχειν, ἵνα <σῴζηται>, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο,
ὥσπερ αὐτὸ ὀνομάζεται, ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα, [τὸ] “σῶμα,” καὶ
οὐδὲν δεῖν παράγειν οὐδ' ἓν γράμμα.
[Socrates:] Do you mean the body? [Hermogenes:] Yes. [Socrates:] This name
[sōma “body”] seems to me to work in many different ways, and if someone alters
it a little, there would be even more. For indeed some say it is the tomb of the
soul, as if (the soul) is buried in the present moment; and furthermore because the
soul indicates whatever it indicates with it [i.e., the body], for this reason (the
body) is also called correctly “sign.” However, the Orphics330 seem to me most
likely to have given this thing [the body] its name, since the soul is paying the
penalty which it pays, and it has this as its enclosure (i.e., the body), just like a
prison, so that it is kept safe (or saved); and therefore that this is the “body” of the
soul, just as the thing itself is called, until (the soul) can pay off what it owes in
full, and it is not even necessary to change a single letter.
(Plato Cratylus 400c)
Scholars have long argued that the σῶμα/σῆμα idea discussed here is a reference to a
central Orphic belief.331 I suggest that the occurrence of the word ἐκτίνω (ἐκτείσῃ)
within this specifically Orphic context of Cratylus 400c adds to the evidence that the
σῶμα/σῆμα idea is an authentic Orphic belief. Because ἐκτίνω is cognate with ποινή, I
argue that Plato is using the verb ἐκτείσῃ as a direct, albeit symbolic reference to the
330

I translate the phrase οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα, literally, “those men about Orpheus” as denoting a specific group
that can be identifed as “Orphics.” Edmonds (2013:198) argues that the term “Orphics” is first applied to
people in the second century CE, but, as I have argued above, I view Orphism as an active cult with
specific beliefs and customs dating as early as Pindar (mid-6th cent. BCE).
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Rhode 1925: 342, 355n43, 359n73, 484n44, Guthrie 1993: 156-157, Edmonds 2013: 291.
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myth of Dionysus-Zagreus. Furthermore, Plato is alluding to three etymologies in this
passage: (1) body is “tomb” of the soul, activiting one meaning of sōma; (2) body is
“sign” of the soul, activating a second meaning of sōma; (3) the body is what “securely
keeps” (sōzetai) the soul, like a prisoner in a prison, until his penalty is paid. This third
etymology is specifically marked as “Orphic” (οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα), and in that context the
etymology is linked to the Orphic Hieros Logos. The phrases δίκην διδούσης ... ἕως ἂν
ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα indicate both legalistic (in which someone ‘pays a penalty’:
implying judgment) and economic contexts (ἐκτείσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα). If the body is a
prison in which the soul is held fast until a penalty is paid—a penalty levied by a judge to
make good for a specific debt—then, by extension, life in this world is a punishment that
can only be escaped through initiation into cult mysteries. Here Plato transposes the
Orphic ideas of debt and judgment by deploying an Orphic etymology, and using a form
of the verb τίνω.
As introducted in Chapter One, in Plato’s Phaedo Socrates explains that the soul’s
immortality hinges on an “ancient belief” that men are in a sort of prison. This belief is
explicitly presented as a Hieros Logos at 62b:
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ
ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ'
ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν·
The story about these things which is told in secret, that we humans are in sort of
prison and we certainly must not release oneself from it nor run away from it,
seems to be both great and not easy to understand.
(Plato Phaedo 62b)

132

Plato’s word ἀπόρρητος “secret” is used elsewhere specifically to refer to the
Mysteries,332 which suggests that Plato is alluding to a “secret” story known only to
initiates, and that Socrates is using the authority of this “secret story” to explain why it is
not right to kill oneself. The story explains that humans are in a sort of prison (ἔν τινι
φρουρᾷ); Socrates then poses a rhetorical question:
Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ
ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν
αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν;
If one of your possessions killed itself when you did not indicate that you wish it
to die, would you not be angry at it, and would you not punish it, if you had some
punishment?
(Plato Phaedo 62c)
Here, I argue, Plato uses a key Orphic term τιμωρία emphatically within the context of a
discussion on the body as a φρουρᾷ “prison.” Burkert (1985) argued that Plato’s
repetitive use of the unusual word φρουρά indicates that this word was a symbolon used
to indicate a secret interpretation for initiates in Orphic cult.333 In his commentary on
Plato’s Meno, R. S. Bluck pointed out that Plato’s pupil Xenocrates “associated the bodyprison idea with the Titans and with Dionysus.”334 In turn, I contend that Plato’s idea of
the soul’s imprisonment at Phaedo 62b is a reference to the myth of Dionysus-Zagreus
because in the myth the Titans represent the prison for the immortal soul represented by
Dionysus. I maintain that the φρουρά indicates the body or Titanic portion following the
interpretation of Plato’s pupil Xenocrates, and Plato’s use of τινι in the Phaedo (ἔν τινι
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Burkert 1985: 276. Albinus (2000: 156) argues the aporrheton was a taboo on divulging or imitating the
Mysteries “outside the proper frame of ritual.” The rites of Dionysus are called ὄργιον ἄρρητον “a secret
rite” at Orphic Hymn 52.5 (Athanassakis 1977). See Edmonds 2013: 129 for a different argument, namely
that the use of terminology like “secrets” in the context of mystery rites is part of a rhetorical device
employed to enhance a speaker’s expertise in arcane matters.
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φρουρᾷ, 62b) emphasizes the Titans through the indefinite pronoun’s suggestion of a
certain portion, i.e., the body. This argument follows Yates’ detailed investigation into
the Titanic origins of men: “the Titans as the principle of separation are responsible for
the world of plurality.”335 The Titans as the Hesiodic strivers against the Olympians
function as the principle of the separation of the soul from the gods and its banishment
into a physical body.
As Burkert affirmed: “the dismemberment of Dionysos was an unspeakable
doctrine of the mysteries,” I argue that this Dionysus-Titan myth circulated as part of an
original secret Orphic initiate myth or Hieros Logos. 336 Plato’s use of the word τιμωρία
within the context of mystery religion indicates that he is using it as an Orphic term.
Plato’s use of specific terminology (τιμωρία and ποινή) related to the repayment of the
soul’s “debt” is a philosophical transposition of the ritual function of symbola in the
Orphic rites of Dionysus.
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Plato’s Orpheus: Concluding Remarks
At the end I return to the beginning with the problem of Plato’s Orphica. The
question of how to read Plato’s duplicitious Orphica can be read from a Minimalist
perspective as Plato’s incorporation of polemical or extra-ordinary rhetoric, or from a
Maximalist perspective as Plato’s reading and incorporation of the foundations of an
authentic doctrine. In this thesis I have focused on a collection of Plato’s Orphic
fragments and followed the Maximalist stance in reading them as references to a unified
Orphic doctrine. I have shown that throughout his dialogues Plato systematically borrows
and transposes Orphic formulae within eschatological contexts in the pursuit of his own
philosophical agenda.
A genuine reading of Plato shows that the philosopher was responding to the
Orphic tradition in the eschatological branch of his philosophy. In my thesis I have
shown how Plato appropriates Orphic formulae into his own philosophy but additionally I
have confirmed the existence of a genuine Orphic discourse by reading Orphic texts in
order to read Plato. Because of Plato’s systematic deployment of Orphic formulae I have
claimed that we can reconstruct a doctrine of the Orphic tradition, and moreover that the
consistency in Plato’s use of Orphic formulae points to the cohesiveness of the Orphic
doctrine. This sacred doctrine or Hieros Logos included the belief in the immortality of
the soul and its divine lineage, but also its corruption and punishment in the mortal body.
This punishment of mortality or the cycle of rebirth, represented by the formula
life/death/life, was symbolically represented as ποινή, a word which conveys both the
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idea of the primordial blood-guilt of the death of Dionysus but also the basic sense of a
debt that must be payed off until the initiate becomes redeemed (apoinos) and once again
dwells among the gods. Plato transforms the elements of this sacred doctrine into the
foundations of his own philosophy and as a result we can trace the Orphic tradition
through his appropriation of formulae.
I have relied on a philological approach to read Plato’s Orphica by first
identifying specific terminology used formulaically in Orphic texts and then performing a
close reading of Plato’s frequent use of this same terminology. My approach has revealed
a connection between form and function such that Plato’s formulaic use of Orphic ritual
symbola constitutes a ritualization of his philosophy. In Chapter One I set out the idea of
a Hieros Logos and the use of passcodes or symbola in Orphic texts such as life/death/life
or body/soul, which I identify as formulae. I showed how Plato invokes a Hieros Logos
and uses formulae within eschatological contexts in order to promote his philosophical
ideas. In Chapter Two I investigated the Zagreus myth and its connections to the Orphic
symbolon ποινή and its cognates and I worked specifically toward the arguments of
Edmonds because his arguments represent the strongest opposition to the authenticity of a
unified Orphic doctrine.
In response to Edmonds’ argument I maintain that the word ποινή must have the
primary meaning of “blood-price” in Pindar’s fragment quoted by Plato in the Meno that
therefore points to the Orphic myth of the dismemberment of Persephone’s son Dionysus.
However, I also hypothesize that the word ποινή could have the double meaning of a
“blood-price/penalty” and “ritual honor” because the Orphic initiate receives the ritual
honor of a blissful afterlife after paying the blood-price. From this perspective the word

136

ποινή functions as an Orphic symbolon as I have defined it in Chapter One. Orphic
symbola in particular and Greek words in general often perform this broad semantic
function. Both the payment of cultic honors to the goddess for her traumatic rape and
recompense paid for the murder of kin involve a debt and payment between two parties.
According to Sallustius, the Mysteries interpreted the myth of the rape of Persephone by
Hades as the descent of the soul into the body.337 Therefore, I conjecture that the
Eleusinian myth of the rape of Persephone could have been a complementary myth to the
Orphic myth of the dismemberment of Dionysus evoked by the term ποινή. The soul
represented by Dionysus descends into the body represented by the Titans, just as
Persephone descends into Hades. According to this interpretation of the myth, these
traumatic experiences (rape and murder of kin) both seem to depict a transformation from
the divine into the corporeal. I suggest that the ποινή or “debt” can be interpreted as the
Orphic “cult honor” paid to Persephone for both the traumatic crime of her rape and the
murder of her son Dionysus. In this sense the Greek verb τελέω “to be initiated into the
Mysteries” gains new meaning, since the verb at its earliest usage also meant, “to pay off
what is owed,” and thus at its most basic form the Mysteries can be understood as an
institution for paying off the primordial debt.
Finally I hypothesize that all of Edmonds’ required strands of the DionysusZagreus myth can be interpreted from column VI of the Derveni Papyrus.338 The
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Sallustius tells us the Hymn to Demeter was allegorically interpreted in the Mysteries as the descent of
the soul represented by Persephone into matter represented by Hades: ἡ τῆς Κόρης ἁρπαγὴ
μυθολογεῖται γενέσθαι, ὃ δὴ κάθοδός ἐστι τῶν ψυχῶν, “the rape of Κούρη is mythologized to become
that which is certainly the descent of souls” (De deis et mundo 4.11.5).
338
Edmonds 2013: 297: “Scholars weave together four strands into this central mythic narrative: the
dismemberment of Dionysus-Zagreus by the Titans, the punishment of the Titans by Zeus, the generation
of human beings from the ashes of the lightning-blasted Titans, and the burden of guilt that human beings
inherited from their Titanic ancestors because of original sin. I argue to the contrary that this ‘Zagreus
myth’ (as I will refer to this construct of the four elements) is a modern fabrication.”
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dismemberment of Dionysus and the punishment of the Titans are both evoked by the
Maenadic subtext of ritualized sparagmos by τιμω]ροί (Column VI.4 Tsantsanoglou),
and symbolized by the Mystery cult sacrifice of ἀνάριθμα τὰ πόπανα “numberless
cakes,” a phrase which evokes the division of Dionysus by the Titans. The anthropogony
of humans from the Titans is alluded to by the appearance of the Eumenides, who
according to Hesiod were the offspring of the Titans Gaia and Kronos.339 The Dionysian
aspect of the anthropogony is indicated by the use of daimones in the column because
according to Plato, in the context of discussing the Bacchic afterlife in the Phaedo, a
daimon is a personal soul; moreover, according to Euripides, Dionysus is called a
δαίμων in Bacchic cult.340 I suggest a daimon as a personal soul in Plato’s terms can be
interpreted as the microcosmic portion of the macrocosmic daimon Dionysus. In column
VI the Eumenides are explicitly called divine through the designation daimones, but they
also retain their Titanic origin. Finally, the inherited guilt can be inferred from the use of
the Orphic term ποινή.
I have demonstrated a view of Orphism independent from the historical Orpheus
and a definition for Plato’s Orphica separate from Plato’s negative view of Orpheus.
Plato was not only assimilating and transposing Orphic teachings, but he was actively
participating in Orphic ritual through his use of formulae and thereby transmitting Orphic
tradition through his philosophical writings. When all the archeological and literary
evidence is brought into perspective, the Mysteries appear to have been a highly
organized cult-system with branches spread throughout the ancient Greek world, from
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Hesiod Theogony 176.
See Plato Phaedo 107d: “the daimon to whom each was alloted in life”; Euripides, Bacchae 417: ὁ
δαίμων ὁ Διὸς παῖς “the daimon is the son of Zeus”; Euripides, Bacchae 498: λύσει μ' ὁ δαίμων αὐτός
“the daimon himself will release you.”
340
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Eleusinian, to Bacchic, and even Pythagorean practices. Scholars have demonstrated that
Orphism was a reformation of other mystery cults, and in turn I claim Plato’s philosophy
was a reformation of Orphic ideas. I maintain that Plato was reproducing Orphic myths;
the Platonic doctrine of the immortal and divine soul is an illumination of Orphic
doctrine, and therefore investigating Plato’s Orphica is a most reliable way of
reconstructing Orphism.
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